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“That Teenage Feeling: Affect and Queer Adolescence in the Mid-Twentieth Century 
American Novel,” examines three queer coming-of-age novels: Vladimir Nabokov’s 
Lolita, Richard Wright’s Native Son, and Carson McCullers’s The Member of the Wedding. 
At first blush, these works may not seem “traditionally” queer, as the protagonists are 
not explicitly gay characters. Yet these characters participate in non-heteronormative, 
even deviant, sex acts, display gender mutability or instability, and, most significantly, 
fail to “grow up.” Their thwarted development is paralleled by the stalled narrative 
movement of the texts. These novels are derailed coming-of-age stories whose queer 
characters never reach maturity, and their narratives reflect the delayed temporality of 
perpetual adolescence. The teenage angst found in these works is not merely a character 
trait, but a narrative device. The “weak” emotions Lolita, Bigger Thomas, Frankie 
Addams and John Henry West experience, which include boredom, indolence, and 
disaffection, perform the narrative work of stalling the linear, forward progress of the 
text. Although a growing body of literary criticism is informed by affect studies—the 
interdisciplinary study of the way human feelings are socially and culturally 
understood and constructed—current scholarship has yet to account for the role weak 
affects play in literature and culture. While weak affects are often read as feelings that 
fail to effect political action, I follow Roland Barthes’s classification of many of these 
emotions as manifestations of what he names the “Neutral,” a figure for the disruption 
of meaning-producing paradigms—the social, cultural, and linguistic mechanisms 
 through which interpretations of human experience emerge. As contemporary queer 
theory has noted, non-progressive, atemporal, non-reproductive narratives are often 
unintelligible in a society that values cultural narratives of progress, productivity, and 
reproduction—narratives queer sexuality disrupts. Rather than simply gazing at the 
ruined lives and bodies of queer kids in the U.S., well-trodden critical ground, “That 
Teenage Feeling” investigates the relationship between queerness, affect, and narrative 
temporality in these works in order to argue for a way of thinking of queerness as 
temporal. 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE QUEER TEMPORALITY OF ADOLESCENCE: ROLAND BARTHES, 
AFFECT, AND NARRATIVE 
“That Teenage Feeling: Affect and Queer Adolescence in the Mid-
Twentieth Century American Novel,” examines three queer coming-of-age 
novels: Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita, Richard Wright’s Native Son, and Carson 
McCullers’s The Member of the Wedding. At first, these works may not seem 
“traditionally” or canonically queer as their protagonists are not explicitly gay 
characters. Yet these adolescents participate in nonheteronormative, even 
deviant, sex acts, display gender mutability or instability, and, most 
significantly, fail to “grow up.”  I figure queerness in these novels broadly to 
include instances of homoerotic or homosexual behavior, as well as 
nonheteronormative behavior, including rejections of or exclusions from the 
domain of reproductive futurity.  The thwarted development of these 
adolescent characters is paralleled by the stalled narrative movement of the 
texts themselves.  These novels are derailed coming-of-age stories whose 
queer characters never reach maturity, and their narratives reflect the delayed 
temporality of perpetual adolescence.  In each novel, the text finds its 
narrative duration in the lack of developmental progress of its youthful 
characters. Their nonheteronormative desires and behavior delay or prevent 
entrance into a dominant, heteronormative social order in the plot, and the 
narrative pace reflects this delay.  Scholars Heather Love and Kathryn Bond 
Stockton, among others, have argued that a cultural focus on linear and 
reproductive progress models has led to the historical and literary 
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characterization of queer figures and narratives as “backward” or “sideways.”  
The queer adolescents in these novels, however, are closer to static figures; 
they fail to progress or reproduce and actively eschew productivity.     
These narrative and textual delays frequently correspond with the 
ineffectual affects experienced by the characters.  The teenage angst and 
stubbornness found in these works is not merely a character trait, but a 
narrative device.  The “weak” emotions Lolita, Bigger Thomas, and Frankie 
Addams experience, which include boredom, indolence, anxiety, and apathy, 
also perform the narrative work of stalling the linear, forward progress of the 
text.  Unlike strong emotional states, such as anger, which often prompt 
powerful, immediate (re)actions, weak feelings of annoyance, weariness, 
laziness, or nervousness are largely states of inaction that simply endure.  
Sianne Ngai claims such “ugly feelings” “tend to interfere with the 
outpouring of other emotions.  Moods like irritation and anxiety, for instance, 
are defined by a flatness or ongoingness entirely opposed to the ‘suddenness’ 
on which Aristotle’s aesthetics of fear depends.  And unlike rage, which 
cannot be sustained indefinitely, less dramatic feelings like envy and paranoia 
have a remarkable capacity for duration” (7).  The adolescent affects I examine 
in these novels share this “capacity for duration,” which in turn establishes the 
narrative duration of the text.   
Reading the relationship of affect to narrative temporality in these texts 
from Roland Barthes’s work on feeling and narrative to recent queer theory 
and criticism on the function of literary affect by scholars such as Love, Ngai, 
Stockton, Sara Ahmed, Lee Edelman, Elizabeth Freeman, and Eve Kosofsky 
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Sedgwick shows how the figure of the perpetual adolescent paradoxically 
serves both generative and disruptive narrative functions in these novels.  
Although weak affects are often read as feelings that fail to effect political 
action, I follow Roland Barthes’s classification of many of these emotions as 
manifestations of what he names “the Neutral,” a figure for the disruption of 
meaning-producing paradigms—the social, cultural, and linguistic 
mechanisms through which interpretations of human experience emerge.  As 
contemporary queer theory has noted, non-progressive, atemporal, non-
reproductive narratives are often unintelligible in a society that values cultural 
narratives of progress, productivity, and reproduction—narratives queer 
sexuality disrupts.  Rather than simply gazing at the ruined lives and bodies 
of queer kids in the U.S., well-trodden critical ground, “That Teenage Feeling” 
investigates the relationship between queerness, affect, and narrative 
temporality in these works in order to argue for a way of thinking of 
queerness as temporal.  Reading the temporality of these novels as both 
influenced and constituted by the queerness of the narrative offers a fuller, 
formal understanding of these adolescents in ways unaccounted for by genre-
based, biographical, nationalist, or historical critiques.  
As the objects of study in this dissertation are grouped under a 
historical conception of time—the mid-twentieth century—questions of 
history and nationhood loom large. Indeed, a wide range of questions might 
be addressed in terms of the historical conditions that brought about the 
emergence of the category of the teenager and the (re)definition of adolescence 
in the United States in the twentieth century. Thinking through the 
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distinctions between the three types of adolescents at work in these texts helps 
contextualize the figure of the twentieth-century queer adolescent. These three 
types of adolescents include the actual lived lives of “real” historical 
adolescents, the fictional adolescent characters that exist in the world of the 
novels I address, and the figural adolescent that haunts these works.    
There is no shortage of sociological studies, psychological case 
histories, government commission reports, or historical surveys on the topic of 
“real” twentieth-century adolescents.  Despite this volume of scholarship, 
however, no one seems to agree on the conditions for the historical emergence 
of the American adolescent, the significance, or usefulness of the category.  
Most believe the societal invention of the adolescent or teenagers1 to have 
taken place at some point in the past between the late-nineteenth century and 
the 1950s—a rather broad historical range—due to factors such as 
industrialization, economic changes to society, shifts in family size, changing 
attitudes toward debt and consumerism, and the role of children within the 
labor market.  More slippery, however, is the significance (or necessity) of 
discussing adolescence as a social category.  While there are, objectively, 
twelve to twenty-year-old individuals who exist at any given point in history, 
the characteristics, motivations, and societal roles of this group is still up for 
debate.   
A cursory perusal of sociological texts published in the early and mid-
twentieth century reveals that certain perceived characteristics of youth stood 
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out as distinct or troublesome.  In 1927’s What Ails Our Youth?, George A. Coe 
writes, “[young people] are getting on the nerves of many members of the 
older generation, though on different nerves and for very different reasons” 
(vii).  Coe goes on to list, “The faults that everybody notices—the baggage,” 
which include “Craze for excitement; immersion in the external and the 
superficial; lack of reverence and of respect; disregard for reasonable restraints 
in conduct and for reasonable reticence in speech; conformity to mass 
sentiment—‘going with the crowd’; lack of individuality; living merely in the 
present, and general purposelessness” (2).  Sound familiar?  Such complaints 
might be just as easily applied to the 1920s young people who populated 
Theodore Dreiser’s fiction as to today’s youth as a recent (April 25, 2011) New 
York Times article demonstrated when it proclaimed the current generation of 
young people to be narcissists.  According to University of Kentucky 
psychologist Nathan DeWall, “Late adolescents and college students love 
themselves more today than ever before” (Tierney D1).  Tell it to Clyde 
Griffiths.  Coe does wonder whether there is anything “new” about any of 
this, but proceeds to outline what is ailing 1920s youth and ends with a call to 
make Christianity more appealing to young people in order to fix their 
priorities. 
By 1940—the same year Native Son was published—the question shifted 
to “Youth—Millions Too Many?” in a book of the same name by Bruce L. 
Melvin.  Melvin’s text features a Foreword by Eleanor Roosevelt who invokes 
                                                                                                                                       
1 Some critics use these terms interchangeably, while others use adolescence to 
mark a wider age range than 13-19 year olds, showing that the very category 
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the language of futurity in regard to adolescents: “No one who studies the 
world picture today can fail to see that youth is the determining factor in the 
civilization of the future.  Whether our democracy succeeds depends on co-
operation with youth” (5).  Melvin addresses the effect of unemployment on 
youth in the wake of the Great Depression and warns: 
The clamor of youth is increasing.  For some years now young people 
have believed that conditions would be righted; they were told that the 
inability to secure gainful work was a temporary episode.  They no 
longer believe this statement; their experience before the factory doors 
and on the farms belies it.  Their temper is such that they could easily 
respond to demagogic leadership.  (9) 
Appearing at the height of Hitler’s organization of German youth during 
World War II, the book evinces a fear of unemployed and otherwise 
unoccupied young people.  The evilness of idle hands in this worldview 
ranges from “Thrill seeking [which] is bad medicine for young people” (116) 
to the threat of mobilization by a demagogue such as Hitler.   
In 1957, two years after Lolita’s publication, The American Teenager, a 
book based on studies by social scientists at Purdue University and published 
by H. H. Remmers and D. H. Radler, attempts to “delineate a serious 
problem—the problem of the American teenager and the beliefs he holds” (7).  
These problematic beliefs, according to Remmers and Radler, primarily seem 
to be a susceptibility to McCarthysim by virtue of their easily impressionable 
nature: “The typical teenager believes himself incapable of deciding what’s 
                                                                                                                                       
of adolescence is unfixed and malleable.  
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best for him.  He thinks behavior can—and should—be scrutinized by police, 
using wiretapping as a legitimate source of evidence.  He endorses censorship 
of books, newspapers, magazines and other media as protection of the public 
against improper ideas” (7).  Teenagers in all of these depictions become a 
blank slate upon which a society projects its fears about brainwashing and 
susceptibility to external influences, from Nazism to McCarthyism to the 
implied, but unstated risk of engaging in sexual deviance, including 
homosexuality.  As Stockton writes, “the gay child lights up the problem of 
History.  Lying outside of historians’ focus—not yet ‘in’ it—the gay child 
illuminates precisely what histories have not seen” (8-9).  It is true that none of 
these works explicitly addresses queer adolescents, yet all speak directly to 
heteronormative societal expectations, including marriage and reproduction 
as key to retaining the fabric of democracy and a productive society.   
The problem of History is not simply that of queer invisibility—an 
issue tackled by numerous queer theorists over the past twenty years.  It is 
what this invisibility itself highlights—that history sees what it wants to see, 
the figurative teenager.  These historical, sociological texts seem to point, 
paradoxically, to a figurative adolescent apart from “real,” historical ones.  
Even as these texts cite surveys and interviews with actual teenagers, the 
picture that emerges repeatedly is that of a figurative compilation of the 
“typical” adolescent as impressionable, disagreeable, emotionally volatile, and 
generally unpleasant.  Such a figure forms a potential counterpoint to the 
figure of the innocent Child who must be protected at all costs. The imaginary 
Child for whom the future is held in “perpetual trust,” as Edelman argues 
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(11).  The adolescent is the figure of a dangerous, temporary state of 
uncontainment where the normative linear trajectory from an assumed 
asexual childhood to adult reproductive sexuality is threatened with the 
possibility of derailment and haunted by the specter of teens who might 
choose, or be pressured, tricked, or otherwise lured off this normative path.  
While children must protected from everyone, teenagers must be protected 
from their own impressionable natures, and others must be saved from their 
volatility.  The figure of the queer adolescent then, is the figure for both 
uncontained, non-linear growth, to borrow from Stockton’s formulation of 
“sideways” growth in children, and a non-progressive form of spreading that 
threatens reproductive futurism through its stalling of the heteronormative 
progress of “growing up.”  
Adolescents are sponges or indiscriminate consumers in the 
sociological works I have cited—eagerly absorbing momentary diversions or 
prettily disguised ideology without the wisdom to be circumspect about their 
influences.  The significance of having such easily influenced teens, however, 
is always the same, and frequently expressed using a rhetoric of futurity: “The 
present generation of youth of high school age will be responsible for carrying 
on the business of life tomorrow.  It is, therefore, of great practical importance 
to obtain if possible a continuous inventory of their views on matters of 
common concern” (Remmers 9).  The business of tomorrow—the business of 
democracy—is, of course, predicated on “the teenage boy or girl’s ultimate 
development into a responsible husband or wife, father or mother.  It’s only a 
short jump from high school to marriage and parenthood” (Remmers 79).  
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Each successive generation frets about a future left to the youth of today—a 
population seemingly apart from, if not actively hostile toward the norms and 
expectations of a dominant social order.  This is what makes fictional 
adolescents such interesting objects of study.  They are stuck in time, while the 
novels that contain them are not.  As such, we are forced to understand these 
adolescents both as they were and as they are now—a challenge that 
ultimately tells us more about the reader’s conception of adolescents than the 
figures themselves.  
Both contemporary and historical accounts of adolescence posit a 
prelapsarian past devoid of difficult teenagers and an imagined future now 
dependent upon the choices they make.  This formulation of adolescents links 
their “in-between” state—not quite children, not yet adults—to a larger 
conception of time in which the desires of the present must be contained in 
order to ensure the future good of society.  It also sacrifices any investigation 
of adolescence not in relation to the past or the future, because the very 
category is defined by its temporal relationship to both.  Adolescents cannot 
exist without a relationship to a futurity that anticipates their maturation—the 
point at which they cease to be adolescents at all.  Queer adolescents with their 
stalled, thwarted, or otherwise nonnormative developmental progress, can 
scarcely hope to obtain any sense of intelligibility within such conditions, as 
the following chapters will explore.  The fictional adolescents in these novels 
share much in common with the twentieth-century figural queer child who 
embodies the kind of non-linear growth that paralyzes forward progress and 
stalls a narrative of growing up into reproductive adulthood.  Significantly, 
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many of the characteristics attributed to both “real” and figurative teenagers 
hinge upon their emotional states.  In the novels I examine, the affective lives 
of teenagers inform the stalled narrative movement of the texts themselves. 
Literary critics have primarily addressed children in nineteenth and 
twentieth-century literature, rather than adolescents or teenagers specifically, 
though there is significant overlap in these porous categories.  The 2004 edited 
volume of essays, Curiouser: On the Queerness of Children specifically addresses 
how “There is currently a dominant narrative about children: children are 
(and should stay) innocent of sexual desires and intentions.  At the same time, 
however, children are also officially, tacitly, assumed to be heterosexual” (ix).  
However, as Stockton notes, “scholars of childhood were turning the child 
even queerer, even as they didn’t see, or never said they saw, the ghostly gay 
child (in the fictions) around them.  In point of fact, there has been no 
monograph yet on the queer child—no historically layered, theoretical view of 
this matter in Anglo-American literature, film, theory, or even cultural 
studies” (10).   
Rachael McLennan claims in Adolescence, America, and Postwar Fiction, 
her study of post-1950 American novels, that adolescence is often figurative 
and notes: 
In many critical discussions and dominant constructions of the subject, 
adolescence bears little resemblance to a stage of development 
experienced differently by individuals (which it is), but is in effect 
employed metaphorically in academic discussion as a figurative 
container for the uncontainable [.  .  .] adolescence has been made to 
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mean that which it is not—American identity, or the world.  (27)   
It is surely tempting to read adolescence as a metaphor for a young nation or a 
relatively young national literature, especially in a text like Lolita where its 
theme of old world European sophistication (or pretension) meeting callow, 
gaudy Americaness is, as many have argued, made manifest in the figures of 
Humbert and Lolita respectively as they chase different sorts of amusements 
and delights across the geography of a United States vividly evoked in 
descriptions of roadside attractions, diners, and motels.  Likewise in criticism 
of Native Son, Bigger has frequently been read as a symbolic figure for the state 
of U. S. race relations.  Yet reading these adolescent characters solely as 
symbols or metaphors does little justice to them, just as the plots of the novels 
they inhabit.  In some ways, thinking of Lolita-as-metaphor or Bigger-as-
symbol is easier than thinking through the other kinds of narrative work these 
characters do, which is what my emphasis on affect, queerness, and 
temporality investigates in the following chapters.  In exploring the 
temporality of adolescence in terms of stalling or narrative delay, I focus on 
the paradoxically active work accomplished by weak or neutral affects in 
terms of prolonging this “in-between” time and how it feels to live there.   
As Edelman notes in No Future, the symbolic figure of the child as 
representative of the future of a dominant social order does not correspond to 
real children, historical or otherwise.  In an undergraduate course I have 
taught on coming-of-age narratives, I often pair J. D.  Salinger’s novel The 
Catcher in the Rye, with Audre Lorde’s semi-autobiographical 
biomythography, Zami.  These works concern the same time and place (a 
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postwar New York City), yet the characters are worlds apart.  Although both 
are teenagers temporarily on their own in the city during the same historical 
time period, the experiences of an economically disadvantaged queer black 
girl and a wealthy white boy are so radically different that it becomes nearly 
impossible to imagine these characters interacting with each other or 
responding to the same cultural or social forces.  Such is the trouble with 
historical or sociological studies of adolescence in general.  Trying to explain 
“kids these days,” necessitates a certain amount of generalization that is 
ultimately unhelpful in understanding specific teenagers, let alone fictional 
ones, which is why the turn to the figural is important to an understanding of 
these works.  
Roland Barthes, Affect, and Narrative Temporality 
Contemporary queer theory that engages with questions of affect often 
relies upon psychoanalytic readings of trauma, or Kleinian theories of object 
relations, or, via Sedgwick, investigations of Silvan Tomkins’s theories of 
affect and response.  While these analyses are undeniably valuable, outside 
such readings lies an underutilized source for thinking feelings—Roland 
Barthes’s poststructuralist work on language, affect, and meaning. 
Barthes’s insistence upon choosing the pleasurable as the most 
important, if not the only, object of study has threatened to render him a 
suspect scholarly figure even as it makes his work all the more appealing to 
queer theory.2  His 1973 work, The Pleasure of the Text, like his later book, A 
                                                
2 See D. A. Miller’s Bringing Out Roland Barthes (1992) for a sustained queer 
engagement with Barthes’s work.   
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Lover’s Discourse (1977), takes a disavowed affect and brings it into intellectual 
discourse.  Richard Howard, Barthes’s frequent translator, describes A Lover’s 
Discourse as “a way to speak pleasure” and asserts that in The Pleasure of the 
Text Barthes creates a “difficult (because supposedly inexpressible, apparently 
ineffable) achievement, an erotics of reading” (PT viii).3  In his 1977-1978 Collège 
de France lecture course on “The Neutral,” his notes for which were published 
as The Neutral in 2002, Barthes chooses his vacation home library as the source 
for the readings through which he will describe his desire for the Neutral.  
This seemingly arbitrary library of intertexts constitutes “a place-time where 
the loss in methodological rigor is compensated for by the intensity and the 
pleasure of free reading [my emphasis]” (9).  In each case, emotional states 
serve as the basis for critical interpretation.   
Camera Lucida (1980) takes a different culturally circumscribed affect as 
its subject matter—grief.  Barthes embraces pleasure and boredom (even 
considering one a type of the other), and love and mourning as ignored or 
unthinkable discourses and positions them as intelligible sites of meaning 
production.  For Barthes, weariness and grief specifically, are affects rendered 
unintelligible by society.  In The Neutral, Barthes identifies weariness as “an 
intensity,” but asserts, “society doesn’t recognize intensities” (TN 18).  Society 
discourages the expression of intense affects, especially those construed as 
ineffectual.  In terms of grief, society “codifies mourning in order to assimilate 
it: after a few weeks, society will reclaim its rights, will no longer accept 
                                                
3 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text (1973).  Page references follow the 
abbreviation PT in the text. 
 14 
mourning as a state of exception [.  .  .] Today the right to mourning [is] very 
reduced—right to mourning: to be inscribed in the social claims (utopias?): 
sick leave for pregnancy, for mourning .  .  .” (TN 17).  Society makes specific 
expressions of grief intelligible in order to control them.  Barthes chafes at 
such restrictions on intense feelings, frequently choosing them as his object of 
study. 
In Mourning Diary, the recently published text of the diary Barthes 
began keeping after his mother’s death until nearly his own (from 1977-1979), 
he writes of the intensity and duration of the non-productive emotions 
experienced in his state of mourning: “The measurement of mourning.  
(Dictionary, Memorandum): eighteen months for mourning a father, a mother 
[Barthes’s emphasis]” (19).  This entry highlights the arbitrariness of the length 
of time society (represented by the dictionary, an agreed-upon authority that 
exists to codify meaning) will recognize feelings of grief, a duration that bears 
little relationship to the feelings experienced by the subject.  Yet Barthes sees a 
paradoxically productive core to intensely weak, non-productive, or neutral 
affects writing, “Weariness is thus creative, from the moment, perhaps, when 
one agrees to submit to its orders” (TN 20).  Such Neutral affects can be 
generative as well as paralyzing.  A meditation on mourning, Camera Lucida’s 
genesis is noted in a 1978 diary entry: “My haste (constantly verified in recent 
weeks) to regain the freedom (now rid of delays) of getting to work on the 
book about Photography, in other words, to integrate my suffering with my 
writing.  Belief and, apparently, verification that writing transforms for me the 
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various ‘stases’ of affect, dialectizes my ‘crises’” (MD 105).4  Here Barthes 
aligns his feelings of intense grief with inactivity, stasis, but also ascribes 
generative capabilities to them—they allow the production of writing.  The 
“weak” affects Barthes describes as figures of the Neutral share these qualities: 
they are intense feelings (though are not recognized by society as such) with a 
long duration, which seem ineffectual because they are not associated with 
action or (re)production.  They also, paradoxically, are generative in the sense 
that they “baffle” paradigms through their suspension of conflict.  In other 
words, they accomplish something by accomplishing nothing for a long 
period of time.  In Camera Lucida, intense feelings of grief form the basis for a 
new epistemology after Barthes grew weary and frustrated with available 
interpretive practices that failed to offer a viable method for addressing 
intense, weak emotions.  This mode of affective reading and the affirmation of 
the critical efficacy of such practice permeates Barthes’s late works.  This focus 
renders Barthes a particularly compelling figure for the reading of desire and 
loss. 
Barthes provides us with a way of thinking about affect and desire 
through a formalist approach that privileges aesthetics and accounts for the 
role of narrative structure and its relationship to temporality.  In this, Barthes’s 
work on the concept of “the Neutral,” one that he continually revisited and 
revised in myriad formations throughout his work, from Writing Degree Zero 
in 1953 to Camera Lucida in 1980, holds particular promise as a reading 
                                                
4 Roland Barthes, Mourning Diary (October 26, 1977-September 15, 1979).  Page 
references follow the abbreviation MD in the text. 
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practice.  Barthes defines the Neutral as “that which outplays {déjoue} the 
paradigm, or rather I call the Neutral everything that baffles the paradigm.  
For I am not trying to define a word; I am trying to name a thing: I gather 
under a name, which here is the Neutral” (TN 6).  For Barthes, the desire for 
the Neutral is the desire to suspend the meaning-producing conflict between 
two oppositional terms (or subjects, or bodies, etc.).  An early example he 
provides is the case of grammar in languages which have only masculine and 
feminine nouns, where a neuter (neutral) third term would destabilize the 
masculine/feminine binary that requires a choice and produces meaning—the 
word must be one or the other in order to be intelligible as a concept (things 
that are masculine cannot be feminine and vice versa, thus we know the 
essential property of both is an exclusion from the other).  The desire for the 
Neutral is the desire to temporally suspend such a choice or conflict; a desire 
that Barthes acknowledges might be impossible. 
For Barthes, locating the figure of the Neutral constituted a mode of 
“looking for my own style of being present to the struggles of my time” (TN 
8).5  With this statement, Barthes assigns a political potential and ethical 
sensibility to the Neutral, any third term that destabilizes or “baffles” an 
oppositional binary or paradigm, thus upsetting both conventional meanings 
and ways of making meaning (TN 6).  Barthes used the figure of the Neutral to 
articulate an ethics of living guided by pleasure and nuance, and a 
corresponding reading practice rooted in affect.  Barthes describes the “non-
                                                
5 Roland Barthes, The Neutral: Lecture Course at the Collège de France (1977-1978).  
Page references follow the abbreviation TN in the text. 
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progressive” affects I’ve touched upon, including anxiety, weariness, and 
boredom, among others, as figures of the Neutral.  These feelings and the 
thoughts and behaviors that accompany them (silence, retreat, and oscillation, 
to name a few) signify a stalled cultural narrative.  They are the paradoxical 
feelings with the potential to evacuate meaning from dominant paradigms.  
Barthes sees a potential to disrupt or unsettle progress narratives in the 
dilatory affects he aligns with the Neutral.  
Affects associated with the Neutral are both passive and intense; 
boredom becomes a type of “hysteria” and weariness has an intensity to it in 
his readings of “weak” affect.  He notes that the passive (in)action he 
associates with the Neutral is not positively received: “everywhere in the doxa 
the Neutral has a bad press: the images of the Neutral are depreciative. Each 
bad image is locked into a bad adjective” (TN 69).  Barthes lists these “bad 
adjectives” as “thankless,” “shirking,” “muffled,” “limp,” “indifferent,” and 
“vile”—all adjectives that can also be applied to the teenage protagonists in 
the novels I examine (TN 69-72).  Similarly, Ngai argues that ugly feelings 
“can be described as ‘semantically’ negative, in the sense that they are 
saturated with socially stigmatizing meanings and values (such as the 
‘pettiness’ one traditionally associates with envy); and as ‘syntactically’ 
negative, in the sense that they are organized by trajectories of repulsion 
rather than attraction, by phobic strivings ‘away from’ rather than philic 
strivings ‘toward’” (11). What I refer to as “neutral” affects then are not 
neutral in the sense that they have neither positive nor negative connotations, 
but rather in the Barthesian sense of the Neutral as a disruption with intensity 
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and duration. Thus in noting that anxiety, for example, is often considered a 
“weak” affect as it is not an emotion that leads to swift physical, political, or 
narrative action, I am also arguing that the sheer duration of a bout of anxiety 
itself performs the action of delaying action. In other words, these feelings that 
do not appear to do very much politically or otherwise are actually 
performing the work of narrative stalling.  Barthes’s work on the Neutral and 
his oeuvre in general thus provides a useful lens through which to view the 
recent turn to affect in literary theory, a turn which significantly finds much of 
its force in contemporary feminist and queer theory, as I discuss in the final 
section of this introduction. 
Throughout his oeuvre, Barthes moves from discussing figures of the 
Neutral as objective, “innocent” writing that exists in absence, in negative 
space, or as a pure mathematical equation or algorithm in Writing Degree Zero 
(1953) to positioning it as the impossibly messy space that unsettles binaries 
and destabilizes meaning—the structural third term that “baffles paradigms” 
and becomes both a site for and source of pleasure in his 1977 lecture series.  
Barthes’s shifting methodologies, both in sync with theoretical movements of 
the time and otherwise, were a result of a constant search for the ineffable, for 
the utopic alternative to currently understood or fashionable ways of creating, 
experiencing, and expressing meaning.  Locating this hypothetical space of the 
Neutral was an enduring objective of Barthes’s work.  In his experimental 
autobiography Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes (1975), he writes:  
Evidently he dreams of a world which would be exempt from meaning 
(as one is from military service).  This began with Writing Degree Zero, 
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in which is imagined ‘the absence of every sign’ [.  .  .] Yet for him, it is 
not a question of recovering a pre-meaning, an origin of the world, of 
life, of facts, anterior to meaning, but rather to imagine a post-meaning: 
one must traverse, as though the length of an initiatic way, the whole 
meaning, in order to be able to extenuate it, to exempt it.  (87)            
The next section explores the ways a desire for the Neutral permeates many of 
Barthes’s texts in order to show the usefulness of the concept for reading the 
relationship of affect to narrative temporality.  Tracing Barthes’s recursive 
reflections on the figure of the Neutral in its myriad constructions through 
several key texts including Writing Degree Zero (1953), Elements of Semiology 
(1964), “The Grain of the Voice” (1972), The Pleasure of the Text (1973), Roland 
Barthes by Roland Barthes (1975), and The Neutral (1978) with recourse to several 
interviews given by Barthes and collected in The Grain of the Voice (1981) 
allows a fuller understanding of the Neutral’s relationship to temporality.  In 
the last section, I focus on A Lover’s Discourse and Camera Lucida to show how 
the temporal qualities of the Neutral as related to certain affects, and in 
conjunction with contemporary queer theory related to these concepts, 
provides a useful theoretical framework for my readings of queer desire and 
narrative in Lolita, Native Son, and The Member of the Wedding. 
Mapping the Neutral: 1953-1980 
Barthes’s desire for the Neutral first emerges in Writing Degree Zero 
(1953), his response to Sartre’s 1947 work, What is Literature?, where the 
Neutral is named “zero-degree writing,” which is writing “basically in the 
indicative mood, or if you like, amodal” or a “transparent form of speech” 
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(WDZ 76, 77).6  Zero-degree writing exists outside of ideology (or mythology 
in Barthes’s parlance), “it achieves a style of absence which is almost an ideal 
absence of style; writing is then reduced to a sort of negative mood in which 
the social or mythical characters of a language are abolished in favour of a 
neutral and inert state of form” (WDZ 77).  Barthes briefly summarizes the 
trajectory of the history he means to trace, with its emphasis on semiotics and 
linguistics, from inception to the envisioning of a “utopia of language” (or the 
logical end of said trajectory) predicated on the (im)possibility of escaping an 
existing literary sign system:  
From an initial non-existence in which thought, by a happy miracle, 
seemed to stand out against the backcloth of words, writing thus 
passed through all the stages of a progressive solidification; it was first 
the object of a gaze, then of creative action, finally of murder, and has 
reached in our time a last metamorphosis, absence: in those neutral 
modes of writing, called here ‘the zero degree of writing’, we can easily 
discern a negative momentum, and an inability to maintain it within 
time’s flow, as if Literature, having tended for a hundred years now to 
transmute its surface into a form with no antecedents, could no longer 
find purity anywhere but in the absence of all signs, finally proposing 
the realization of this Orphean dream: a writer without Literature [my 
emphasis].  (WDZ 5)   
In this passage, writing comes into existence because it is capable of being the 
                                                
6 Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero (1953).  Page references follow the 
abbreviation WDZ in the text. 
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passive receptor of action—another’s gaze, the figural victim of murder.  As 
object, it receives the action of the subject, yet when writing-as-object 
eventually reverses this trend toward solidification, erasing its antecedents, it 
begins to disappear, moving backwards into an erasure of presence, into the 
void of its origins.  The Neutral shares a close relationship with temporality—
it is always the province of a moment, unsustainable and destined to be 
rewritten as history.  The “negative momentum” Barthes describes here 
characterizes the potential of neutral writing to hinder the forward movement 
of narrative and, I argue, stymie progress narratives.  For Barthes the Neutral 
is not passive, it “doesn’t refer to ‘impressions’ of grayness, of ‘neutrality,’ of 
indifference.  The Neutral—my Neutral—can refer to intense, strong, 
unprecedented states.  ‘to outplay the paradigm’ is an ardent, burning 
activity” (TN 7).7  Thus while affects such as boredom or anxiety are passive in 
nature, they perform the paradoxically active behavior of disrupting dominant 
paradigms.  Barthes seems to envision a writing that moves from something to 
nothing, but sees this as a significant nothing as he clarifies in Elements of 
Semiology: “The second problem arising in connection with privative 
opposition is that of the unmarked term.  It is called the zero degree of the 
opposition.  The zero degree is therefore not a total absence (this is a common 
                                                
7 The link between Writing Degree Zero and The Neutral has not gone 
uncommented upon.  Barthes himself answers the question, “What have you 
become in relation to the author of Writing Degree Zero?” in a 1974 interview 
by stating, “I will say that I don’t think I’ve changed much.  I love and 
comment on the same things, the same values that appeared in Writing Degree 
Zero: language, literature, and that very notion of ‘degree zero’ which refers to 
the utopia of a lifting of signs, an exemption from meaning, an indivision of 
language, a transparency of social relations” (GV 194-195). 
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mistake), it is a significant absence.  We have here a pure differential state; the 
zero degree testifies to the power held by any system of signs, of creating 
meaning ‘out of nothing’ [Barthes’s emphasis]” (77).  “Zero” operates here as a 
placeholder—an absence with meaning.   
Just as Barthes claims that zero-degree writing exists in the absence of 
signs in Writing Degree Zero, in The Neutral he asserts: “the Neutral is the 
shedding of meaning: all ‘planning’ (thematic grouping) on the Neutral would 
fatally lead to an opposition between the Neutral and arrogance, that is, to 
reconstituting the very paradigm that the Neutral wants to baffle: the Neutral 
would become discursively the term of an antithesis: in displaying itself, it 
would consolidate the meaning it wanted to dissolve” (TN 12).  This is exactly 
what happens to the Neutral—it reconstitutes paradigms by becoming part of 
one, only to fall again at the introduction of a new Neutral in a seemingly 
endless cycle.  He writes, “The paradigm, what is that?  It’s the opposition of 
two virtual terms from which, in speaking, I actualize one to produce 
meaning” (TN 6-7).  Throughout his career, Barthes investigated the ways in 
which oppositional binaries and paradigms create meaning in language.  In 
1964, he wrote:  
The internal arrangement of the terms in an associative or paradigmatic 
field is usually called—at least in linguistics, and more precisely, in 
phonology—an opposition.  This is not a very good denomination, for on 
the one hand it presupposes too much the antonymic character of the 
paradigmatic relation (Cantineau would have preferred relation, and 
Hjelmslev correlation), and on the other hand, it seems to connote a 
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binary relation, about which there is no certainty that it is the 
foundation of all semiological paradigms.  We shall, however, keep the 
word, since it is accepted [Barthes’s emphasis].  (ES 73-74)8 
He began to find such divisions, or the desire for them, pleasurable by 1975: 
For a certain time, he went into raptures over binarism; binarism 
became for him a kind of erotic object.  This idea seemed to him 
inexhaustible, he could never exploit it enough.  That one might say 
everything with only one difference produced a kind of joy in him, a 
continuous astonishment.  Since intellectual things resemble erotic 
ones, in binarism what delighted him was a figure.  Later on he would 
find this (identical) figure again, in the opposition of values.  What (in 
him) would deflect semiology was from the first the pleasure principle: 
a semiology which has renounced binarism no longer concerns him at 
all.  (RB 51-52)9 
In 1977, he makes the disruption of paradigms the focus of his lecture course:  
[A]ccording to the perspective of Saussure, to which, on this matter, I 
remain faithful, the paradigm is the wellspring of meaning; where there 
is meaning, there is paradigm, and where there is paradigm 
(opposition), there is meaning → elliptically put: meaning rests on 
conflict (the choice of one term against another), and all conflict is 
generative of meaning: to choose one and refuse the other is always a 
                                                
8 Roland Barthes, Elements of Semiology (1964).  Page references follow the 
abbreviation ES in the text. 
9 Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes (1975).  Page references 
follow the abbreviation RB in the text. 
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sacrifice made to meaning, to produce meaning, to offer it to be 
consumed [Barthes’s emphasis].  (TN 7)  
Barthes displays a fascination with the ways in which paradigms create 
meaning within language and with the possibility that a neutral third term 
could temporarily delay the choice demanded by an either/or proposition, 
which would both reaffirm the system (since the essential paradox is that one 
cannot upset binaries without simultaneously affirming the existence of said 
binaries to begin with and simply reinscribe them), and briefly transcend it.  
Barthes’s desire for the Neutral is the desire to identify a concept that would 
constitute language and meaning by existing outside of language and 
meaning. 
The figure of the Neutral, or the desire for the impossibility of the 
Neutral, inhabits different formulations at different points in Barthes’s work.  
Always transient and amorphous, the Neutral can be most clearly glimpsed 
behind the following terms: “zero-degree” in Writing Degree Zero, 
“Bliss/jouissance” in The Pleasure of the Text, “the grain of the voice” in the 
essay of the same name, and “punctum” or “time” in Camera Lucida (though 
these last two terms become slippery).  All of these concepts are, of course, not 
equivalent, nor do they reference the same thing, but they exist as multiple 
representations of the same desire.   
In The Pleasure of the Text, Barthes elaborates on his notion of a 
significant absence and the way such an absence is, in a sense, unlocatable.  
Since it can represent both the beginning and the end—pre-origin and post-
destruction—it does not exist at a fixed point in linear, narrative time.  The 
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Pleasure of the Text is in many ways one of Barthes’s most elusive texts: its self-
reflexivity confounds, its paradoxes and contradictions abound, its 
deceptively neat binaries ensnare, its erotics both create and disavow desire, 
and its subject matter—hedonism—is intellectually suspect.  The work’s twin 
key concepts are “pleasure” (plaisir) and “bliss” (jouissance).  The text conflates 
these terms from the beginning, acknowledging in a parenthetical: 
“Pleasure/Bliss: terminologically, there is always a vacillation—I stumble, I err.  
In any case, there will always be a margin of indecision; the distinction will 
not be the source of absolute classifications, the paradigm will falter, the 
meaning will be precarious, revocable, reversible, the discourse incomplete” 
(PT 4).  Thus the reader is specifically warned not to view the categories of 
“pleasure” and “jouissance” as separate, stable, definable, or even intelligible, 
yet the text seduces us into doing so through Barthes’s contradictory examples 
of each term and the ways he consciously positions the terms within unstable 
paradigms in order to continually disassemble and reinscribe them.10  The 
frequently contradictory categorization of texts of pleasure and bliss reveal 
glimpses of the Neutral at work, since the potential for encountering the 
Neutral exists wherever paradigms (particularly unstable paradigms) are 
erected.   
                                                
10 In a 1975 Le Magazine litteraire interview, Barthes speaks to the artificiality of 
his pleasure/bliss distinction: “The opposition ‘pleasure/bliss’ is one of those 
voluntarily artificial oppositions for which I’ve always had a certain 
predilection.  I’ve often tried to create such oppositions: for example, between 
ecriture and ecrivance, ‘denotation’ and ‘connotation.’  These oppositions 
shouldn’t be taken literally; for example, by asking if such and such a text 
belongs to the order of pleasure or of bliss.  These oppositions are intended 
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With his caveat about not expecting “absolute classifications” firmly in 
place, Barthes offers the following “split”:  
Text of pleasure: the text that contents, fills, grants euphoria; the text 
that comes from culture and does not break with it, is linked to a 
comfortable practice of reading.  Text of bliss: the text that imposes a 
state of loss, the text that discomforts (perhaps to the point of a certain 
boredom), unsettles the reader’s historical, cultural, psychological 
assumptions, the consistency of his tastes, values, memories brings to a 
crisis his relation with language.  (PT 14)   
As a result of this formulation, many critics parallel Barthes’s pleasure/bliss 
formulation with the readerly/writerly division he posits in S/Z: the 
traditional, readerly text, which imparts its (pre-determined) meaning to the 
reader brings pleasure whereas the avant-garde, postmodern, writerly text, 
which relies on the reader for the creation of a multiplicity of meanings, brings 
the reader bliss.11  Such a neat divide also seems to parallel a pleasure/bliss 
binary with Barthes’s doxa/paradoxa binary where those traditional, 
pleasurable texts represent doxa (bourgeois ideology, public opinion) and 
texts of bliss are the paradoxa (that which confounds doxa).  These 
comparisons are imperfect, however, for the text of bliss is repeatedly aligned 
with the loss of self, the significant absences created by the reader that 
                                                                                                                                       
above all to clear more ground, to make headway—just to talk and to write” 
(GV 206). 
11 In Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, Barthes upsets this readerly/writerly 
binary with the addition of a third term: “the receivable,” another figure of the 
Neutral (RB 118).  The “receivable” text would be “unreaderly” and “would 
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structure the text—a void that possesses an unsustainable temporality.  If we 
understand the relationship between pleasure and bliss as a binary, then the 
Neutral would figure as any occurrence that disrupts or disturbs this 
paradigm (which could include a term that combines pleasure and bliss, or 
one that is neither pleasure nor bliss).  The difficultly lies in the fact that 
pleasure/bliss is not an oppositional binary. These are not mutually exclusive 
categories; this binary does not produce the conflict that making an either/or 
choice does and therefore does not produce meaning within Barthes’s 
structural framework.  Under such a system, the paradigm could more 
provocatively be expressed as: pleasure/displeasure with jouissance (bliss) 
acting as the third, disruptive term—functioning as the Neutral.12  This is 
similar to the way Barthes illustrates the concept of the Neutral in terms of 
color in The Neutral, positioning gray as the unmarked term standing in 
opposition to black and white as the marked binary.  If pleasure and 
displeasure are known values, then jouissance, in its unknowability and 
unattainability becomes the unmarked term.  It possesses the “shimmer” of 
the desire for the Neutral. 
Barthes’s assertion that the text of bliss provokes an intense state of 
boredom resonates with his description of intense neutral affects as figures of 
the Neutral.  Boredom as an affect is defined in part by duration and inaction, 
as to be bored is to have nothing to do for a period of time.  Boredom causes a 
                                                                                                                                       
require the following response: I can neither read nor write what you produce, 
but I receive it, like a fire, a drug, an enigmatic disorganization” (RB 118).   
12 One way of seeing the Neutral more clearly is to remember that bliss can be 
a figure of the Neutral, but is not always positioned in such a way. 
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discontentment associated with an inability or refusal to act or to progress.  
Boredom is an intense form of waiting for some external stimulation to 
alleviate the mental condition that allows for its existence.  Barthes describes 
the Neutral as a state of bodily awareness, as “kinesthesia,” the “shimmering 
state of the active and affected body” (TN 73, 228n25).  It is the bodily state of 
experiencing intense feeling without engaging in physical action.  The Neutral 
is “to pathos = what one feels, as opposed to what one does [.  .  .] to pathos: in 
the neutral: both active and affected: withdrawn from the will-to-act but not 
from ‘passion’” (TN 73).  The text of bliss creates a state of disaffectedness in 
the reader because the state is intensely discomfiting.  The text of pleasure is 
comfortable precisely because it does not disrupt familiar, knowable cultural 
norms and narratives.  The affects associated with the text of pleasure are 
positive: euphoria, contentment, happiness, fulfillment, while those associated 
with bliss/jouissance are intensely neutral or vaguely negative due to the 
upsetting disruption of cultural narratives.  The text of bliss/jouissance causes 
discomfort, unease, and feelings of loss, confusion, and boredom.  None of 
these are intensely negative affects—there is no anger or shame—they are 
passive states that occupy the temporal moment that occurs between the 
disruption of one cultural narrative or paradigm and its reabsorption into the 
next.  Anger, in fact, is precisely the type of strong affect that Barthes excludes 
from the category of the Neutral: “Mythologically, the Neutral is associated 
with a weak, unmarked ‘state’ (pathos).  It breaks away from, is distanced by 
every strong, marked, emphatic state (which is, by the same token, allied with 
‘virility’) → anger is an example of a strong state of marked pathos: it functions 
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perfectly as an anti-Neutral” (TN 74).  The Neutral is associated with weak 
affect and occurs in the moment of confusion that takes place between 
receiving and processing new information into a dominant narrative that 
supplants the previous one.  The Neutral is an unsustainable interruption. 
Barthes places the text of bliss within the realm of paradox stating, 
“With the writer of bliss (and his reader) begins the untenable text, the 
impossible text.  This text is outside pleasure, outside criticism, unless it is 
reached through another text of bliss: you cannot speak ‘on’ such a text, you can 
only speak ‘in’ it, in its fashion, enter into a desperate plagiarism, hysterically 
affirm the void of bliss (and no longer obsessively repeat the letter of pleasure) 
[Barthes’s emphasis]” (PT 22).  Here, once again, bliss is described as a “void” 
that can only be imitated, but never discussed.  The text of bliss is 
unintelligible to an extent: “The text of bliss should be on the side of a certain 
illegibility.  It should unsettle us, not only on the level of our imagination, but 
on the level of language itself” (GV 207).  As a figure of the desire for the 
Neutral—a desire that might be impossible—bliss upsets the linguistic 
binaries that create meaning within language.  Barthes asks, “How can a text, 
which consists of language, be outside languages?  How exteriorize the world’s 
jargons without taking refuge in an ultimate jargon wherein the others would 
simply be reported, recited?” (PT 30).  Barthes seems to face the same 
quandary faced by zero-degree writing in Writing Degree Zero.  He first 
envisions the potential of neutral writing: “If the writing is really neutral, and 
if language, instead of being a cumbersome and recalcitrant act, reaches the 
state of a pure equation, which is no more tangible than an algebra when it 
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confronts the innermost part of man, then Literature is vanquished, the 
problematics of mankind is uncovered and presented without elaboration, the 
writer becomes irretrievably honest” (WDZ 78).  Yet he then acknowledges if 
not the impossibility of achieving it, at least the unsustainability of its 
presence:  
Unfortunately, nothing is more fickle than a colourless writing; 
mechanical habits are developed in the very place where freedom 
existed, a network of set forms hem in more and more the pristine 
freshness of discourse, a mode of writing appears afresh in lieu of an 
indefinite language.  The writer, taking his place as a ‘classic’, becomes 
the slavish imitator of his original creation, society demotes his writing 
to a mere manner, and returns him a prisoner to his own formal myths.  
(WDZ 78)   
Thus Neutral writing is not “innocent” of ideology or doxa or history forever.  
If a writer is able to achieve a colorless, organic style, it soon becomes codified 
and brought into cultural discourse.13  
The connections between the descriptions of neutrality in Writing 
Degree Zero and The Pleasure of the Text are striking.  Barthes concludes Writing 
Degree Zero with a utopic fantasy of the Neutral where “The writers of today [.  
.  .] search for a non-style or an oral style, for a zero level or a spoken level of 
writing is, all things considered, the anticipation of a homogeneous social 
state; most of them understand that there can be no universal language 
                                                
13 Jonathan Culler refers to this state of events as a “semiotic law: 
neutralization becomes a style and signifies” (Spiralling 112). 
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outside a concrete, and no longer a mystical or merely nominal universality of 
society” (WDZ 87).  Similarly, Barthes notes in The Pleasure of the Text, “There 
is only one way left to escape the alienation of present-day society: to retreat 
ahead of it: every old language is immediately compromised, and every 
language becomes old once it is repeated [.  .  .] Confronting it, the New is bliss 
(Freud: ‘In the adult, novelty always constitutes the condition for orgasm’) 
[Barthes’s emphasis]” (PT 40-41).  While Barthes locates bliss in absence and in 
encounters with the new, he also correlates the bliss found in absence with its 
opposite—excess:  
[T]o repeat excessively is to enter into loss, into the zero of the signified 
[.  .  .] In short, the word can be erotic on two opposing conditions, both 
excessive: if it is extravagantly repeated, or on the contrary, if it is 
unexpected, succulent in its newness [.  .  .] In both cases, the same 
physics of bliss, the groove, the inscription, the syncope: what is 
hollowed out, tamped down, or what explodes, detonates.  (PT 41-42) 
Here Barthes counts acts of repetition and surprise—the expected and routine 
as well as the unanticipated—as “excessive.”  Reading the text of 
bliss/jouissance as a figure of the Neutral reveals both absence and excess as 
serving the purpose of disruption and, significantly, delay—a temporal 
intervention.  These states are correlated with the neutral affect surprise.14  An 
“Addendum to The Pleasure of the Text” appears in Roland Barthes by Roland 
Barthes and clarifies this point: “Bliss is not what corresponds to desire (what 
                                                
14 I discuss surprise as a neutral affect in relation to Sedgwick’s work on Silvan 
Tomkins in the last section of this introduction. 
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satisfies it) but what surprises, exceeds, disturbs, deflects it” (112).  Thus the 
relationship between bliss and desire is that the text of bliss performs the work 
of the Neutral in its upsets, surprises, and bafflements that suspend the 
production of meaning. 
This discussion of bliss (jouissance) as a figure of the Neutral leads us 
to what initially seems to be the resolution offered at the conclusion of The 
Pleasure of the Text: “the grain of the voice.”  First articulated in his 1972 essay, 
“The Grain of the Voice,” Barthes here refers to the utopic notion of “an 
aesthetic of textual pleasure,” which would involve “writing aloud”: “This 
vocal writing (which is nothing like speech) is not practiced, but it is doubtless 
what Artaud recommended and what Sollers is demanding.  Let us talk about 
it as though it existed” (PT 66).15  This mode of writing has a texture, a 
materiality to it, it “allow[s] for the corporeal exteriorization of discourse”: 
Writing aloud is not expressive; it leaves expression to the pheno-text, to 
the regular code of communication; it belongs to the geno-text16, to 
                                                
15 Of course, “talking” about this non-practiced writing brings “it” into a type 
of existence, and Barthes uses the verb “talk,” referring to a specifically oral 
mode of communication, even though he is specifically not “talking,” but 
writing about it—both slight paradoxes staged knowingly in service of his 
argument. 
16 In “The Grain of the Voice,” Barthes classifies music by its two registers: its 
“pheno-song” and its “geno-song” (following Julia Kristeva’s formulation of 
pheno-texts and geno-texts).  The “pheno-song” is constituted in the symbolic.  
It includes, “all the features which belong to the structure of the language 
being sung” (182).  The pheno-song offers no access to jouissance.  In contrast, 
the “geno-song” “forms a signifying play having nothing to do with 
communication, representation (of feelings), expression [ .  .  .] the diction of 
the language [author’s emphasis]” (182-3).  Ultimately, Barthes identifies 
geno-songs with writing: “The French are abandoning their language [.  .  .] as 
a space of pleasure, of thrill, a site where language works for nothing, that is, in 
perversion [author’s emphasis]” (“GV” 187).  The “grain,” Barthes elaborates, 
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significance; it is carried not by dramatic inflections, subtle stresses, 
sympathetic accents, but by the grain of the voice, which is an erotic 
mixture of timbre and language, and can therefore also be, along with 
diction, the substance of an art: the art of guiding one’s body [.  .  .] the 
articulation of the body, of the tongue, not that of meaning, of language 
[Barthes’s emphasis].  (PT 66-67)   
Barthes distinguishes between experiencing the material body and occupying 
the realm of language.  Questions of materiality become increasingly urgent to 
Barthes from this point in his work forward.  Barthes hypothesized that the 
material body is a site different from, apart, beyond the sign system that 
constitutes language, straddling the line between the intelligible and the 
unintelligible.  Likewise, “the thought of the Neutral is in fact a borderline 
thought, on the edge of language, on the edge of color, since it’s about 
thinking the nonlanguage, the noncolor” (TN 52).  The grain of the voice, in its 
ability to convey meaning outside of the expressiveness of language—through 
materiality alone—occupies the impossible space of the Neutral.   
In what initially seems to be a confusing theoretical move, Barthes 
provides the cinema as an example of a site where the grain of the voice can be 
found: 
[I]t suffices that the cinema capture the sound of speech close up (this is, 
in fact, the generalized definition of the ‘grain’ of writing) and make us 
hear in their materiality, their sensuality, the breath, the gutturals, the 
                                                                                                                                       
has a distinct materiality: “The ‘grain’ is the body in the voice as it sings, the 
hand as it writes, the limb as it performs” (“GV” 188).   
 34 
fleshiness of the lips, a whole presence of the human muzzle [.  .  .] to 
succeed in shifting the signified a great distance and in throwing, so to 
speak, the anonymous body of the actor into my ear: it granulates, it 
crackles, it caresses, it grates, it cuts, it comes: that is bliss [Barthes’s 
emphasis].  (PT 67)   
The use of cinema as an example, as opposed to theater, which has a more 
immediate connection to physical texture and material bodies seems odd in 
that film is image divorced from referent—the sound of the cinema is 
recorded, disembodied.  Indeed, in Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, he notes: 
The erotic function of the theater is not accessory, for the theater alone 
of all the figurative arts (cinema, painting) presents the bodies and not 
their representation.  The body in the theater is at once contingent and 
essential, you cannot possess it (it is magnified by the prestige of 
nostalgic desire); contingent, you might, for you would merely need to 
be momentarily crazy (which is within your power) in order to jump 
onto the stage and touch what you desire.  (RB 83-84)  
Yet, Barthes explains a crucial difference: “The cinema, on the contrary, 
excludes by a fatality of Nature all transition to the act: here the image is the 
irremediable absence of the represented body [Barthes’s emphasis]” (RB 84).  
Thus, that which is remarkable about film is the (often fetishized) absences it 
allows us to experience.17   
                                                                                                                                       
 
17 In The Imaginary Signifier, Christian Metz identifies cinema as an “imaginary 
signifier” predicated on Lacanian notions of loss.  For the cinema spectator, 
the process of viewing a film is that of encountering an essential lack or 
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 Due to this “irremediable absence” of the material body, we hear the 
gap, the void, the disconnection between actor/image and vocalization: “what 
pleasure wants is the site of a loss, the seam, the cut, the deflation, the dissolve 
which seizes the subject in the midst of bliss” (PT 7).  The key, however, is that 
the grain of the voice (which is not exclusively cinematic) constitutes “bliss” 
through acts of nearly fetishistic interruption, division, delay, and orgasm, 
and the reader has already been directed to “recognize bliss wherever a 
disturbance occurs in amatory adjustment” (PT 25).18   
Barthes’s affective critical posture towards music in “The Grain of the 
Voice” begins to show clear links to the Neutral as a reading (listening) 
practice: 
I am determined to listen to my relation with the body of the man or 
woman singing or playing and that relation is erotic—but in no way 
                                                                                                                                       
absence: “everything is recorded (as a memory trace which is immediately so, 
without having been something else before) .  .  .  For it is the signifier itself, 
and as a whole, that is recorded, that is absence: a little rolled up perforated 
strip which ‘contains’ vast landscapes, fixed battles [.  .  .] and yet can be 
enclosed in the familiar round metal tin, of modest dimensions, clear proof 
that it does not ‘really’ contain all that”  (43-44).  Film, for Barthes, is figurative 
rather than directly representational: “the text itself, a diagrammatic and not 
an imitative structure, can reveal itself in the form of a body, split into fetish 
objects, into erotic sites.  All these movements attest to a figure of the text, 
necessary to the bliss of reading.  Similarly, and even more than the text, the 
film will always be figurative (which is why films are still worth making)—
even if it represents nothing” (PT 56).  Thus film always offers the possibility 
for bliss in its essential pleasurable fragmentation and presentation of 
fetishized loss. 
18 Barthes frequently refers to certain processes of writing (fragmented, 
interrupted) and reading (skipping around, dipping in and out of the text) as 
fetishistic (and therefore pleasurable): “the fetishist[ic reader] would be 
matched with the divided-up text, the singling out of quotations, formulae, 
turns of phrase, with the pleasure of the word” (PT 63); “I’m content to read 
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‘subjective’ (it is not the psychological ‘subject’ in me who is listening; 
the climactic pleasure hoped for is not going to reinforce—to express—
that subject but, on the contrary, to lose it).  The evaluation will be 
made outside of any law, outplaying not only the law of culture but 
equally that of anticulture, developing beyond the subject all the value 
hidden behind “I like” or “I don’t like.” (“GV” 188)   
Compare the description of this affective relationship to music with Barthes’s 
discussion of the Neutral, as previously discussed, where he describes it as 
“an affect” that “outplays {déjoue} the paradigm” and states: “The paradigm, 
what is that?  It’s the opposition of two virtual terms from which, in speaking, 
I actualize one to produce meaning” (TN 6-7).  The opposition of two virtual 
terms, the affective registers “I like” and the “I don’t like,” are disrupted by 
the relationship that seeks to experience “climactic pleasure” or jouissance 
through the loss or destruction of the subject.  The desire for this visceral 
relationship between “I like” and “I don’t like” that potentially offers access to 
jouissance is the desire for the Neutral.  
How then is one to speak of the impossible?  To write outside of 
language and meaning?  To identify or quantify the Neutral?  Barthes resolves 
this quandary by writing not of the Neutral, but of his desire for the Neutral 
throughout his corpus.  Barthes concludes Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes by 
answering a final question (displayed as an image of handwriting—a 
representation of linguistic expression, a reproduction of writing, a copy of a 
                                                                                                                                       
the text in question, in a rather fetishistic way: writing down certain passages, 
moments, even words which have the power to move me” (GV 181). 
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copy): “What to write now?  Can you still write anything?” with the answer, 
“One writes with one’s desire, and I am not through desiring,” thus affirming 
the generative force of the failure inherent in desire (np).  Continually 
thwarted desire produces both writing and rewriting.  Barthes’s (re)writing 
and (re)reading of desire offers queer theory an alternative reading of affect 
and narrative, an attention to an aesthetic of desire resulting from the ethical 
imperative of impossible desires to structure all the rest. 
Barthes and Queer Theory 
Barthes’s desire for the Neutral resonates with Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick’s call for an alternative reading practice based on an examination of 
the role of affect in learning to think “nondualistically” in Touching Feeling: 
Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity.  Both Barthes and Sedgwick wish to question 
forms of knowledge that spring from oppositional binaries and identify 
“negative” and neutral affects as potential loci of new epistemologies and 
pedagogies. Sedgwick calls for a “reparative” reading practice (one contrary to 
the “paranoid” reading practices she describes) based on viewing the 
relationship to affect as the primary human response to stimuli (as opposed to 
a Freudian drive theory).19  Sedgwick describes “paranoid” critical reading 
practices as those that rely upon the drama of exposure.  She argues that the 
“unidirectionally future-oriented vigilance of paranoia,” which “reparative” 
strategies serve to highlight and interrogate, is “paradoxically, a complex 
relation to temporality that burrows both backward and forward: because 
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there must be no bad surprises, and because learning of the possibility of a 
bad surprise would itself constitute a bad surprise, paranoia requires that bad 
news be always already known” (130).  This linking of emotions with 
narrative delay and repetition recalls the Neutral’s concern with temporality.  
The Neutral exists, by its nature, in the creation of a temporary structural 
position during the brief moment between the destabilization of a meaning 
producing oppositional binary and its nearly instantaneous absorption into a 
new paradigmatic structure—the interrupting of a series of pure interruptions.  
In this sense, the Neutral relies upon narrative interruptions and suspensions 
both occasioned by and resulting from emotions.  For Sedgwick, alternative 
“reparative” readings acknowledge the primacy of a different set of affects in 
relation to both “everyday knowledge and experience” and academic theory—
a reading practice that might just as easily describe Barthes’s privileging of a 
set of neutral affects in his work (Touching Feeling 144-5).  While Sedgwick asks 
us to think outside of a framework that structures meaning and knowledge 
around notions of repression and prohibition, Barthes’s corpus embraces 
contradiction and paradox—he wishes to “baffle paradigms,” yet admittedly 
finds pleasure in locating and constructing artificial binaries (TF 8-9).  
Sedgwick does not look to move beyond current epistemologies, specifically 
situating her ideas “beside” other theories while Barthes explicitly expresses 
his desire to move beyond other ways of knowing.  Barthes’s goal is to use the 
figure of the Neutral to articulate a new ethics of living, and both he and 
                                                                                                                                       
19 See chapter four in Touching Feeling, “Paranoid Reading and Reparative 
Reading, or, You’re So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Essay is About 
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Sedgwick desire a new reading practice that takes negative and/or neutral 
emotions into account.   
 The element of surprise paranoid readings attempt to circumvent and 
disavow is at the very heart of Barthes’s Neutral.  While Sedgwick invokes the 
work of psychologist Silvan Tomkins on the uses of positive and negative 
affect, specifically the uses of shame, she does not make much of the affect 
Tomkins first described as positive, but later reclassified as neutral—surprise.  
Tomkins identified the brief moment of surprise (or startlement in its more 
intense form) as the neutral affect that operates as a precondition for all the 
others—positive and negative.  This neutral affect functions as a kind of 
“reset” switch, a “circuit breaker” that momentarily suspends or interrupts 
any state of feeling and creates the possibility for a change in affect.  Barthes’s 
description of affects as figures of the Neutral works in much the same way.  
The Neutral creates the potential for change by subversively suspending 
meaning derived through paradigmatic substitution.  Paranoid readings, on 
the other hand, reinscribe a logical, linear narrative trajectory through 
monolithic textual interpretations that do not account for pluralities (in the 
search for the truth of the text, interpretations are either right or wrong) and 
seek to subsume the Neutral’s uncertainties into new paradigms.   
In terms of the political efficacy of affect, Sedgwick writes, “Shame 
interests me politically, then, because it generates and legitimates the place of 
identity—the question of identity—at the origin of the impulse to the 
performative, but does so without giving that identity space the standing of an 
                                                                                                                                       
You” (124-151). 
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essence.  It constitutes it as to-be-constituted, which is also to say, as already 
there for the (necessary, productive) misconstrual and misrecognition” (64).  
Sedgwick values the possibilities affect holds for constituting one’s identity.  
She speaks to the specificity of shame as a productive, interpretive experience, 
attributing a foundational status to it as the affect that influences others (64).  
According to Sedgwick, while shame is traditionally seen in psychoanalytic 
terms as a negative affect or one which serves the purpose of maintaining 
social order and control, she argues “that at least for certain (‘queer’) people, 
shame is simply the first, and remains a permanent, structuring fact of 
identity: one that, as [Henry] James’s example suggests, has its own, 
powerfully productive and powerfully social metamorphic possibilities” (64-
65).   
While Sedgwick’s focus is largely on shame, Barthes’s most compelling 
analyses describe the numerous and complex emotions that accompany 
mourning and love and offer examples of the desire for the Neutral as both a 
reading and a writing practice: A Lover’s Discourse and Camera Lucida.  In the 
chapters that follow, these works serve as a model for reading the relationship 
between affect and temporality in Lolita, Native Son, and The Member of the 
Wedding.  The affects and emotional states represented in A Lover’s Discourse 
and Camera Lucida work to delay the realization and acceptance of the now 
absent other.  A Lover’s Discourse is a text whose existence is predicated upon 
the lover’s solitude in the absence of the loved one.  In it, Barthes rejects doxa’s 
(society’s) assignment of a linear narrative progression to the ubiquitous “love 
story,” which assigns it a narrative with a predefined beginning, middle, end, 
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and satisfactory moral that serves to curb the intense, chaotic feelings 
associated with being in love.  As an alternative, Barthes offers a depiction of 
the lover’s unruly discourse in his fragmented text.  The externally imposed 
social narrative transforms the lover’s discourse into “a painful, morbid crisis 
of which he must be cured, which he must ‘get over’ (‘It develops, grows, 
causes suffering, and passes away’ in the fashion of some Hippocratic 
disease): the love story (the ‘episode,’ the ‘adventure’) is the tribute the lover 
must pay to the world in order to be reconciled with it)” (7).  Barthes’s text, 
however, affirms a different lover’s discourse.  It translates the disorganized, 
random fragments of a non-linear, disavowed or invisible mode of being 
normally subjugated to the linear narrative of the universal love story into the 
form of non-linear text.   
 A Lover’s Discourse is formally constructed of fragments that present 
individual arguments placed in alphabetical order so as to confound narrative 
logic: “the figures are non-syntagmatic, non-narrative; they are Erinyes; they 
stir, collide, subside, return, vanish with no more order than the flight of 
mosquitoes.  Amorous dis-cursus is not dialectical; it turns like a perpetual 
calendar, an encyclopedia of affective culture” (7).  The text mimics the affects 
and emotional states of the inaction it describes: waiting, anxiety, hiding, 
embarrassment, jealousy, languor, silence, and solitude, in its starts, stops, and 
stutters.  The discourse of the lover is itself not without narrative, but it finds 
this narrative paradoxically constituted by its resistance to linearity.  This 
paradox—the ways interruptions and delays serve to constitute the very 
narrative they aim to hinder—is also a foundational component of the 
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Neutral.  These suspensions of meaning or delays of narrative conclusions and 
certainties stem from a “manipulation of absence” within the text: “This 
staging of language postpones the other’s death: a very short interval, we are 
told, separates the time during which the child still believes his mother to be 
absent and the time during which he believes her to be already dead.  To 
manipulate absence is to extend this interval, to delay as long as possible the 
moment when the other might topple sharply from absence into death” (LD 
16).  Various tactics of narrative delay serve as formal manifestations of the 
absent other whose disappearance from or invisibility within the text provides 
the occasion for discourse while suspending narrative progress. 
 The desire for the Neutral is not concerned with assigning an 
importance to affect, but rather insists upon an affirmation that certain types 
of affect matter, specifically those that accompany this paradoxical inactive 
movement.  Grief has a duration and an intensity, but these are qualities 
achieved through delay—through a resistance to the certainty of death.  This 
resistance is only recognized by society for a short period of time.  Likewise, 
the lover adopts the societal imposition of a progressive, linear narrative onto 
the experience of actively loving another in order to gain a cultural 
intelligibility.  The love story, or narrated version of the experience, does not 
care about the passive state of being the loved object or the aimless drift that 
knows no end point and characterizes the experience of being in love.  In their 
socially defined, progressive narrative states, the tortured lover and the grief-
stricken mourner must “get over it,” preferably sooner rather than later.  
Those who resist this tightly structured cultural narrative face, at best, 
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pathologization and, at worst, unintelligibility.  In the face of such strictures, 
Barthes’s work on the Neutral applies structuralist principles to denigrated 
emotional states of being.  The terms assigned to affects that resist or hinder 
progressive narratives are nearly always deprecatory and serve to code them 
as unfavorable emotional positions to occupy.  Anxiety is the state of 
perpetual waiting or anticipation; laziness is that of non-productivity; 
weariness stalls through its slow movement.  While some or all of these may, 
in fact, be pleasurable experiences, they are all viewed as negative within a 
culture that values progress and continual reproduction.  The Neutral affirms 
those affects associated with non-progressiveness and failure as essential to 
the experience of desire and pleasure and, ultimately, the desire for the 
jouissance that constitutes the Symbolic in its exclusion from it.   
Barthes describes his growing sense of frustration at not possessing the 
right analytical tools for his chosen emotional object of study in Camera Lucida: 
“this disorder and this dilemma, revealed by my desire to write on 
Photography, corresponded to a discomfort I had always suffered from: the 
uneasiness of being a subject torn between two languages, one expressive, the 
other critical [.  .  .] I was bearing witness to the only sure thing that was in me 
(however naïve it might be): a desperate resistance to any reductive system” 
(8).  Disavowing accepted critical language (just as he had disavowed 
accepted critical objects of study in The Pleasure of the Text and A Lover’s 
Discourse), Barthes articulates a critical, affective reading practice as a new 
means of approaching those texts that bring us individualistic, subjective 
pleasure.  Barthes writes, “[I was] determined to be guided by the 
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consciousness of my feelings” (CL 10).  His methodology in the first part of the 
work is clear: “my phenomenology agreed to compromise with a power, affect; 
affect was what I didn’t want to reduce; being irreducible, it was thereby what 
I wanted, what I ought to reduce the Photograph to; but could I retain an 
affective intentionality, a view of the object which was immediately steeped in 
desire, repulsion, nostalgia, euphoria?” (21).  Barthes identifies a critical void 
and seeks to fill it: “Classical phenomenology, the kind I had known in my 
adolescence (and there has not been any other since), had never, so far as I 
could remember, spoken of desire or of mourning” (CL 21).20  
Barthes creates a new terminology (to complement his new reading 
practice) with which to speak of the effect of certain photographs upon him.  
He refers to the “studium” of a photograph as that which gives it its cultural 
intelligibility21, its “average affect,” while the “punctum” is that which 
ruptures or punctures the studium by virtue of the effect it has on the 
spectator: “The studium is of the order of liking, not of loving; it mobilizes a half 
desire, a demi-volition; it is the same sort of vague, slippery, irresponsible 
interest one takes in the people, the entertainments, the books, the clothes one 
finds ‘all right’” (CL 26-27).  Such a division allows Barthes to become a 
resistant reader in his deliberate disregard for a photograph’s “intent” or its 
studium, caring only for its punctum: “I am primitive, a child—or a maniac; I 
                                                
20 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography (1980).  Page 
references follow the abbreviation CL in the text.   
21 “To recognize the studium is inevitably to encounter the photographer’s 
intentions, to enter into harmony with them, to approve or disapprove of 
them, but always to understand them, to argue them within myself, for 
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dismiss all knowledge all culture, I refuse to inherit anything from another eye 
than my own” (CL 51).  In reading for the punctum—reading for affective 
response—Barthes desires a way to remove himself from culture and its 
attendant mythologies.22  The punctum functions as a figure of the Neutral 
when Barthes discusses its reliance on serendipity, on its dependence upon 
the photograph’s capture of a specific, unsustainable “right moment,” which 
he describes as “the kairos of desire” (CL 59).  Barthes also uses “Kairos” as a 
figure of the Neutral in his lectures: “Ho kairos = right, appropriate measure.  
Appropriate, timely moment, opportunity [.  .  .] The idea is useful to signal 
the asystematic character of the Neutral: → its relation to occasion, 
contingency, conjuncture, extemporizing” (TN 169).  The punctum, as a figure 
                                                                                                                                       
culture (from which the studium derives) is a contract arrived at between 
creators and consumers” (CL 28). 
22 Camera Lucida at first seems to present us with another binary: 
studium/punctum, but we soon realize that we have another false paradigm 
similar to The Pleasure of the Text’s pleasure/bliss divide.  While the studium 
represents cultural intelligibility, the punctum is not the opposite: cultural 
unintelligibility—for it aspires to exist outside of culture entirely: “Absolute 
subjectivity is achieved only in a state, an effort, of silence (shutting your eyes 
is to make the image speak in silence).  The photograph touches me if I 
withdraw it from its usual blah-blah: ‘Technique,’ ‘Reality,’ ‘Reportage,’ ‘Art,’ 
etc.: to say nothing, to shut my eyes, to allow the detail to rise of its own 
accord into affective consciousness” (CL 55).  It is the ineffable, unknowable, 
unnamable, for which we have no system to render it intelligible.  It 
disrupts—punctures, not unerotically, the surface of culture and its 
mythologies: “What I can name cannot really prick me.  The incapacity to 
name is a good symptom of disturbance” (51).  The punctum here functions as 
another form of the desire for the Neutral as that which disturbs and disrupts.  
The punctum is variable and shifting, and always personal to the individual 
experiencing it: “it is an addition: it is what I add to the photograph and what 
is nonetheless already there” (55).  “[T]he punctum could accommodate a certain 
latency (but never any scrutiny)” (53).  The punctum contains a certain excess, 
it “is a kind of subtle beyond—as if the image launched desire beyond what it 
permits us to see” (59).   
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of the Neutral, offers us a transient “kairos of desire.” 
Barthes establishes the basis of his reading practice in the first half of 
Camera Lucida, only to upend it in part two: “I had not discovered the nature 
(the eidos) of Photography.  I had to grant that my pleasure was an imperfect 
mediator, and that a subjectivity reduced to its hedonist project could not 
recognize the universal,” yet Barthes maintains that the answers he seeks are 
located deep within himself and turns to personal photographs in search of 
the universal (60).  In a photograph depicting his mother as a child that he 
examines after her death, Barthes discovers that that specific photograph “was 
indeed essential, it achieved for me, utopically, the impossible science of the 
unique being” (CL 71).  Using this photograph of his mother, Barthes “decided 
to ‘derive’ all Photography (its ‘nature’) from the only photograph which 
assuredly existed for me, and to take it somehow as a guide for my last 
investigation” (73).  Barthes’s desire for an affective reading practice in this 
work shapes itself through the temporality of the narrative in which it is 
constructed: 
At the time (at the beginning of the book: already far away) when I was 
inquiring into my attachment to certain photographs, I thought I could 
distinguish a field of cultural interest (the studium) from that 
unexpected flash which sometimes crosses this field and which I called 
the punctum.  I now know that there exists another punctum (another 
‘stigmatum’) than the ‘detail.’  This new punctum, which is no longer of 
form but of intensity, is Time, the lacerating emphasis of the noeme 
(‘that-has-been’), its pure representation.  (CL 95-96) 
 47 
The desire for the Neutral changes shape from one half of Barthes’s book to 
the other.  It is both the detail that disrupts (the first punctum—one of form) 
as well as a state of intensity, the very essence of photography for Barthes—
the pure representation of Time.   
Barthes records the relationship between his experience of grief and 
time throughout his diary.  At one point he writes, “(How) long everything 
becomes without her” (MD 202).  At another he remarks, “What I find utterly 
terrifying is mourning’s discontinuous character [Barthes’s emphasis] (MD 67).  
Barthes eventually finds that his grief confounds the linear temporal narrative 
assigned to it by society.  He does not grieve a little less each day until he’s at 
last “over it,” as he notes: “Explained to AC, in a monologue, how my distress 
is chaotic, erratic, whereby it resists the accepted—and psychoanalytic—
notion of a mourning subject to time, becoming dialectical, wearing out, 
‘adapting.’  Initially this mourning of mine has taken nothing away—on the 
other hand, it doesn’t wear out in the slightest” (MD 71).  Barthes recognizes 
both the paralyzing and generative aspects of his grief: “Not to suppress 
mourning (suffering) (the stupid notion that time will do away with such a 
thing) but to change it, transform it, to shift it from a static stage (stasis, 
obstruction, recurrences of the same thing) to a fluid state” (MD 142).  He 
further finds that he constantly fears his mother’s death even though it has 
already occurred: “I am suffering from the fear of what has happened” (MD 122) 
and that “At each ‘moment’ of suffering, I believe it to be the very one in 
which for the first time I realize my mourning.  In other words: totality of 
intensity” [Barthes’s emphasis] (MD 75).  The temporality of mourning is 
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“chaotic,” intermittent, enduring, and always intense (MD 31).  There comes a 
point when “it [death] is no longer an event, it is another duration, 
compressed, insignificant, not narrated, grim, without recourse: true 
mourning not susceptible to any narrative dialectic [Barthes’s emphasis]” (MD 
50).  This experience of grief as an emotional state that is intense, enduring, 
and simultaneously static and generative is repeatedly reflected in his course 
on the Neutral.  
In Camera Lucida, Barthes locates the affective, universal reading of 
photography in its relationship to death: “It is because each photograph 
always contains this imperious sign of my future death that each one, 
however attached it seems to be to the excited world of the living, challenges 
each of us, one by one, outside of any generality (but not outside of any 
transcendence)” (CL 97).  Such a relationship reaches its conclusion in the 
photograph’s reiteration of subjecthood:  
Such would be the Photograph’s ‘fate’: by leading me to believe (it is 
true, one time out of how many?) that I have found what Calvino calls 
‘the true total photograph,’ it accomplishes the unheard-of 
identification of reality (‘that-has-been’) with truth (‘there-she-is!’); it 
becomes at once evidential and exclamative; it bears the effigy to that 
crazy point where affect (love, compassion, grief, enthusiasm, desire) is 
a guarantee of Being.  It then approaches, to all intents, madness; it 
joins what Kristeva calls ‘la vérité folle.’ (CL 113) 
Barthes still desires the Neutral, but here it is in the face of an intense 
emotional response to death.  His grief over the death of his mother becomes 
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his affective response to the death he sees in every photograph regardless of 
the subject.  The central question of Camera Lucida is ultimately and simply: 
What now?  What is one to do when one can no longer trust old 
epistemologies and is left with only the certainty that “In the end, its [the 
Neutral’s] essential form is a protestation; it consists of saying: it matters little 
to me to know if God exists or not; but what I know and will know to the end 
is that He shouldn’t have simultaneously created love and death.  The Neutral 
is this irreducible No: a No so to speak suspended in front of the hardenings of 
both faith and certitude and incorruptible by either one” (TN 14). Camera 
Lucida takes this question and builds from it an affective interpretive practice 
narrated from its origins through the construction of its methodology, through 
several formulations of the strategy at work.  The work offers an example of a 
reading practice founded in affect (one that goes beyond “I like it/I don’t like 
it” readings), and one that has critical currency for contemporary queer theory 
in light of current work on queerness and affect.      
The Neutral holds promise in its potential to “undo” language and 
culture.  If we follow Barthes’s lead, an affective reading practice offers access 
to a new truth, but one that may deny us written expression—one located 
outside of language.  Sedgwick similarly offers an epistemology that thinks 
intelligibility and subjectivity within a different, affective framework, and she 
also experiences the frustration of the inexpressible.  In Touching Feeling, she 
writes of her feelings of identification with a photograph of sculpture artist 
Judith Scott.  In this photograph, which appears on the front cover of her 
book, Sedgwick finds something akin to Barthes’s “truth” of Time in Camera 
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Lucida.  The subject, Scott, creates meaning through art even though she “does 
not use language” (Scott is deaf and has down syndrome) (23).  Sedgwick 
admires in Scott the “obvious fullness of her aesthetic consciousness, her 
stubbornly confident access to autotelic production, her artist’s ability to 
continue asking new, troubling questions of her materials that will be difficult 
and satisfying for them to answer” (24).  Sedgwick reaffirms her own 
subjectivity through her identification with this photograph.  She articulates 
her own artistic production by noting that Scott “convey[s] an affective and 
aesthetic fullness that can attach even to experiences of cognitive frustration.  
In writing this book I’ve continually felt pressed against the limits of my 
stupidity, even as I’ve felt the promising closeness of transmissible gifts” (24).  
In looking at this photograph, Sedgwick encounters that “crazy point” for 
Barthes “where affect (love, compassion, grief, enthusiasm, desire) is a 
guarantee of Being” (CL 113).  Yet Sedgwick also articulates a desire to become 
Scott in some way—a desire for the intelligibility associated with “senile 
sublimity” (24).  It is this desire for an intelligibility gained through material 
texture and affect that exists outside of language (for Scott’s process of making 
and experiencing meaning is located outside of language) that, paradoxically, 
allows us to write of it.   
The Neutral provides an alternative to paranoid critical reading 
practices that rely upon the drama of exposing pre-determined, linear truths.  
We can see the Neutral at work in textual reflections of ineffectual actions that 
paradoxically constitute narrative through interruptions and delays.  The 
Neutral offers the possibility of thinking and being outside normative cultural 
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narratives.  This altered relationship to what Barthes would call doxa and the 
disruption of heteronormative binaries serves explicitly political ends in this 
passage from Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes: “Who knows if this insistence 
on the plural is not a way of denying sexual duality?  The opposition of the 
sexes must not be a law of Nature; therefore, the confrontations and 
paradigms must be dissolved, both the meanings and the sexes be pluralized” 
(69).  He continues: 
 Similarly, difference, that much-vaunted and insistent word, prevails  
because it dispenses with or triumphs over conflict.  Conflict is sexual, 
semantic; difference is plural, sensual, and textual; meaning and sex are 
principles of construction, of constitution; difference is the very 
movement of dispersion, of friability, a shimmer; what matters is not 
the discovery, in a reading of the world and of the self, of certain 
oppositions but of  encroachments, overflows, leaks, skids, shifts, slips 
.  .  .” (69)   
In its suspension of conflict, the Neutral dissolves the normative binaries of 
sex and heteronormativity.  In rejecting narratives of progress and discovery, 
the Neutral asserts an atemporal trajectory that attempts to sidestep what 
Edelman describes as “the compulsory narrative of reproductive futurism” in 
No Future (21).  The Neutral offers up a queerness of affect and narrative 
through its desire to baffle heteronormative doxa.  Thus the Neutral has much 
to say to contemporary queer and affect theory and offers a formal critical 
practice with the potential to make absences visible in those narrative pauses 
Neutral affects perpetuate by virtue of their failure to reproduce. 
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In her introduction to a 2007 GLQ special issue on “Queer 
Temporalities,” Elizabeth Freeman argues for a “porous” queer studies that 
“reimagine[s] ‘queer’ as a set of possibilities produced out of temporal and 
historical difference, or see[s] the manipulation of time as a way to produce 
both bodies and relationalities (or even nonrelationality),” claiming that 
redrawing such boundaries allows queer studies to engage in the process of 
being “shaped by and reshaping not only various disciplines but also the 
studies of race, nation, migration, and postcolony” (159).  Freeman asserts that 
“one of the most obvious ways that sex meets temporality is in the persistent 
description of queerness as temporally backward, though paradoxically 
dislocated from any specific historical moment” and further notes: 
Queer critics tend to identify the residual as specters, ghosts, or copies 
and to think of “production” in terms of culture rather than merely 
economics [. . .] These kinds of intellectual forays are histories not just 
of emotion but of sensations that do not even count as emotions in a 
particular historical moment, such as the feelings of uncanniness, 
untimeliness, belatedness, delay, and failure that suffuse so many queer 
performances.  (162-3) 
By thinking through the “sensations that do not even count as emotions in a 
particular historical moment,” the following chapters examine the relationship 
between Barthes’s Neutral and the disavowed affects that thwart linear 
narrative and produce instances of “queer time,” given that the Neutral is 
often associated with “images of failure or impotence [Barthes’s emphasis]” and 
delay (TN 72).  I read these two modes of relating to the Neutral—as a weak or 
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passive affect and as a failure to produce or reproduce—as connected to its 
temporal dimensions.  If the Neutral serves an interrupting function as it 
“baffles” dominant paradigms, then it also causes narrative delays of varying 
degrees and intensities.  In his lecture course summary Barthes writes, “The 
argument of the course has been the following: we have defined as pertaining 
to the Neutral every inflection that, dodging or baffling the paradigmatic, 
oppositional structure of meaning, aims at the suspension of the conflictual 
basis of discourse” (TN 211).  This “suspension” of meaning points to both its 
inevitability and to the temporary nature of the Neutral.  It, as Barthes 
frequently claims, “shimmers” with impermanence, with what I argue we can 
call “queer time.” 
Barthesian thought, with its critical mode that combines 
poststructuralist semiotics and narratology with affective response and ethical 
responsibility can also fulfill a certain desire on the part of queer theory today.  
As Barthes desired the Neutral (and could only desire, not possess it in its 
intrinsically impossible form) and wrote through his desire, queer theory 
paradoxically desires both a queer subjectivity and a queer unintelligibility.  
These respectively affirmative and negative turns in queer theory create a field 
at odds with itself as it seeks to unsettle heteronormative culture and create a 
more inclusive mainstream while still looking for sources of pride and 
political agency in negativity and abjection.  Barthes’s Neutral in its 
subversive yet constantly compromised state resonates with queer theory’s 
contradictory temporal impulses to look forward to a happier tomorrow and 
backward in an embrace of the antisocial.   
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The privileging of a future-oriented linear temporality associated with 
heteronormative sexualities and certain affects—frequently couched in the 
language of “progress” or “improvement” and production and 
reproduction—has been recently explored in Sedgwick’s Touching Feeling 
(2003), Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (2004), Ngai’s 
Ugly Feelings (2007), Love’s Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer 
History (2007), and Kathryn Bond Stockton’s The Queer Child: or Growing 
Sideways in the Twentieth Century (2009), which seek to question, resist, or reject 
heteronormative progress models while offering alternative understandings of 
“non-progressive” narratives and negativity.  In terms of affect, negative 
emotions may lead to direct political action in the case of anger, be used as a 
way of defining subjecthood or subjectivity in the case of shame, or can serve a 
diagnostic function by illuminating discursive power structures, which is how 
Love describes Ngai’s reading of “weak” affects like irritation.  A resistance to 
the cultural reliance upon historical, linear narrative trajectories as a condition 
of subjectivity informs all of these critiques.   
Ngai reads ambivalent, enduring “ugly feelings,” including anxiety, 
envy, and paranoia, as “explicitly amoral and noncathartic” and indicative of 
a “noncathartic aesthetic: art that produces and foregrounds a failure of 
emotional release (another form of suspended ‘action’) and does so as a kind 
of politics” (6, 9).  Love, however, writes, “I do not think it would be right to 
read this [Ngai’s] interest in intentionally weak feelings or this refusal to 
directly link affect and action as a disinterest in action.  Rather, I would 
venture that this persistent attention to ‘useless’ feelings is all about action: 
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about how and why it is blocked, and about how to locate motives for political 
action when none is visible” (13).  While I agree that these feelings are “about 
action,” Love’s formulation still characterizes weak affects as inactive or 
passively receiving action (they are “blocked” by some external force)—a 
description that ignores the action these feelings accomplish that takes the 
form of duration, suspension, and delay.  Ngai recognizes that these feelings 
can take the form of “suspended action,” but does not consider the way 
“suspending” can itself be a political action.  Thus, Barthes assigns a different 
political potential to “weak” or “ugly” feelings than Love and Ngai do.  Love 
sees these feelings as emotions that can lead to other emotions that in turn can 
be politically efficacious and Ngai identifies a passive resistance at work, but 
Barthes ascribes explicitly ethical and political potential to Neutral affects. 
Suspension, duration, and delay are temporal qualities.  In No Future, 
Edelman describes the disruptiveness of queer sexuality to heteronormative 
“reproductive futurism,” or the organization of society around the image of 
the future Child and the tyranny of cultural narratives based on it: 
“Historically constructed [ . . .] to serve as the repository of variously 
sentimentalized cultural identifications, the Child has come to embody for us 
the telos of the social order and come to be seen as the one for whom that 
order is held in perpetual trust” (10-11).  Edelman locates the ethical 
importance of the antisocial queer as the figure that resists “the viability of the 
social while insisting on the inextricability of such resistance from every social 
structure” in the Lacanian analysis that informs No Future (3).  Barthes’s 
Neutral performs similar temporally and socially disruptive work.  For 
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Edelman, the queer, in his association with the death drive, constitutes the 
essential loss that structures the social.  Likewise, the Neutral is the 
structuring absence that makes possible a system’s existence as well as its 
destruction.  Edelman writes:  
[T]he impossible project of a queer oppositionality that would oppose 
itself to the logic of opposition.  This paradoxical formulation suggests 
a refusal—the appropriately perverse refusal that characterizes queer 
theory—of every substantialization of identity, which is always 
oppositionally defined, and, by extension, of history as a linear 
narrative (the poor man’s teleology) in which meaning succeeds in 
revealing itself—as itself—through time.  (4)  
Edelman’s impossible project shares much in common with Barthes’s desire 
for the Neutral in their Lacanian-influenced treatment of language and the 
Symbolic.  In embracing the “self-constituting negation” of the Symbolic, 
Edelman embarks on a task always already destined for failure, that of 
searching for an “access to the jouissance that at once defines and negates 
us”—the same impossible escape from the Symbolic Barthes desires even in 
his recognition of the inevitable failure of attempts to outplay language and 
sidestep assertion (5). 
Seeing something different in the figure of the child, Kathryn Bond 
Stockton makes the claim that “every child is queer” and examines, as I do, the 
problem of how “children’s delay: their supposed gradual growth [ . . .] has 
been relentlessly figured as vertical movement upward (hence, ‘growing up’) 
toward full stature, marriage, work, reproduction, and the loss of 
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childishness” (Queer Child 3,4).  Stockton sees delay as “central to defining 
childhood” and a concept that “call[s] us into notions of the horizontal—what 
spreads sideways—or sideways and backwards—more than a simple thrust 
toward height and forward time” (4).  Similarly, my reading of adolescence in 
Nabokov, Wright, and McCullers examines the role of delay, as attached to 
neutral affects, as that which stalls both child development (“growing up”) 
and the movement of the narrative to its conclusion.   
 Reading for the Neutral is a means of making visible an aesthetic of 
desire as a structuring force.  Interruption and fragmentation as formal 
devices mirror certain Neutral affects—those emotions frequently described as 
ineffectual.  Hysterical boredom, as an example of the type of non-progressive 
affect Barthes associates with the Neutral, serves as a means of thwarting the 
reproductive futurism Edelman describes by interrupting the cultural 
narratives that perpetuate it while underscoring its paradoxically generative 
properties.  In The Pleasure of the Text, boredom is a function of discomfiting 
loss and an endless deferral of pleasure located in the constant presence of a 
jouissance we can no longer access, a loss revealed through an affect that 
gestures toward that which is no longer, paralyzing forward movement.  The 
desire for the Neutral offers a mode of resistance to progress narratives of 
futurity and becomes a state of being and of “being present.”  It assigns an 
ethics to passive acts that resist reproduction.  In reading Barthes’s 
commitment to the legitimacy of affective response as critical discourse, an 
aesthetic of narrative delay, suspension, or interruption that characterizes 
neutral affects as having the potential to unravel cultural progress narratives 
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emerges.   
The Neutral reinforces a state of perpetual desire and ensures the 
existence of the desiring subject.  Barthes assigns an aesthetic of narrative 
suspension to the state of continuous desire that the Neutral reproduces 
within formal textual constraints at one point by comparing his penchant for 
fragmented prose to Schumann’s use of intermezzo: “he increased the 
intermezzi within his works as he went on composing: everything he 
produced was ultimately intercalated: but between what and what?  What is 
the meaning of a pure series of interruptions?” (RB 94).  The relational 
impossibility of a pure series of interruptions captures the paradox of the 
Neutral—interruptions are not interruptions when they eliminate the 
paradigm they disrupted in the first place; the series becomes its own 
paradigm, which would then be subject to other interruptions in an endless 
circular fashion, constantly moving yet going nowhere.   
 The Neutral’s formal manifestation as narrative interruption, 
disruption, or suspension allows us to see its temporal and relational aspects.  
Formal narrative interruptions exist in myriad other forms literary and 
critical—in the fragmented prose of Barthes’s criticism and the annotated text, 
which Barthes describes as a quintessentially disrupted one.  The “work of the 
commentary,” he writes in S/Z, inheres “in manhandling the text, interrupting it.  
What is thereby denied is not the quality of the text [.  .  .] but its ‘naturalness’” 
(15).  Barthes here identifies literary criticism’s ability to denaturalize the text 
through its interjections, which form a punctuated aesthetic.  Such narrative 
disruptions also delay the linear movement of the text, which is what we see 
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in Lolita’s repetitive, allusive prose, as I discuss in chapter one.  The character 
speech patterns in all three novels offer a stuttering repetition and return that 
stalls textual movement.  They feature “non-progressive” narratives that 
refuse the normative logic of linearity.  At the level of characterization, these 
novels evince those “affective gaps and illegibilities, dysphoric feelings, and 
other sites of emotional negativity,” as well as the “ambivalent situations of 
suspended agency” that Ngai locates in Melville’s Bartleby, the character who 
would, famously, “prefer not to,” and paradoxically propel the narrative 
through their very resistance to it (1).  The moments of “recessive action” 
Anne-Lise François identifies as a literary version of passive aggressiveness 
found in the willful refusal to act in Open Secrets: The Literature of Uncounted 
Experience (2008) similarly drive these narratives forward by moving 
backward.  These denaturalizing interruptions serve as formal manifestations 
of the affective components of the narrative and constitute an aesthetic in 
Lolita, Native Son, and The Member of the Wedding that can be read in terms of 
the Neutral. 
 In the next three chapters, I read three novels in which queer 
temporality figures prominently in both the narrative and its structure 
through Barthes’s concept of the Neutral, as well as the queer theory texts 
discussed above.  All three novels share narrative properties that baffle linear 
temporal movement, and I will show how the feeling of being “out of time” in 
these novels resonates with Freeman’s claim that the “sensation of asynchrony 
can be viewed as a queer phenomenon—something felt on, with, or as a body, 
something experienced as a mode of erotic difference or even as a means to 
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express or enact ways of being and connecting that have not yet arrived or 
never will” (159). 
Many mid-twentieth century coming-of-age novels, such as The 
Yearling (Rawlings, 1938), A Tree Grows in Brooklyn (Smith, 1943), A Separate 
Peace (Knowles, 1959), and To Kill a Mockingbird (Lee, 1960), conform to the 
conventional narrative arc of the bildungsroman, a “novel of formation” in 
which a young protagonist matures from childhood to adulthood, often 
undergoing and surviving a spiritual (or existential) crisis.  This narrative arc 
resolves itself when the character accepts her role in a larger society.  In such 
works the development of the narrative parallels the development of the 
youth from unmoored misfit to her adoption of and absorption into the 
dominant social order.  The novels’ conclusions coincide with the 
protagonists’ maturation.  Something quite different, however, is happening 
in Lolita (1955), Native Son (1940), and The Member of the Wedding (1946), which 
offer no such successful resolution for their adolescent characters.  These 
works depict adolescents navigating the world, or, more accurately, show 
how the world acts upon these youthful figures rendered passive by 
circumstance.  These novels are as much about a dominant social order as the 
characters who fall outside it.  As such, adolescence in these works serves as 
less a model of natural progress and development than an obstacle that 
impedes it, setting them apart from conventional bildungsromane.  Yet taken 
together the novels also resist other generic classifications.  Native Son and The 
Member of the Wedding share some naturalist elements, but also contain 
modernist and gothic characteristics respectively.  Lolita self-consciously toys 
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with various genres and has been considered both a modern and postmodern 
novel.  What these seemingly diverse novels do share is a focus on adolescent 
characters who represent the transient or temporary nature of unsustainable 
desires.  The adolescents at the heart of these novels do not mature or develop 
for reasons specific to their gender, race, and socio-economic class, but also 
overarchingly because of their nonheteronormative desires and queer 
behavior.  These novels reject, criticize, or complicate the developmental, 
temporal narrative of maturity over time that the bildungsroman captures.  
They highlight stalled, delayed, or thwarted development in both the 
characters and the narrative movement of the text.  
“Queer time” is the result of a disruption of heteronormative 
conceptions of (re)production, linearity, and futurity in my first chapter, 
“Going Nowhere Fast: Queer Temporality in Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita.” In 
Lolita, narrator Humbert Humbert’s pedophilia functions as an anti-progress 
narrative, a subversion of heteronormative narratives of reproductive 
sexuality.  He rejects and Lolita fails to achieve the possibility of a 
heteronormative futurity—a future characterized by a linear narrative of 
development progressing through normative desire, marriage, and 
reproduction—due to the way affect structures his narration.  Humbert’s tale 
relies upon an indulgent relating of the emotions experienced, or believed to 
be experienced, by Lolita and himself.  The feelings and non-normative 
sexualities of these characters create formal delays within the text.  For 
example, Humbert describes in laborious purple prose Lolita’s frequent bouts 
of petulance—a passive emotion that Lolita wields as a means to temporarily 
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fend off or delay Humbert’s ultimately unstoppable sexual advances.  For 
Humbert, however, his description of her emotions becomes a device that 
slows the movement of the novel to its conclusion.  Lolita’s weak feelings stall 
Humbert’s actions within the plot, while simultaneously stalling the 
movement of the text itself.  Her boredom or indifference hinders the 
progression of Humbert’s written narrative as it forces him to find ways to 
accommodate them within his story.  Such delays and circular movements 
create a sense of queer temporality in the work.   
Chapter Two, “Killing Time: Violence and Temporality in Richard 
Wright’s Native Son,” examines the depiction of protagonist Bigger Thomas as 
suffering from a case of arrested development as a twenty-year-old perpetual 
adolescent denied the socio-economic means of maturity by the systemic 
racism and oppression of American society.  The novel portrays Bigger’s 
developmental narrative as stalled.  He cannot inhabit a normative “coming-
of-age” narrative, and he does not desire one.  Without access to such a 
progress narrative he has no future, a reality that queers his development.  
Bigger’s queer, delayed maturation is reflected in the narrative delays in the 
text—the instances of time killing that punctuate the narrative.  If Bigger exists 
when he acts—impulsively, violently, and motivated by rage or fear—as his 
lawyer Max argues at his trial, how then are we to read the large portions of 
the novel Bigger spends waiting to act; the stretches of narrative time marked 
by inaction that give way to violent outbursts? While contemporary 
scholarship often reads Native Son as a commentary on menacing black 
masculinity, or even misogyny, this chapter argues that Bigger’s desires are 
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queer and characterized by “weak” gendered affects.  Bigger kills time 
through a passive spectatorship of the world around him, a spectatorship 
characterized by weak or neutral affects that manifest in displays of idleness, 
apathy, and disaffection.  Such passivity serves as a prelude to violence that 
delays the movement of the plot.  This chapter focuses on one such site of 
queer stalling, the Regal Theatre where Bigger and his friend Jack masturbate 
together.  This scene presents the theater as a homoerotic space.  The act of 
time killing that occurs in that space is one that also queers the temporality of 
the narrative. 
 My final chapter, “Where the Day Takes You: Boredom and Belonging in 
Carson McCullers’s The Member of the Wedding,” examines the consequences of 
queer desire for two youthful characters in the novel, Frankie Addams and her 
cousin John Henry West.  For Frankie, her assimilation into the dominant 
social order requires that she abandon her queer desires to maintain her 
tomboy identity and become the third party in her brother’s wedding and 
marriage.  The alternative to embracing a heteronormative developmental 
model of progress is represented by John Henry who cross-dresses and 
believes that people should be “half boy and half girl.” His untimely death 
demonstrates the lack of narrative options available outside heteronormative 
linear progress models.  The novel provides the structural inverse of the 
narratives of stalled progress found in Native Son and Lolita.  The novel is 
primarily about the inaction of waiting and unfulfilled desires, an inaction 
characterized by Frankie’s constant weak feelings of boredom and anxiety.  
The action in the novel performs the work of interrupting the inaction that 
 64 
characterizes much of the plot.  Frankie’s one strong, positive emotion—
happiness—causes the novel to come to an abrupt end.  Her joy interrupts the 
persistent “hush” of the kitchen, a location figured as a queer space within the 
novel and one that had facilitated a rich inner life based upon her failure to 
achieve a feeling of belonging.  Frankie survives her adolescence, but survival 
comes at the cost of relinquishing an unintelligible subject position 
characterized by neutral affects for one more closely related to the narrative of 
futurity her brother’s marriage represents, one aligned with strong, positive 
feelings. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GOING NOWHERE FAST: QUEER TEMPORALITY IN VLADIMIR 
NABOKOV’S LOLITA  
Humbert Humbert criss-crosses a postwar American landscape in 
Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita, aimlessly running from nothing in particular in an 
effort to stall or even halt the development and maturation of his “nymphet,” 
Lolita: “We had been everywhere,” he states, “We had really seen nothing.  
And I catch myself thinking today that our long journey had only defiled with 
a sinuous trail of slime the lovely, trustful, dreamy, enormous country” (175-
6).  This instance of time killing leads to a wide range of defilements, scarring 
the landscape, Lolita, and the narrative structure of the text. The novel begins 
with narrator Humbert awaiting trial for murder.  He recalls the events that 
led to his imprisonment, which nearly wholly concern the years spent sexually 
abusing his twelve-year-old stepdaughter, Lolita.  Humbert’s narration of 
these events is characterized by his strategic use of language to delay or 
prolong the duration of his narrative. Such delays are tied to Lolita’s stalled 
development—a result of Humbert’s desire to keep her a prepubescent 
“nymphet,” in his parlance, both in “real life” and in his retelling of it—and 
accomplished through Humbert’s descriptions of Lolita’s weak or neutral 
affects, many of which correspond to those Roland Barthes aligns with the 
Neutral, as outlined in the Introduction.  Lolita’s ineffectual emotions become 
a source of textual duration.  They are a stalling technique she uses to fend off 
Humbert’s advances, and Humbert’s description of them similarly stalls the 
narrative’s conclusion. During the pair’s first road trip, Lolita’s neutral affects, 
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which stem from her desire to both put off Humbert’s sexual advances and 
secure a sense of futurity for herself—even if it is only an immediate one, 
cause delays in Humbert’s narrative.  During the second road trip—this one 
Lolita’s idea—she has already devised an escape plan different from waiting 
to “grow up” and away from Humbert’s control and her dilatory affects 
paradoxically work to hasten this end.   
 Indifferent, indolent, petulant Lo is not allowed to “grow up” in the 
novel, moving from Humbert’s abuses to Quilty’s, and finally to her death in 
childbirth at age eighteen.  Humbert’s narrative is antithetical to 
heteronormative progress models that place a value on reproductive 
futurity—on protecting the world of hypothetical future children, as Lee 
Edelman describes it in No Future.  In this sense, Humbert’s narrative can be 
read as adhering to a queer temporality that eschews looking forward in favor 
of looking backward.  Lolita herself is a queer child whose normative 
development is thwarted and who is denied access to a social order defined by 
heteronormative reproductive futurity.  Heterosexual reproduction literally 
kills her.  
Reading the novel’s temporality as possessing a certain queerness 
opens up new possibilities for understanding the formal properties of the text.  
While a significant portion of the body of criticism surrounding Lolita 
addresses the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in the novel, 
surprisingly little of it addresses the relationship between language and 
pleasure other than to note that Nabokov’s use of language is stylistically 
impressive, or to assert that the novel is one big linguistic puzzle or riddle that 
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the reader must decipher in order to understand Nabokov’s true meaning.   
Many, if not most, critics approach Lolita as a riddle, puzzle, or game 
meant for the cunning reader to unravel, decipher, master, or solve.  Michael 
Wood writes, “Lolita, like countless detective and horror stories, presents itself 
as a textual game,” alluding to the influence of Poe’s tales of ratiocination on 
Nabokov in order to link Lolita to a specific literary tradition rooted in enigma 
(103).  Viewing the novel as a vexing mystery one must solve in order to 
uncover the truth, Ellen Pifer asserts: 
As we strive to get to the bottom of things, however, we are likely to 
find that what seemed like firm ground becomes, in Nabokov’s phrase, 
one more ‘false bottom,’ a trap door that springs open to reveal yet 
another quandary, a further conundrum.  In this sense, all of the self-
conscious devices in the author’s cunningly wrought fiction, all the 
puns and parodies, allusions and alliterations that declare the novel’s 
status as a work of art, faithfully reflect his vision of reality.  (8-9)   
This notion that the novel’s status as “art” depends upon the “puns and 
parodies, allusions and alliterations,” that construct the reader-as-detective is 
reflected in Alfred Appel’s extensive annotated edition of Lolita, which 
dedicates itself to penetrating the dense, allusive thicket of Lolita’s dizzying 
prose in order to discover the meaning, the secret of the novel (in over nine 
hundred notes).  Appel refers to Lolita as “Nabokov’s puppet show,” and 
claims, “Nabokov’s passion for chess, language, and lepidoptery has inspired 
the most elaborately involuted patterning in his work.  Like the games 
implemented by parody, the puns, anagrams, and spoonerisms all reveal the 
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controlling hand of the logomachist; thematically, they are appropriate to the 
prison of mirrors” (xxviii).  Appel further asserts:  
Lolita is a great novel to the same extent as Nabokov is able to have it 
both ways, involving the reader on the one hand in a deeply moving 
yet outrageously comic story, rich in verisimilitude, and on the other 
engaging him in a game made possible by the interlacings of verbal 
figurations which undermine the novel’s realistic base and distance the 
reader from its dappled surface, which then assumes the aspect of a 
gameboard.  (lvi-lvii)   
Here the “game” becomes one of style or genre—Lolita is positioned as a 
would-be realist novel transformed into a post-modern chessboard by virtue 
of its reflexivity.  Even Kathryn Bond Stockton’s queer reading of the novel 
positions itself as explaining a “riddle” (119) by finding “cunning clues” (139) 
and claiming that “The answer to the detective mystery is the mystery of 
childhood sexuality [author’s emphasis]” (144).  Part of the allure of such 
approaches to the novel is, of course, Nabokov’s own willingness to speak of 
Lolita in similar ways,23 but such rhetoric ultimately has the effect of 
                                                
23 When asked in an interview to “explain the role of fate in your novels,” 
Nabokov remarked: “I leave the solution of such riddles to my scholarly 
commentators, to the nightingale voices in the apple trees of knowledge.  
Impersonally speaking, I can’t find any so-called main ideas, such as that of 
fate, in my novels, or at least none that would be expressed lucidly in less than 
the number of words I used for this or that book.  Moreover, I’m not interested 
in games as such.  Games mean the participation of other persons; I’m 
interested in the lone performance—chess problems, for example, which I 
compose in glacial solitude” (Strong Opinions 117).  Similarly, when asked in a 
different interview why he wrote Lolita, Nabokov replied, “It was an 
interesting thing to do.  Why did I write any of my books, after all?  For the 
sake of the pleasure, for the sake of the difficulty.  I have no social purpose, no 
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encouraging the disavowal of certain forms of pleasure associated with and 
produced by the text, and often leads to an over-reliance on biographical 
criticism.     
Kevin Ohi succinctly sums up the majority of Lolita scholarship in this 
way:  
Moralistic readings must cultivate an obliviousness to the novel’s 
remarkable—and remarkably elusive, subtle, and canny—language and 
its transformation of confessed remorse into aesthetic rapture.  The 
need to ignore the novel’s language registers—albeit in negative form—
one of the novel’s central insights: the linguistic seduction and the 
erotic seduction are one, and critics’ leaden readings of the text thus 
seek to contain the novel’s erotic subversiveness.  (160)   
A queer reading of the novel’s formal structure allows for a different 
understanding of the pleasure the text provides, the “erotic subversiveness” 
Ohi describes, in relationship to the temporality of the narrative.  The pleasure 
found in the narrative’s hesitations and delays, in the duration of Humbert’s 
confession, has not been accounted for in criticism focused on puzzle-solving 
or moralistic readings.  A queer reading of the narrative opens up new 
possibilities for understanding the relationship between Humbert’s 
                                                                                                                                       
moral message; I’ve no general ideas to exploit, I just like composing riddles 
with elegant solutions” (Strong Opinions 16).  While such statements are often 
read by critics in the singular (Lolita is a riddle with a single solution), 
Nabokov’s words here clearly point to a multiplicity of riddles and potential 
solutions within the text.  If Lolita is a singular riddle (in both senses of the 
term), it is in fact one with no solution, a game with no opponent or end point.  
It is not surprising then that critics who attempt to solve the riddle and win 
the game become bound up in a system of infinite regress. 
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pleasurable confession, as Foucault would describe it, and textual duration—
the foundation of the novel form.    
From a narratological standpoint, delay is central to the existence of 
narrative.   In his essay “Textual Analysis of a Tale by Edgar Allan Poe” in The 
Semiotic Challenge, Barthes writes, “every narrative obviously has an interest in 
delaying the solution of the enigma it poses, since this solution will signal its 
own death as a narrative: we have seen that the narrator takes a whole 
paragraph to delay the exposition of the case, under the pretext of scientific 
precautions” (291).  Barthes elaborates on this idea in S/Z: “In fact, the 
hermeneutic code has a function, the one we (with Jakobson) attribute to the 
poetic code: just as rhyme (notably) structures the poem according to the 
expectation and desire for recurrence, so the hermeneutic terms structure the 
enigma according to the expectation and desire for its solution” (75).  He 
continues: 
The dynamics of the text (since it implies a truth to be deciphered) is 
thus paradoxical: it is a static dynamics: the problem is to maintain the 
enigma in the initial void of its answer; whereas the sentences quicken 
the story’s ‘unfolding’ and cannot help but move the story along, the 
hermeneutic code performs an opposite action: it must set up delays 
(obstacles, stoppages, deviations) in the flow of the discourse; its 
structure is essentially reactive, since it opposes the ineluctable advance 
of language with an organized set of stoppages: between question and 
answer there is a whole dilatory area whose emblem might be named 
‘reticence,’ the rhetorical figure which interrupts the sentence, suspends 
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it, turns it aside [author’s emphasis].  (S/Z 75)  
The centrality of structural delay to narrative returns in Barthes’s formulations 
of the Neutral.  As outlined in the Introduction, the Neutral, for Barthes, is the 
structural third term that “baffles” the oppositional binaries that produce 
meaning.  This bafflement creates a pause or delay in the creation of 
meaning—it temporarily suspends it.  While the Neutral takes many forms 
and figures in Barthes’s work, here, as in the dissertation as a whole, I am 
interested in his linking of the Neutral to certain weak or neutral affects that 
appear ineffectual, but harbor great desires.  Barthes embraces affects such as 
boredom, weariness, laziness, and anxiety as ignored or unthinkable 
discourses.  They are characterized by a reticence to action or revelation.  
While an angry person makes her feelings known and acts upon them with 
violence in word or deed, the lazy or anxious person does little and reveals less 
about the conditions of such a state of being.  When applied to narrative, these 
are the weak affects that can paradoxically constitute the narrative by delaying 
its linear progress when the text mimics their duration.  This stalled narrative, 
in turn, mirrors Lolita’s own stalled development.  
In The Queer Child: or Growing Sideways in the Twentieth Century, 
Kathryn Bond Stockton takes up the question of “children’s delay”: “their 
supposed gradual growth, their suggested slow unfolding, which, 
unhelpfully, has been relentlessly figured as vertical movement upward 
(hence, ‘growing up’) toward full stature, marriage, work, reproduction, and 
the loss of childishness.  Delay, as we will see, is tremendously tricky as a 
conception, as is growth.  Both more appropriately call us into notions of the 
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horizontal—what spreads sideways—or sideways and backwards—more than 
a simple thrust toward height and forward time” (4).  Asserting that “every 
child is queer,” Stockton writes, “despite our culture’s assuming every child’s 
straightness, the child can only be ‘not-yet-straight,’ since it too, is not allowed 
to be sexual.  This child who ‘will be’ straight is merely approaching while 
crucially delaying [. . .] the official destination of straight sexuality, and 
therefore showing itself as estranged from what it would approach” (7).  In 
Lolita, Humbert “suffers” from grand passions characterized by the affects of 
classical philosophy and rhetoric, while Lolita exhibits the passive, “neutral” 
affects Barthes examines, which paradoxically move the narrative along by 
delaying it.     
Humbert aligns himself with these strong feelings—love, rage, jealousy, 
and sorrow—while he, as the narrator, allows Lolita access only to weak, 
ineffectual emotions associated with childishness: infatuation instead of love, 
frustration instead of rage, boredom and apathy instead of jealousy, sulky fits 
instead of sorrow.  Immature Lolita is often incoherent, while educated 
Humbert is hyperarticulate and manipulative, controlling both Lolita and his 
prose.  Barthes identifies images of the Neutral as being “depreciative,” 
including the adjectives “Thankless,” “Shirking,” “Muffled,” “Limp,” 
“Indifferent,” and “Vile”—all descriptors that Humbert either applies to Lolita 
or implies to be part of her character (TN 71-71).  Humbert describes Lolita’s 
indifference in terms of neutrality: “‘Look,’ she said in that neutral voice that 
hurt me so” (141).  In his possessiveness, Humbert writes, “Oh, I had to keep a 
very sharp eye on Lo, little limp Lo!  Owing perhaps to constant amorous 
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exercise, she radiated, despite her very childish appearance, some special 
languorous glow which threw garage fellows, hotel pages, vacationists, goons 
in luxurious cars, maroon morons near blued pools, into fits of concupiscence” 
(159).  Limpness here evokes both the wilting helplessness of Lolita and 
Humbert’s twisted characterization of the defiance of heavy limbs as 
seduction; it is credited with the power to incite action of the part of others.  
When associated with Humbert, however, limpness carries the opposite 
meaning: 
I recall certain moments, let us call them icebergs in paradise, when after 
having had my fill of her—after fabulous, insane exertions that left me 
limp and azure-barred—I would gather her in my arms with, at last, a 
mute moan of human tenderness (her skin glistening in the neon light 
coming from the paved court through the slits in the blind, her soot-black 
lashes matted, her grave gray eyes more vacant than ever—for all the 
world a little patient still in the confusion of a drug after a major 
operation)—and the tenderness would deepen to shame and despair.  
(285)   
Here Humbert’s limpness is the result of satiation and Lolita’s emotional state 
(vacant and confused) is relegated to a parenthetical while his strong feelings 
(shame and despair) are the intended focus of the recollection.  Humbert’s 
narrative dallying centers on a series of memories that serve to highlight his 
own strong emotional states by contrasting them with Lolita’s weak ones 
under the guise of showing remorse for his deeds. 
 Lolita’s position within the plot as a kidnapped and abused stepchild 
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further circumscribes the range of affects available to her.  Her temper 
tantrums are doomed to be ineffectual in such a situation and never rise to the 
level of action-producing rage.  Humbert renders Lolita incoherent in his 
description of one such scene when an argument between them is interrupted 
by the police:  
Lo treated me to one of those furious harangues of hers where entreaty 
and insult, self-assertion and double talk, vicious vulgarity and childish 
despair, were interwoven in an exasperating semblance of logic which 
prompted a semblance of explanation from me.  Enmeshed in her wild 
words (swell chance . . . I’d be a sap if I took your opinion seriously . . . 
Stinker . . . You can’t boss me . . . I despise you . . . and so forth) I drove 
through the slumbering town [. . .] when the kind officers pardoned us 
and servilely we crawled on, her eyelids closed and fluttered as she 
mimicked limp prostration. (171)   
In this passage, Lolita’s “wild words” are truncated by Humbert, who not 
only places them in parentheses, but also uses ellipses to omit so many of 
them that her speech becomes too punctuated to be legible.  Her “despair,” 
unlike Humbert’s, is minimized as “childish” and unearned.  Her body, 
however, is deliberately “limp” and “prostrate”—a strategy Lolita makes 
frequent use of in her attempts to thwart Humbert’s desires. 
 Humbert frequently construes Lolita’s resistance to his sexual pleasure as 
mere indifference: “There she would be, a typical kid picking her nose while 
engrossed in the lighter sections of a newspaper, as indifferent to my ecstasy 
as if it were something she had sat upon, a shoe, a doll, the handle of a tennis 
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racket, and was too indolent to remove” (165).  Here, Humbert describes her 
as lazy for not being an enthusiastic participant in her violation. More telling 
still is his lengthy description of her reading material, which concludes with 
the observation that “she was curiously fascinated by the photographs of local 
brides, some in full wedding apparel, holding bouquets and wearing glasses” 
(165).  Lolita fantasizes about the normative sexuality of heterosexual 
marriage while trapped in Humbert’s warped, quasi-incestuous world.  This 
fantasy recurs throughout the novel, perhaps most provocatively when Lolita 
briefly disappears in Wace and tells Humbert she had been looking at a store 
window with two mannequins: “One figure was stark naked, wigless, and 
armless.  Its comparatively small stature and smirking pose suggested that 
when clothed it had represented, and would represent when clothed again, a 
girl-child of Lolita’s size.  But in its present state it was sexless.  Next to it, 
stood a much taller veiled bride, quite perfect and intacta except for the lack of 
one arm” (226). The almost-whole bride mannequin represents the only future 
Lolita sees for herself—a comically warped version of heteronormative 
futurity where her normative development has been stunted as she plays child 
bride to Humbert during their extended road trips, which Elizabeth Freeman 
has described as a parody of the popular 1950s travel honeymoon (Wedding 
173). 
 Within Humbert’s carefully constructed narrative, he links his extreme 
emotional states that lead to acts of spectacular violence and misanthropy to 
his narrative devices.  Early in the novel Humbert claims, “You can always 
count on a murderer for a fancy prose style,” thus associating violent acts with 
 76 
florid prose (9).  His “fancy prose” is a manipulation of language and 
narrative to suit his own ends.  He uses it to hide and reveal his motives and 
desires simultaneously.  Humbert provides elaborate justifications for his 
actions by offering deceptive theories of age, time, and history in an attempt to 
prevent the reader from rendering moral judgment.  He frequently glosses 
over his violent acts—his kidnapping and rapes of Lolita and his murder of 
Quilty—in overwrought narration of his feelings and employs narrative 
delays as a mode of creating and prolonging pleasure in service of his affects.  
Early in his confession he writes, “Now I wish to introduce the following idea.  
Between the age limits of nine and fourteen there occur maidens who, to 
certain bewitched travelers, twice or many times older than they, reveal their 
true nature which is not human, but nymphic (that is, demoniac); and these 
chosen creatures I propose to designate as ‘nymphets’” (16).  This relatively 
straightforward description of Humbert’s pedophilia and his rationalization of 
it—he’s sexually attracted to prepubescent girls and justifies his desires by 
casting the object of them as an inhuman other—becomes gradually hidden 
under layer upon layer of tortuous prose in the following pages.  Turning to 
myth and metaphor and jumbling conceptions of space and time, he states:  
It will be marked that I substitute time terms for spatial ones.  In fact, I 
would have the reader see ‘nine’ and ‘fourteen’ as the boundaries—the 
mirrory beaches and rosy rocks—of an enchanted island haunted by 
those nymphets of mine and surrounded by a vast, misty sea.  Between 
those age limits, are all girl-children nymphets?  Of course not.  
Otherwise, we who are in the know, we lone voyagers, we nympholepts, 
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would have long gone insane. (16-17) 
Here “nymphets,” different from other nine to fourteen-year-old girls as he is 
quick to assert, move from “demoniac” creatures to ghost-like ones, becoming 
more inhuman and disembodied, and placed outside of recognizable reality.  
He continues, “Furthermore, since the idea of time plays such a magic part in 
the matter, the student should not be surprised to learn that there must be a 
gap of several years, never less than ten I should say, generally thirty or forty, 
and as many as ninety in a few known cases, between maiden and man to 
enable the latter to come under a nymphet’s spell” (17).  Humbert’s 
relationship with time rests upon his desires to suspend it, to confine the 
objects of his pedophilic desire to an enchanted island where he grows older, 
but they stay the same age.  Humbert has a pleasurable investment in 
delaying the maturation of both the nymphet at the center of his confession—
Lolita—and of the narrative itself.  Taking the form of a confession, Humbert’s 
tale is already structured by the pleasure of recounting his sins.  Humbert’s 
narrative prolongs the retelling of his affair with Lolita and prolongs his 
pleasure in equal measure.  Thus temporality in the novel is bound up with 
Humbert’s desires, which he simultaneously masks and unveils with his 
elaborate prose.  
 Humbert’s pleasure is that of a pedophile reliving his crimes for an 
imagined, captive audience.  The longer his narrative time stretches, the 
longer the story time—where Lolita exists as a perpetual 12-year-old 
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nymphet—lasts.24  The entirety of part I, chapter 26 reads as follows: 
This daily headache in the opaque air of this tombal jail is disturbing, 
but I must persevere.  Have written more than a hundred pages and 
not got anywhere yet.  My calendar is getting confused.  That must 
have been around August 15, 1947.  Don’t think I can go on.  Heart, 
head—everything.  Lolita, Lolita, Lolita, Lolita, Lolita, Lolita, Lolita, 
Lolita, Lolita.  Repeat till the page is full, printer. (109)   
In this 66-word chapter, Humbert gestures toward three levels of narrative 
temporality: narrative time (the present—Humbert’s period of writing the 
narrative in his “tombal jail” cell), story time (the story of Humbert’s 
relationship with Lolita related in his narrative—here the events leading up to 
August 1947), and the invocation of futurity (the fate of the narrative after his 
death—here the imagined printer who will “complete” the story by endlessly 
delaying its resolution through the repetition of a single proper noun).25  
Humbert’s narrative has “not got anywhere” because he is not interested in 
going somewhere.  In this way, his narrative retelling mirrors the journeys he 
undertakes with Lolita.  When he states, “We had been everywhere.  We had 
really seen nothing,” he might just as easily be discussing his narrative—it 
shows us everything, but attempts to reveal nothing.  Humbert does not care 
if we never reach the end of his story and uses his self-fashioned persona as a 
                                                
24 Here I follow Gérard Genette’s terminology in distinguishing between these 
levels of narrative temporality. 
25 A fourth level—that of the time taken by the imaginary reader to read the 
narrative—is gestured toward at other points in the novel: “Gentlewomen of 
the jury!  Bear with me!  Allow me to take just a tiny bit of your precious 
time!” but falls outside of the scope of this analysis (123). 
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man of great feeling to structure a confession that forestalls a swift conclusion.   
Stockton notes that delay “is seen as a friend to the child.  Delay is said to 
be a feature of its growth: children grow by delaying their approach to the 
realms of sexuality, labor, and harm,” yet she also recognizes that “we know 
how sexual delaying sex can be.  Sexual delay as an active arrest [. . .] is a way, 
we say, of ‘maturing’ sexually” (62, 63).  Within the story time, Lolita’s passive 
affects stall Humbert’s pleasure.  She attempts to delay his sexual gratification 
as a means to hasten her maturation by shortening the amount of time she 
remains until his control and, as a child, subject to the desires of a pedophile.  
Humbert is motivated by the present and the past while Lolita constantly 
plots to escape both.  Humbert’s recollection of these emotions, however, 
pleasurably stalls the movement of his narrative to its conclusion; delay 
becomes a form of sexual pleasure within narrative time, one that is at odds 
with progress-oriented, future-driven temporality.  Such an understanding of 
delay in the novel depends, in part, on a reading of Lolita’s character as 
possessing an identifiable subjectivity. 
Critics, however, frequently read Lolita as a character deprived of any 
interiority and some have judged the novel ethically suspect because of this.  
In one of the most compelling of these accounts, Linda S. Kauffman 
interrogates Lolita’s lack of subjectivity and her erasure from the text in Special 
Delivery: Epistolary Modes in Modern Fiction.  In her feminist critique, Kauffman 
writes, “Lolita is not about love but about incest, which is a betrayal of trust, a 
violation of love.  How have critics managed so consistently to confuse love 
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with incest in the novel?  My aim here is to show how—through a variety of 
narrative strategies—the inscription of the father’s body in the text obliterates 
the daughter’s” (57).  Kauffman is one of many critics who cite “narrative 
strategies” as responsible for causing readers to sympathize with a pedophile 
at the expense of recognizing the pain suffered by his victim.  James Phelan, in 
his in his narratological analysis of the ethics of the text, ultimately expresses a 
“distrust of his [Nabokov’s] ethics” and claims, “In writing this book, 
Nabokov, like Dolores, enters umber and black Humberland; but unlike her, 
he does not survey it with a shrug of amused distaste, but rather lives there 
with a kind of perverse relish.  That, to my vision, is the inescapable ethical 
dark side of this book” (131).  Such ethical objections to the text revolve 
around Lolita’s lack of subjectivity within the novel: “whatever else we might 
say about the complexities of Nabokov’s technique, he never moves in the 
direction of giving Dolores a significant voice in the narrative: it is Humbert 
the criminal and his response to his crimes as he writes about them that 
dominate the narrative first, last, and always” (Phelan 130).  The scene most 
often used in support of these claims is one in which Humbert discreetly 
masturbates with Lolita on his lap on the family davenport.  After this, his 
first sexual contact with Lolita, he claims to have “safely solipsized” her and 
attempts to render her entirely his creation: “What I had madly possessed was 
not she, but my own creation, another, fanciful Lolita—perhaps, more real 
than Lolita; overlapping, encasing her; floating between me and her, and 
having no will, no consciousness—indeed, no life of her own” (60, 62).  
Humbert’s dehumanization of Lolita is what allows him to commit his crimes 
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against her and is what these critics most strongly react against.  In Style is 
Matter: The Moral Art of Vladimir Nabokov, Leland de la Durantaye rightly 
points out that this initial act of Humbert’s changing Lolita from an “ethical 
subject” to an “aesthetic object” paves the way for his later abuse of her, 
writing that Humbert can only enjoy “his vicious circle of paradise if the real 
little girl he is so desperately mistreating does not too violently interpose 
herself—and so he decides to ‘firmly ignore’ her in favor of the ‘phantasm’ 
first formed on this fateful Sunday” (71, 73).   
Ohi, however, argues that both Humbert and Lolita are essentially 
unknowable: “Consistency of tone or character is difficult to assess in a 
virtuosic prose that dazzles with sudden shifts of tone and voice: the real 
Humbert is no more accessible than the real Lolita” (184).  Ohi claims that “to 
‘know’ Lolita is thus to realize that one hasn’t known her [. . .] So thoroughly 
disoriented is any notion of a ‘real’ Lolita whom Humbert was to have known 
that any moralizing effort to condemn Humbert’s willful ignorance of her is 
destined to incoherence” (182).  Since it does seem at first that the reader can 
only access Dolores Haze through Humbert’s consciousness, if at all, it stands 
to reason that we only ever see Lolita—Humbert’s fantasy version of Dolores.  
Yet the structure of the novel proves more complex than a reading predicated 
on a Humbert-as-subject, Lolita-as-other divide can account for.  For what we 
learn of our narrator tells us that Humbert is never as fully in control of his 
text as he thinks he is, often blinded by narcissism, arrogance, and selfishness.   
Not all critics, of course, view the novel in this way.  Freeman’s reading 
of the novel, for example, places Lolita in control of Humbert’s narrative: 
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Lolita has refused to grant Humbert [. . .] a legible, complete identity. 
Her marks on the paper mimic the novel’s unending movement not only 
across the United States but among narrative modes and the kinds of 
public personhood that she inflicts on Humbert [. . .] His travelogue, in 
turn, lurches uncontrollably between romance and courtroom testimony, 
and its narrator never stabilizes as either lover or pervert. [. . .] the fact 
that [. . .] Humbert seems condemned to imaginatively stagger across 
U.S. spaces and genres even from his jail cell, is Lolita’s triumph. (175)  
Stockton also argues for an evaluation of Lolita’s subjectivity: 
Since he [Humbert] self-confesses for the length of the book, it would 
seem as if Lolita can only appear inside his mouth, strapped to his 
motives [. . .] But fortunately Nabokov is not satisfied with this.  He starts 
to hide Lolita—and her own competing motives—inside the legs that 
Humbert loves and the motions he describes but cannot comprehend.  
Legs and locomotions launch from Humbert’s words that rhapsodize 
Lolita.  A leg and a dog on his tongue make her seen—seen, that is, as a 
moving suspension, an interval of animal, inside his solipsism.  (133)   
Stockton further claims that the novel makes visible the motives of a sexual 
child—motives that remain invisible to Humbert throughout much of the 
story time: “Lolita has a sidetrack. A sexual girl grows alongside but strikingly 
apart form the arc of her (fake) father’s future for her.  For Humbert cannot 
see, until it is too late, the child’s threat growing to the side of his own” (155).  
Only in retrospect does Humbert see how Lolita has plotted to leave him for 
Quilty, his doppelgänger pedophile.   
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Nabokov’s authorial intrusions into his characters’ narratives cast further 
doubt onto how much of Humbert’s narrative belongs to him in a novel with 
postmodern characteristics.  Appel notes Nabokov’s use of the name “Vivian 
Darkbloom” in the text (an anagram for “Vladimir Nabokov”) as an instance 
of an intrusive authorial presence in his notes to The Annotated Lolita: “As for 
H.H. and John Ray, unless characters in a novel can be said to have 
miraculously fashioned their creators, someone else must be responsible for 
an anagram of the author’s name, and such phenomena undermine the 
narrative’s realist base by pointing beyond the book to Nabokov,” though he 
also notes the “utilitarian reason” for the anagram—Nabokov initially 
considered publishing the text anonymously (323).  Gérard Genette refers to 
such intrusions as “the concurrence of theoretically incompatible focalizations, 
which shakes the whole logic of narrative representation” in Narrative 
Discourse (211).  Lolita’s self-reflexivity imparts information to the reader about 
the novel’s status as a novel that only the author, Nabokov, and not the 
narrator, Humbert, would have in his possession.  Furthermore, while both 
Humbert and John Ray claim to have obscured identifying details from the 
text, Lolita remains linguistically exposed as the only character that does not 
receive a protective pseudonym.  John Ray notes, “While ‘Haze’ only rhymes 
with the heroine’s real surname, her first name is too closely interwound with 
the inmost fiber of the book to allow one to alter it; nor (as the reader will 
perceive for himself) is there any practical necessity to do so” (4).  Taken 
together, all of these factors call into question how “solipsized” Lolita ever 
really is for both the reader who sees the elements of Lolita’s character 
 84 
Humbert is blinded to and for Humbert himself.  Humbert admits that not 
only did he “not know a thing about my darling’s mind and that quite 
possibly, behind the awful juvenile clichés, there was in her a garden and a 
twilight, and a palace gate—dim and adorable regions which happened to be 
lucidly and absolutely forbidden to me, in my polluted rags and miserable 
convulsions,” but he also acknowledges that “there were times when I knew 
how you felt, and it was hell to know it, my little one.  Lolita girl, brave Dolly 
Schiller”  (284).  Here Humbert displays not only his current knowledge, as 
our jailed narrator (narrative time), that he harmed Lolita, but also the 
knowledge he attempted and failed to brush aside during the time he was her 
captor (story time)—that Dolores-the-ethical-subject and the phantasmatic 
Lolita-the-aesthetic-object were always one and the same.  Thus the position 
that Humbert’s narrative provides us with his monolithic view of the other 
characters in the novels is a flawed one from the start. 
 If Lolita is Humbert’s creation, existing at the whim of Humbert’s 
unreliable narration, then how could we begin to imagine this character does 
anything, much less wrests narrative control from Humbert’s dominant voice?  
The answer is that Humbert is far less in control of his narrative than he 
believes and than readers tend to give him credit for.  After all, for readers to 
recognize him as an unreliable narrator we must see that there is a difference 
between what he tells us and what “really happened” beyond simply 
assuming that he is untrustworthy or that a narrative framed as both 
confession and apologia meant, at least initially, to get him off the hook is not 
to be trusted. The moment in the novel when Humbert claims to safely 
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solipsize Lolita during the course of masturbating against her while she is 
perched on his lap is one such scene in which we see Humbert’s narrative 
control flounder. In this, Humbert’s first sexual contact with Lolita, he lays out 
the scene of his masturbation like a play for the reader (“I want my learned 
readers to participate in the scene I am about to replay” [57]), yet when he 
reaches the part of the tale where he realizes he is assured of an orgasm, 
Humbert deliberately slows both his sexual climax and the pace of his 
narrative description of it: “With the deep hot sweetness thus established and 
well on its way to the ultimate convulsion, I felt I could slow down in order to 
prolong the glow.  Lolita had been safely solipsized” (60).  It is a scene 
motivated by lust both in the action of the story time and in the prolonged 
narrative retelling punctuated by a series of delays.  Humbert’s delayed 
orgasm leads to his use of narrative delay tactics—here comparisons and 
digressions: 
I was a radiant and robust Turk, deliberately, in the full consciousness of 
his freedom, postponing the moment of actually enjoying the youngest 
and frailest of his slaves.  Suspended on the brink of that voluptuous 
abyss (a nicety of physiological equipoise comparable to certain 
techniques in the arts) I kept repeating chance words after her—barmen, 
alarmin’, my charmin’, my Carmen, ahmen, ahahamen—as one talking 
and laughing in his sleep while my happy hand crept up her sunny leg 
as far as the shadow of decency allowed. (60)   
Humbert consciously associates the pleasurable delay of sexual release with 
“certain techniques in the arts,” and his use of language to delay the narrative 
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conclusion of the scene is meant to mirror the delayed sexual gratification his 
orgasm brings.  The “equipoise” he strikes between coming and not coming is 
compared to the balance achieved in moments of narrative suspension.  His 
recollection of the event tells the reader he filled this gap before orgasm with 
the mindless repetition of words after Lolita—the lyrics to a pop song.  If 
Humbert, as he claims, “has only words to play with” in Lolita’s absence, then 
his words, the text of his confession, serve the sole purpose of filling the void 
of Lolita’s absence from the text.  This occurs first in Humbert’s intended 
sense of her literal estrangement from him, then in her death that becomes the 
condition for the publication of the text, but also in the way his solipsism 
threatens to render her his invention (32).  
 This masturbation scene is a crucial one in which Humbert’s narrative 
control is seen to be less than absolute and one that allows the reader to see 
how Lolita and her weak emotions serve a larger narrative function than that 
of mere objects within Humbert’s hermetic narrative.  Although he sets up the 
details precisely: “I want my learned readers to participate in the scene I am 
about to replay [. . .] Main character: Humbert the Hummer.  Time: Sunday 
morning in June.  Place: sunlit living room.  Props: old, candy-striped 
davenport, magazines, phonograph, Mexican knickknacks,” he is unable to 
create a convincing script (57).  In this scene, when Humbert tries his hardest 
to erase Lolita’s subjectivity, hints of the “actual” event shine through.  The 
reader can discern what the narrator cannot see; Humbert views Lolita as a 
sexualized object whose movements conform to his desires, but the reader 
sees Lolita as a squirming child.  Humbert uses the pretext of noticing a bruise 
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on Lolita’s thigh to fondle her: “there seemed to be nothing to prevent my 
muscular thumb from reaching the hot hollow of her groin—just as you might 
tickle and caress a giggling child—just that and: ‘Oh it’s nothing at all,’ she 
cried with a sudden shrill note in her voice, and she wiggled, and squirmed, 
and threw her head back, and her teeth rested on her glistening underlip as 
she half-turned away” (61).  Here we see the contrast between the actions of 
Lolita, who squirms away as he tickles, as a child might, and Humbert’s 
willful interpretation of child-like behavior as flirtatious and seductive: she 
bites “her glistening underlip,” and her attempt to gain the magazine 
Humbert has taken from her is related as “a sham effort to retrieve it, she was 
all over me” (58).  After his orgasm, Lolita breaks free from his grasp to 
answer the telephone: “Immediately afterward (as if we had been struggling 
and now my grip had eased) she rolled off the sofa and jumped to her feet [. . 
.] There she stood and blinked, cheeks aflame, hair awry, her eyes passing 
over me as lightly as they did over the furniture [. . .] Blessed be the Lord, she 
had noticed nothing!” (61).  Here Humbert’s own prose betrays his desire to 
construe his actions as undetectable even as he acknowledges, “I was mortally 
afraid that some act of God might interrupt me, might remove the golden load 
in the sensation of which all my being seemed concentrated, and this anxiety 
forced me to work, for the first minute or so, more hastily than was consensual 
with deliberately modulated enjoyment” (59).  Lolita’s escape from the sofa 
“as if we had been struggling” must be read as we had been struggling and now 
my grip had eased in order for her actions to make sense as the telephone does 
not suddenly ring and provide an interruption.  Rather Humbert notes it 
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“might have been ringing for ages as far as I was concerned” (61).  This scene 
then, in which Humbert claims to negate or revoke Lolita’s personhood, does 
not lead the reader to adopt a similar stance; it reveals instead the slippages 
between what Humbert wills himself to believe about Lolita (she is a wanton 
seductress who paradoxically remains innocent of any knowledge of 
Humbert’s exertions) and what he inadvertently exposes about her (that the 
character is a “normal little girl,” and that “nymphets” exist only in the eye of 
the beholder).  Humbert’s solipsizing move falls flat precisely because he is 
not aware enough of Lolita’s interiority to be able to effectively mask it.  
Though certainly muffled and obscured by his narrative, Humbert never fully 
succeeds in stripping Lolita of her subjectivity. Humbert’s further description 
of Lolita’s cool, indifferent demeanor at the end of the masturbation scene—
she surveys Humbert as if he were a piece of furniture—gives an early 
indication of how Humbert will describe his Eve after her fall in this initial 
sexual encounter.26   While he is aflame with passion, he describes her as 
detached and indifferent.  
Humbert’s narration explains the banal with excruciating detail, but 
glosses over the intricacies of his pedophilia or obscures them with 
exceptionally purple prose.  Humbert’s narration of his first night with Lolita 
in a hotel room, for example, consists primarily of lengthy descriptions of his 
agonized desire for her:  
And less than six inches from me and my burning life, was nebulous 
                                                
26 Humbert explicitly refers to the biblical tale of Eve and the serpent 
throughout the passage: “[Lolita] was holding in her hallowed hands a 
 89 
Lolita!  After a long stirless vigil, my tentacles moved towards her 
again, and this time the creak of the mattress did not awake her.  I 
managed to bring my ravenous bulk so close to her that I felt the aura 
of her bare shoulder like a warm breath upon my cheek [. . .] She freed 
herself from the shadow of my embrace—doing this not consciously, 
not violently, not with any personal distaste, but with the neutral 
plaintive murmur of a child demanding its natural rest.  And again the 
situation remained the same: Lolita with her curved spine to Humbert, 
Humbert resting his head on his hand and burning with desire and 
dyspepsia.  (130) 
Yet after this long buildup Humbert pretends to dispense with the act in a 
single sentence: “by six she was wide awake, and by six fifteen we were 
technically lovers” (132).  Humbert provides a narrative rationale for his 
descriptive strategy, stating “If I dwell at some length on the tremors and 
gropings of that distant night, it is because I insist upon proving that I am not, 
and never was, and never could have been, a brutal scoundrel” (131), while in 
a later act of paralipsis he declares: 
I shall not bore my learned readers with a detailed account of Lolita’s 
presumption.  Suffice it to say that not a trace of modesty did I perceive 
in this beautiful hardly formed young girl [ . . .] My life was handled by 
little Lo in an energetic, matter-of-fact manner as if it were an insensate 
gadget unconnected with me.  While eager to impress me with the 
world of tough kids, she was not quite prepared for certain 
                                                                                                                                       
beautiful, banal, Eden-red apple” (58). 
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discrepancies between a kid’s life and mine [ . . .] But really these are 
irrelevant matters; I am not concerned with so-called ‘sex’ at all.  
Anybody can imagine those elements of animality.  A greater endeavor 
lures me on: to fix once and for all the perilous magic of nymphets.  
(133) 
Here Humbert has moved from describing Lolita as a child desiring “natural” 
child-like things, such as sleep, to a demoniac nymphet.  Children “naturally” 
grow up whereas nymphets are suspended in time.  Humbert’s prose 
meticulously details his desires before turning away from them and claiming 
to do no such thing.  Since part of Humbert’s pleasure springs from the 
confessional structure of his narrative, which allows for the rehashing of all 
the gory details of his actions in a narcissistic, masturbatory fashion, the 
reader must always be wary of his claims of omission.  As befitting the legal 
defense he hopes his story will provide, Humbert claims to supply the details 
that would exonerate him while omitting those most damning.   
 Unsurprisingly, the clear relish Humbert displays in recounting these 
anticipatory interludes offers the most convincing evidence of his guilt.  He is 
the predator delighting in recounting the chase.  While Humbert claims he is 
“trying to describe these things not to relive them in my present boundless 
misery, but to sort out the portion hell and the portion of heaven in that 
strange, awful, maddening world—nymphet love” it becomes clear that his 
confession achieves the opposite and that Humbert protests too much (135).  
The narrative succeeds in exposing what it seeks to veil through its strategies 
of delay and (false) omission.  Just as when Humbert claims, “I am not 
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concerned with so-called ‘sex’ at all,” we know the opposite is true, when he 
tells us it was Lolita who seduced him we should know far better than to 
believe him (133, 132).  For Humbert, a narrative composed of long sequences 
of waiting and time killing punctuated by terse descriptions of sexual 
encounters, or descriptions of sexual acts that follow his protestations against 
describing them, is pleasurable and serves the masturbatory purpose of 
allowing him to relive his exploits.  De la Durantaye notes that as a pedophile 
and a voyeur, Humbert’s primary mode of sexual satisfaction is masturbation; 
here his narrative account serves a similar purpose (67-75). 
Humbert’s strategy of self-conscious narrative delay occurs again near 
the novel’s conclusion with his decision to murder Quilty.  The parallels 
between Humbert’s sexual gratification and his thirst for revenge are clear: 
“Let me dally a little, he is as good as destroyed,” he writes before pages of 
recollections about his life with Lolita as he retraces places and spaces the pair 
had once occupied until he reaches Ramsdale (282).  With a violent climax in 
sight, Humbert slows both his “fancy prose” and his narrative actions.  The 
temporal aspects of Humbert’s narration in this section of the novel begin to 
lose coherency.  Beyond the shift from past tense to present—from “I was 
alone to enjoy the innocent night and my terrible thoughts” to “Let me dally a 
little, he is as good as destroyed”—we also see a change in narrative level.  
Humbert moves from the mode of recollection that characterizes his narration 
to a comment on his act of narrating.  While his various asides and references 
to the text he is creating accomplish this narrative metalepsis throughout the 
novel, here he specifically associates his repetitive descriptions with delay.  
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Between “Let me dally” and the last sentence of the paragraph: “I was 
weeping again, drunk on the impossible past,” Humbert indulges in a long 
description of neon signage: “Some way further across the street, neon lights 
flickered twice slower than my heart: the outline of a restaurant sign, a large 
coffee-pot, kept bursting, every full second or so, into emerald life, and every 
time it went out, pink letters saying Fine Foods relayed it, but the pot could 
still be made out as a latent shadow teasing the eye before its next emerald 
resurrection.  We made shadowgraphs.  This furtive burg was not far from the 
Enchanted Hunters” (282).  This digression is an example of the pleasurable 
equipoise Humbert associates with the delaying of the climactic outcome of 
his strong emotional states, either lust (in which the delayed climax is literally 
an orgasm) or jealousy and rage (where the delayed climax is murder).       
The temporal levels of narration continue to fall apart the closer 
Humbert comes to his goal: 
Now that everything had been put out of the way, I could dedicate  
myself freely to the main object of my visit to Ramsdale.  In the 
methodical manner on which I have always prided myself, I had been 
keeping Clare Quilty’s face masked in my dark dungeon, where he was 
waiting for me to come with barber and priest: ‘Reveillez-vous, Laqueue, 
il est temps de mourir!’  I have no time right now to discuss the 
mnemonics of physiognomization—I am on my way to his uncle and 
walking fast—but let me jot down this: I had preserved in the alcohol of 
a clouded memory the toad of a face.  (290)   
Here the temporal relationship between story time and narrative time 
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collapses as Humbert loses control of his narration.  He has “no time right 
now,” meaning, no narrative time for dallying with digressions or 
explanations.  But the reason he gives for this lack of narrative time is an 
impossible one because it exists within the story time—he is “on [his] way to 
his uncle and walking fast.”  Humbert claims to be methodical, yet here we 
see how his emotional state clouds his narration, even after the fact. 
Upon locating Quilty inside his house, Humbert again first slows then 
quickens his actions and his corresponding narrative pace: “Then, still 
ignoring the raincoated phantasm that had stopped in midstairs, master 
walked into a cozy boudoir across the hall from the drawing room, through 
which—taking it easy, knowing he was safe—I now went away from him, and 
in a bar-adorned kitchen gingerly unwrapped dirty Chum” (295).  In 
confronting Quilty, Humbert’s pleasurable fantasy of the murder 
simultaneously forestalls and hastens its actuality: “To have him trapped, after 
those years of repentance and rage . . . To look at the black hairs on the back of 
his pudgy hands . . . To wander with a hundred eyes over his purple silks and 
hirsute chest foreglimpsing the punctures, and mess, and music of pain . . . To 
know that this semi-animated, subhuman trickster who had sodomized my 
darling—oh, my darling, this was intolerable bliss!” (295).  Here Humbert’s 
prose practically trips over itself as his use of ellipses hastens the movement 
from infinitive clause to infinitive clause, ending in an apostrophe—a 
rhetorical figure of either hopelessness or futility by definition as the 
addressee is usually dead or absent—here Lolita, in Humbert’s narrative time 
and his imagined futurity, is both.  Humbert’s rage punctuates his narrative 
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just as he hopes his bullets will punctuate Quilty’s body.   
While Humbert entertains the passions of “high art”—love, tragedy, 
revenge—Lolita, even in her grief and despair, is allowed access only to the 
weak affects associated with her penchant for “low art,” her consumerism, 
and her vulgarity.  She is bored, irritated, and apathetic: 
She had entered my world, umber and black Humberland, with rash 
curiosity; she surveyed it with a shrug of amused distaste; and it 
seemed to me now that she was ready to turn away from it with 
something akin to plain repulsion.  Never did she vibrate under my 
touch, and a strident ‘what d’you think you are doing?’ was all I got for 
my pains.  To the wonderland I had to offer, my fool preferred the 
corniest movies, the most cloying fudge.  To think that between a 
Hamburger and Humburger, she would—invariably, with icy 
precision—plump for the former.  There is nothing more atrociously 
cruel than an adored child.  Did I mention the name of that milk bar I 
visited a moment ago?  It was, of all things, The Frigid Queen.  Smiling 
a little sadly, I dubbed her My Frigid Princess.  She did not see the 
wistful joke.  (166)     
Even in this description of Lolita’s dislike for him, Humbert attributes only 
weak affects to her.  She shrugs with indifference and “amused distaste,” 
while Humbert does not acknowledge her strong feeling of “plain 
repulsion”—the closest he permits is “something akin” to it.  She is 
characterized as being “atrociously cruel” and “frigid” when she resists his 
advances through idleness and indifference.  When she does submit to him 
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after extracting either a promise of an outing or activity, or, later in the novel, 
money, Humbert minimizes her despair as amusing and ineffectual.  Her 
desires are “silly” while his are characterized as “passions”: “I remember the 
operation was over, all over, and she was weeping in my arms;—a salutary 
storm of sobs after one of the fits of moodiness that had become so frequent 
with her in the course of that otherwise admirable year!  I had just retracted 
some silly promise she had forced me to make in a moment of blind impatient 
passion, and there she was sprawling and sobbing, and pinching my caressing 
hand, and I was laughing happily” (169).  In this division of affects, Lolita 
cannot hope to have Humbert’s capacity for actions, especially violent ones.  
Interiority compromised, though not obliterated, by Humbert’s narrative, she 
appears helpless at most points in the novel.  In one scene in particular, 
Humbert revokes a promise he had made her and he “happened to glimpse [. . 
.] a look on her face . . . that look I cannot exactly describe . . . an expression of 
helplessness so perfect that it seemed to grade into one of rather comfortable 
inanity just because this was the very limit of injustice and frustration—and 
every limit presupposes something beyond it—hence the neutral 
illumination” (283).  Humbert follows his description of Lolita’s helpless and 
inane expression with another of his appeals for the reader’s understanding of 
his emotional state: 
And when you bear in mind that these were the raised eyebrows and 
parted lips of a child, you may better appreciate what depths of 
calculated carnality, what reflected despair, restrained me from falling 
at her dear feet and dissolving in human tears, and sacrificing my 
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jealousy to whatever pleasure Lolita might hope to derive from mixing 
with dirty and dangerous children in an outside world that was real to 
her.  (284)   
While Lolita’s emotional state is “neutral” and impotent, Humbert’s is strong 
and “calculated.”  He feels despair, she feels so much she feels nothing.  
  At this point Humbert recalls: 
I often noticed that living as we did, she and I, in a world of total evil, 
we would become strangely embarrassed whenever I tried to discuss 
something she and an older friend, she and a parent, she and a real 
healthy sweetheart, I and Annabel, Lolita and a sublime, purified, 
analyzed, deified Harold Haze, might have discussed—an abstract 
idea, a painting, stippled Hopkins or shorn Baudelaire, God or 
Shakespeare, anything of a genuine kind.  Good Will!  She would mail 
her vulnerability in trite brashness and boredom.  (284)   
Although he acknowledges that Lolita’s affected boredom is a defense 
mechanism, he fails to see that she uses her access to weak affects as a means 
of stalling or thwarting Humbert’s idealized romantic narrative and forcing a 
series of literal and figurative detours.  When Lolita asks Humbert where her 
“murdered mummy” is buried, Humbert castigates her for her flippancy, 
“’Ray,’ said Lo for hurray, and languidly left the room” (286).  Humbert then 
discovers that she had been reading a book about a dying mother’s love for 
her daughter and sees that languidness for Lo is a mask that covers mourning.  
Humbert “recall[s] that on this and similar occasions, it was always my habit 
and method to ignore Lolita’s states of mind while comforting my own base 
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self” (287).   
Humbert wishes the reader to believe he is a man whose overwhelming 
passions place him at the mercy of fate, while Lolita is “A combination of 
naïveté and deception, of charm and vulgarity, of blue sulks and rosy mirth, 
Lolita, when she chose, could be a most exasperating brat,” leaving Humbert 
“not really quite prepared for her fits of disorganized boredom, intense and 
vehement griping, her sprawling, droopy, dopey-eyed style, and what is 
called goofing off—a kind of diffused clowning which she thought was tough 
in a boyish hoodlum way.  Mentally, I found her to be a disgustingly 
conventional little girl” (147-148).  Try as he might to convince himself, Lolita 
is not the Annabel from his thwarted childhood love affair.  Poe’s tragic, 
gothic maiden has been replaced with a modern, petulant, postwar American 
teenager.  This uncharitable description vilifies the paradoxically productive 
effects of Lolita’s passive, weak affects.  Lolita uses her boredom throughout 
the novel as a means of defending herself against Humbert’s amorous 
advances: 
Most often, in the slouching, bored way she cultivated, Lo would fall 
prostrate and abominably desirable into a red springchair or a green 
chaise lounge, or a steamer chair of striped canvas with footrest and 
canopy, or a sling chair, or any other lawn chair under a garden 
umbrella on the patio, and it would take hours of blandishments, 
threats and promises to make her lend me for a few seconds her brown 
limbs in the seclusion of the five-dollar room before undertaking 
anything she might prefer to my poor joy. (147) 
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Lolita’s boredom here postpones Humbert’s sexual gratification in a way that 
is unpleasurable to him and markedly dissimilar to his own delay of sexual 
possession elsewhere in the text, but it also has the effect of forcing Humbert’s 
text to mimic the delay in his sexual gratification through the mindless 
repetition of the various chairs Lo sits in (the reader will remember that 
Humbert fills voids with the repetition of words and images).  Humbert’s 
desires repeatedly incite what he characterizes as boredom in Lolita during 
their travels: 
I would park at a strategic point, with my vagrant schoolgirl beside me 
in the car, to watch the children leave school—always a pretty sight.  
This sort of thing soon began to bore my so easily bored Lolita, and, 
having a childish lack of sympathy for other people’s whims, she 
would insult me and my desire to have her caress me while blue-eyed 
little brunettes in blue shorts, copperheads in green boleros, and 
blurred boyish blondes in faded slacks passed by in the sun.  (161)    
Here Humbert, as usual, shifts the focus from Lolita’s weak affect—
boredom—to his feelings, condemning her “lack of sympathy” for his sexual 
desires as “childish.”  The narration of this boredom, however, necessitates the 
lengthy description of his desires.     
The first year the pair spend on the road is one long exercise in going 
nowhere fast:  
Now, in perusing what follows, the reader should bear in mind not 
only the general circuit as adumbrated above, with its many sidetrips 
and tourist traps, secondary circles and skittish deviations, but also the 
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fact that far from being an indolent partie de plaisir, our tour was a hard, 
twisted, teleological growth, whose sole raison d’être (these French 
clichés are symptomatic) was to keep my companion in passable humor 
from kiss to kiss.  (154)   
Humbert claims that the trip was not one of lazy pleasure, but rather the 
outgrowth of Humbert’s attempts to create a sense of limited futurity for 
Lolita at her behest.  This passage also describes the movement of the 
narrative itself.  Humbert’s flourishes of rhetoric serve the same purpose as 
these “secondary circles and skittish deviations”—the prolongation of his time 
with a “nymphet,” and his narrative delays pleasurably postpone the 
gratification of his desires. Lolita forces Humbert to create a sense of futurity 
for her in order to secure her compliance and end her passive delays: “Every 
morning during our yearlong travels I had to devise some expectation, some 
special point in space and time for her to look forward to, for her to survive 
until bedtime.  Otherwise, deprived of a shaping and sustaining purpose, the 
skeleton of her day sagged and collapsed” (151).  He continues, “By putting 
the geography of the United States into motion, I did my best for hours on end 
to give her the impression of ‘going places,’ of rolling on to some definite 
destination, to some unusual delight” (152).  The best Humbert can offer is the 
“impression of going places,” the deceptive practice of pretending to approach 
a conclusion when the act truly serves as a means of prolonging their journey 
without a destination.  If Humbert possesses the emotional tools of a 
manipulative ruler, Lolita possesses the passive resistance of the 
disenfranchised, which she ultimately uses to escape her kidnapper.  The 
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reader is led to believe that Humbert is in control of the narrative’s formal 
structure into which he inserts self-conscious acts of narrative delay in his 
attempts to prolong the length of time Lolita spends as his 12-year-old victim 
in the story time.  Lolita’s narrative delays, however, work at the level of this 
narrated or story time.  Her weak or neutral affects postpone Humbert’s 
pleasure in the hopes of creating or hastening a futurity for herself.  For Lolita, 
short of the physical escape she eventually manages, the only way out of 
Humbert’s clutches is to age out of them—a task her delays work to hasten.  
Yet, Humbert narrates these delays.  While unpleasurable to him when they 
occur during the story time of the plot, they ultimately further his goal of 
prolonging the narrative. The affective disparity between the two characters is 
most strikingly seen when a melodramatic, tearful Humbert visits a married, 
pregnant Lolita and finds her utterly unmoved by his elaborate appeals to her 
to run away with him answering merely, finally, and with pity, “No, honey, 
no” (279).  The final description of Lolita we receive is that of insouciance: “I 
was surprised (this a rhetorical figure, I was not) that the sight of the old car in 
which she had ridden as a child and a nymphet, left her so very indifferent.  
All she remarked was it was getting sort of purplish about the gills” (280).  
Here Humbert uses affect, or the profession of it, as a rhetorical figure, 
relegating surprise, the “neutral” affect according to Silvan Tomkins27, to a 
feeling in word or name only divorced from visceral experience.  Humbert the 
narrator feigns surprise then admits that this is yet another example of his 
choosing “fancy prose” over accurate recounting.   
                                                
27 See Introduction. 
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In this, the last scene in which Lolita appears in the novel, she takes 
pleasure in delaying, thereby controlling, the revelation of Quilty’s identity to 
Humbert in their final meeting: 
She thought I had guessed long ago.  It was (with a mischievous and 
melancholy smile) such a sensational name.  I would never believe it.  
She could hardly believe it herself.  His name, my fall nymph.  It was so 
unimportant, she said.  She suggested I skip it.  Would I like a 
cigarette?  No.  His name.  She shook her head with great resolution.  
She guessed it was too late to raise hell and I would never believe the 
unbelievably unbelievable—I said I had better go, regards, nice to have 
seen her.  She said really it was useless, she would never tell, but on the 
other hand, after all—‘Do you really want to know who it was?  Well, it 
was—‘  And softly, confidentially, arching her thin eyebrows and 
puckering her parched lips, she emitted, a little mockingly, somewhat 
fastidiously, not untenderly, in a kind of muted whistle, the name that 
the astute reader has guessed long ago.  (271-2)   
Here, of course, Humbert’s narrative seeks to outdo Lolita’s hedging and the 
taunting of a secret yet-to-be revealed.  He continues to delay the revelation of 
Quilty’s identity for several pages. 
What I term “queer time” in the novel then is linked to a baffling of 
heteronormative conceptions of temporality, (re)production, and linearity.  
Humbert’s pedophilia functions as an anti-progress narrative, a subversion of 
heteronormative narratives of reproductive sexuality.  Humbert claims that 
his desires are a result of thwarted romantic love, itself a familiar “boy meets 
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girl” narrative progressing sequentially through love, marriage, and children.  
He blames the derailing of his burgeoning sexuality, arrested at a young age 
with the death of his first adolescent lover, Annabel, for dooming him to 
attempt to recreate this site of desire over and over again with pre-pubescent 
girls.  Humbert claims this unconsummated pubescent affair led to his fixation 
with Lolita.  Though it reads as an attempt to justify his pedophilia, this 
interrupted sexual relationship mirrors the starts, stops, and stutters of his 
prose.  He writes, “When I try to analyze my own cravings, motives, actions 
and so forth, I surrender to a sort of retrospective imagination which feeds the 
analytic faculty with boundless alternatives and which causes each visualized 
route to fork and re-fork without end in the maddeningly complex prospect of 
my past” (13).  The non-linear narrative of his endless hypothetical past 
imaginings resembles the recursive, compulsive re-reading of a book as he 
“leaf[s] again and again through these miserable memories” (13).  He begins 
this portion of his narrative by “primly limit[ing]” his description of Annabel, 
thus equating long, lush description with the imprudent and the lewd, and 
ends by claiming, “I have reserved for the conclusion of my ‘Annabel’ phase 
the account of our unsuccessful first tryst” (14).  He ends his story of Annabel 
by framing the beginning his story of Lolita through the lens of failed and 
thwarted sexuality.   
In No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Lee Edelman positions 
queerness as “outside and beyond its political symptoms, the place of the 
social order’s death drive” and asserts that “queerness attains its ethical value 
precisely insofar as it accedes to that place, accepting its figural status as 
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resistance to the viability of the social while insisting on the inextricability of 
such resistance from every social structure” (3).  In his Lacanian analysis, 
queerness names the structural position of the death drive and Edelman 
argues for a queer acceptance of this figuration as a means of “undoing the 
symbolic” that structures the politics of the social order (27).  He writes: 
[T]he Child has come to embody for us the telos of the social order and 
come to be seen as the one for whom that order is held in perpetual 
trust […] the image of the Child, not be confused with the lived 
experiences of any historical children, serves to regulate political 
discourse […] For the social order exists to preserve for this 
universalized subject, this fantasmatic Child, a notional freedom more 
highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself, which might, after 
all, put at risk the Child to whom such a freedom falls due. (11)   
In the novel, John Ray, Jr., the fictional author of the novel’s parodic foreword, 
provides the moralizing viewpoint of a social order predicated on the 
reproductive futurity Edelman examines: 
[S]till more important to us than scientific significance and literary 
worth, is the ethical impact the book should have on the serious reader; 
for in this poignant personal study there lurks a general lesson; the 
wayward child, the egotistic mother, the panting maniac—these are not 
only vivid characters in a unique story: they warn us of dangerous 
trends; they point out potent evils.  ‘Lolita’ should make all of us—
parents, social workers, educators—apply ourselves with still greater 
vigilance and vision to the task of bringing up a better generation in a 
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safer world.  (5-6)   
The novel wraps its tale of Humbert’s renunciation of a social order 
predicated on reproductive futurity and the imaginary figure of the innocent 
child Edelman discusses within a parodic cloak.  Nabokov himself lets us 
know unequivocally that he is “neither a reader nor a writer of didactic fiction, 
and despite John Ray’s assertion, Lolita has no moral in tow.  For me a work of 
fiction exists only insofar as it affords me what I shall bluntly call aesthetic 
bliss, that is a sense of being somehow, somewhere, connected with other 
states of being where art (curiosity, tenderness, kindness, ecstasy) is the norm” 
(“On a book” 314-315).  The foreword seeks to preempt the search for a moral 
within the book by parodying those who might seek one, as well as any 
insistence on a moral didacticism that would position the future good of the 
imagined child above the pleasure, the “aesthetic bliss” of the moment.  John 
Ray is the figure of the reader who cannot see beyond his own expectations 
and of the critic whose belief in his own theories of literature and human 
behavior threaten to obscure the text.  
Humbert continually mocks and renounces a social order predicated on 
reproductive futurism.  He delights in the play on “knowing” a person in the 
biblical sense when he refers to the book in which Charlotte had recorded 
Lolita’s measurements and development (“A Guide to Your Child’s 
Development”) as the “Know-Your-Child” book, rendering this explicitly in his 
description of another volume: “I read and reread a book with the 
unintentionally biblical title Know Your Own Daughter (81, 107, 174).  He points 
out various other puns and ironies during their travels: “I derived a not 
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exclusively economic kick form such roadside signs as Timber Hotel, Children 
under 14 Free” (147), to mention just one example.  Humbert disavows his own 
reproductive capabilities by desiring pre-pubescents and he feigns ignorance 
of Lolita’s by describing her menarche as evidence of his sexual prowess.  
When Humbert acknowledges his own reproductive capability, he sees it as a 
tool either to remove Charlotte from the house so he may drug and rape Lolita 
or as a means of providing him with a supply of easily accessible nymphets to 
molest—the children and grandchildren he fantasizes having with Lolita:  
I could switch in the course of the same day from one pole of insanity 
to the other—from the thought that around 1950 I would have to get rid 
somehow of a difficult adolescent whose magic nymphage had 
evaporated—to the thought that with patience and luck I might have 
her produce eventually a nymphet with my blood in her exquisite 
veins, a Lolita the Second, who would be eight or nine around 1960 […] 
indeed, the telescopy of my mind, or un-mind, was strong enough to 
distinguish in the remoteness of time a […] bizarre, tender, salivating 
Dr. Humbert, practicing on a supremely lovely Lolita the Third the art 
of being a granddad. (174)   
Humbert figures reproductive futurity in a pleasurably perverse fashion.  The 
figure of the child who always exists in a fantasy of the future is, in this case, 
the figure of the child perpetually available for sexual possession.  Humbert’s 
version of reproductive futurity does not involve adherence to current social 
and social political restrictions in order to preserve the innocent existence of 
future generations, but rather the flaunting of them in order to preserve the 
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fantasy of the victimization of future generations.  While I do not necessarily 
read Humbert’s queerness as related to an embracing or embodying of the 
death drive (the structural queerness Edelman discusses); I do read as queer 
the way he complicates the social order’s relationship to the figure of the child 
by refiguring the implications of a constantly receding future predicated upon 
the linear temporality of reproduction.  
Humbert has also been read by some critics as a queer figure for 
different reasons.  Ohi, for example, views Humbert as queer by virtue of the 
way he “volubly celebrates a forbidden, illegal passion” and  
[B]ecause his desire and his prose are energized by the world’s 
disapproval, because he transforms everything he encounters into an 
aspect, sign, monument, or portent of his passion, because he is riven 
and obsessed, self-loathing and self-aggrandizing, proud and ashamed, 
mawkish and ironic, conflicted and absolutely arrogant in his refusal, 
his inability to stop talking about a love that disgusts the world.  He 
seems to allow, to invite, my presumption in thinking that his 
predicament is a terribly familiar one. (188) 
Ohi argues against moralizing readings of the novel that concern themselves 
with determining the level of sincerity present in Humbert’s declarations of 
guilt in favor of “relinquish[ing] ourselves to the seduction of desire as a form 
of aestheticism or decadence (and of decadence as a mode or desire), of 
Humbert’s love as founded on an impossibility or loss structural to writing” 
(188). Stockton’s queer reading of the novel, in contrast, hinges on Lolita’s 
position as a sexual child “queered by Freud” who “possesses sexual wishes 
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and aggressive urges, often in queer (mis-)alignment with fathers. [. . .] But 
Lolita is queer herself.  Sexually schooled by ‘little lesbians,’ Dolly as the 
quintessential not-yet-straight child has her own movements with and against 
her two pedophiles through a set of dogs” (121).  While Ohi convincingly 
reads the tropes of sentimentalism Humbert deploys as performing the queer 
work of destabilizing representation and Stockton reads Lolita’s queerness 
through her actual and metaphorical relationship to dogs and modes of 
locomotion, I read Humbert’s rhetoric and Lolita’s (in)action as bound up with 
the structural processes of narrative delay.  Given its pedophile narrator and 
sexualized child, whose normative development is arrested by her abuser, the 
novel’s queerness is most clearly seen in its treatment of time. 
The failure of Humbert’s and Lolita’s sexualities to fall within 
categories recognizable as heteronormative influences the narrative structure 
of the novel.  While Humbert offers examples of what he would have the 
reader believe are narratives similar to his own—he repeatedly alludes to and 
compares himself with Edgar Allan Poe who married his 13-year-old cousin, 
Virginia Clemm, and claims, “Marriage and cohabitation before the age of 
puberty are still not uncommon in certain East Indian provinces.  Lepcha old 
men of eighty copulate with girls of eight, and nobody minds.  After all, Dante 
fell madly in love with his Beatrice when she was nine” (19)—it is clear that 
his narrative of pedophilia falls outside the bounds of these historical 
anecdotes in his desire to halt the maturation of nymphets and deny both his 
and their potential for reproduction.  After all, Poe took Virginia as his bride 
with the attendant normative expectations of marriage, not his prisoner or 
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concubine, and Dante was Beatrice’s contemporary, not a much older lover. 
Lolita’s own nascent sexuality is portrayed as being thrown off trajectory by 
Humbert’s interference.  Her initial introduction comes at camp as a form of 
child’s play, which then becomes warped by the “parody of incest” she shares 
with Humbert (287).  Later, Clare Quilty, who is revealed to be a child 
pornographer, refuses to fulfill her own romantic fantasies of monogamy.  He 
asks her to perform “Crazy things, filthy things.  I said no, I’m just not going 
to [she used, in all insouciance really, a disgusting slang term which, in a 
literal French translation, would be souffler] your beastly boys, because I want 
only you.  Well, he kicked me out” (277).  This is yet another example of 
Humbert’s elaborate prose used in service of narrative delay—he removes the 
word “blow” from Lolita’s mouth and inserts a 19-word interjection ironically 
condemning her vulgarity while celebrating the “old-world politeness” that 
he exploits as a means to elaborately detail that which he claims to be unable 
to discuss (38).  Lolita’s life ends with the product of her normative 
marriage—her daughter—killing her in childbirth.  The nonheteronormative, 
queer trajectories of these characters become bound up in the formal 
properties of the text creating the novel’s nested narration and engendering 
textual interruptions that mirror the fractured psyche of the characters, as well 
as their grief and desires, in recursive acts of delay.  Thus, “queer time” in the 
novel is that which names the stalled maturation, development and progress 
of the characters that then becomes replicated in formal textual delays.  These 
textual delays are in turn, as I have shown, related to the use of affect in the 
novel. 
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There is, of course, no future generation to be had in Lolita.  Humbert’s 
perverse plan to bear girl children with Lolita whom he could in turn molest is 
upset by the perversity of Lolita’s actual demise: killed on Christmas day 
giving birth to a girl—a warped and ironic Virgin Mary.  While John Ray, Jr. 
provides a utilitarian view of the worth of literature that aligns the goals of art 
with those of the reigning social order—that it should teach us things and 
pave the way for a better tomorrow, the text refuses him.  John Ray looks 
toward the future and correlates meaning and value with a concern for 
children and the next generation, but Nabokov’s “aesthetic bliss” belongs to 
the present. 
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CHAPTER 2 
KILLING TIME: VIOLENCE AND QUEER TEMPORALITY IN RICHARD 
WRIGHT’S NATIVE SON 
 “‘Bigger, are there many Negro boys like you?’ ‘I reckon so.  All of ’em I know 
ain’t got nothing and ain’t going nowhere’” (357). 
 
In his exploration of public sex and gay cruising in New York City in 
the late-twentieth century, Times Square Red, Times Square Blue, Samuel Delany 
describes various queer interactions within pornographic movie theaters, 
including the following encounter:  
I glanced at the young guy, two rows below and a few seats to the side, 
when suddenly he put back his head, black hair glimmering in the 
screen’s light in rhythm with his fist.  He blinked twice, closed his eyes, 
clamped his teeth, and, as his lips pulled apart, in two large gouts and a 
smaller, from his speeding grip his fluids arched into the black between 
his khaki knees, wide against two different seat backs.  [. . .] After 
moments, breathing hard, he sat up to grin.  ‘Hey . . . that was a . . .  
pretty good one, wasn’t it?’ [. . .] The young man looked up and—still 
grinning—saw me: ‘Not bad—hey, you’re watchin’ me too?’ I nodded.  
‘I’m gettin’ off on her up there—’ he pointed at the screen—‘and you 
guys are all gettin’ off on me . . .? That’s funny, huh?’ [author’s 
emphasis].  (21-2) 
Here Delany describes a man at a theater known as a gay cruising ground, 
which showed straight pornography, identified by gay patrons as a “straight 
kid” masturbating and inviting others to watch so long as they “sit at least a 
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seat away” (21).  While the man in question might claim to be “getting off” on 
the porn actress on screen, he is also very clearly aroused by the queer 
voyeurism of the theater as a homoerotic space, by being watched by other 
men.  I foreground Delany’s work on the relationship between movie theaters 
and public sex in the latter half of the century in order to think backward 
through this moment of cruising to the homoerotic sex acts contained in movie 
theaters past, specifically the scene of masturbation that occurs in the Regal 
Theatre28 in Richard Wright’s 1940 novel Native Son.  Occurring at the point in 
the plot when protagonist Bigger Thomas and his friend Jack kill time before 
their thwarted attempt to rob Blum’s store, the scene is a key instance of 
waiting or inaction characterized by queer behavior.  Such moments in the text 
punctuate the narrative’s linear movement and progress revealing the queer 
temporality that structures the novel.  The scene depicts the theater as a 
homorerotic space where Bigger and Jack masturbate together and for each 
other.  This chapter reads the Regal Theatre scene as one that highlights 
Bigger’s position as a queer figure within the text.  It depicts his homoerotic 
sexual behavior and shows the weak affects associated with his passive 
spectatorship to be both gendered and nonheteronormative.   
Native Son depicts Bigger as suffering from a case of arrested 
development.  He is a twenty-year-old perpetual adolescent who is denied the 
socio-economic means of maturity by the systemic racism and oppression of 
                                                
28 The address and description of the Regal Theatre given in Native Son 
corresponds with Chicago’s Regal Theater, built in 1928 and shuttered in 1968.  
I use the former spelling when discussing the novel’s fictionalized theater and 
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American society.  As a heteronormative “coming-of-age” narrative is both 
inaccessible and undesirable to Bigger, the novel constitutes a story of stalled 
development.  Without the possibility of occupying such a narrative he has no 
future, a reality that queers his development, much as it does Lolita’s, as 
discussed in the previous chapter.  Bigger’s delayed maturation is reflected in 
the narrative delays in the text—the instances of time killing that interrupt and 
delay the novel’s progress.  If Bigger exists when he acts—impulsively, 
violently, and motivated by rage or fear—as his lawyer Boris Max argues at 
his trial, how then are we to read the large portions of the novel Bigger spends 
waiting to act; the stretches of narrative time marked by inaction that give way 
to violent outbursts? I focus on the Regal Theatre scene as a specific depiction 
of one such instance of “killing time” that prefigures Bigger’s acts of 
violence—his “time to kill”—as a way to examine the interplay of queerness, 
affect and narrative structure within the text.   
Bigger kills time through his passive spectatorship of the world around 
him, a spectatorship characterized by weak or neutral affects that manifest in 
displays of idleness, apathy, and disaffection.  These moments of passivity 
and inaction form a stark contrast to those in which Bigger’s strong affects 
lead to violent action, yet have rarely been critically addressed.  In Native Son, 
the strong affects that propel the major events of the plot—the fear and rage 
that enable Bigger’s murders and his flight from the law—are unsustainable.  
For the text to stretch from beginning to end, to develop linearly, these strong 
                                                                                                                                       
the latter when referring to its physical referent.  See Clovis E. Semmes, The 
Regal Theater and Black Culture, for a history of the Chicago venue. 
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affects must be interrupted, delayed by the weak, enduring ones.  Bigger’s 
indifference slows his rage; his anxiety causes a passivity that counters his 
quick, fear-based movements.  Roland Barthes’s formulation of the “Neutral” 
provides a useful lens through which to read the narrative function of weak 
affects.  As explored in the Introduction, Barthes locates a subversive potential 
to disrupt or unsettle cultural and societal progress narratives in the dilatory 
affects he aligns with the Neutral, which include the idleness, anxiety, and 
hysteria that plague Bigger.  These weak affects are all associated with 
inaction.  They arrest the narrative development of the text, just as they 
characterize Bigger’s own queer arrested development.  Such a reading of the 
novel leads to a new understanding of Native Son’s narrative as structured by 
a queer temporality that, in concert with racial difference and socio-economic 
inequality, disrupts heteronormative progress narratives predicated on 
maturity and reproduction.  Such an understanding, in turn, complicates 
dominant readings of Bigger’s sexuality and masculinity and the role of both 
in the plot. 
Cruising the Movies 
Bigger’s visit to the Regal Theatre to watch the film Trader Horn as a 
way to kill time before his planned armed robbery reveals the passive inaction 
of waiting, as brought on by feelings of nervousness and anxiety, to be queer 
in nature.  Throughout the novel, Bigger kills time through acts of passive 
spectatorship characterized by weak or “neutral” affects.  The beginning of the 
novel establishes Bigger’s physical day as one long exercise in time killing—
from loitering on street corners to “loafing” with friends to watching a movie.  
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While any of these activities might be considered active pursuits under 
different circumstances, for Bigger they all serve as a prelude to the violence 
he hopes will happen.  Bigger’s world swings between action and idleness.  In 
a particularly telling passage, the novel reveals the weak and strong emotional 
poles Bigger vacillates between: 
All that morning he had lurked behind his curtain of indifference and 
looked at things, snapping and glaring at whatever had tried to make 
him come out into the open [.  .  .] Confidence could only come again 
now through action so violent that it would make him forget.  These 
were the rhythms of his life: indifference and violence; periods of 
abstract brooding and periods of intense desire; moments of silence and 
moments of anger—like water ebbing and flowing from the tug of a far-
away, invisible force.  Being this way was a need of his as deep as 
eating.  (28-9)  
Yet Bigger’s actions are often futile or impotent and dependent upon outside 
forces.  Bigger “had been so conditioned in a cramped environment that hard 
words or kicks alone knocked him upright and made him capable of action—
action that was futile because the world was too much for him.  It was then 
that he closed his eyes and struck out blindly, hitting what or whom he could, 
not looking or caring what or who hit back” (240).  Bigger seeks violence for 
its own sake.  He finds pleasure in mindless acting out.  The victims of his 
violence are physically weaker and usually women.  Even as Bigger’s violence 
hurts others, he frames his desire for such action as the certainty that 
something will happen to him.  He fails to claim any agency and denies 
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accountability even within the structure of his own desires:  
Because he was restless and had time on his hands, Bigger yawned 
again and hoisted his arms high above his head.  ‘Nothing ever 
happens,’ he complained.  ‘What you want to happen?’ ‘Anything,’ 
Bigger said with a wide sweep of his dingy palm, a sweep that included 
all the possible activities of the world [. . .] ‘I reckon we the only things 
in this city that can’t go where we want to go and do what we want to 
do.’ [. . .] ‘That’s why you feeling like something awful’s going to 
happen to you,’ Gus said.  ‘You think too much.’ ‘What in hell can a 
man do?’ Bigger asked, turning to Gus.  ‘Get drunk and sleep it off.’ 
(20-21).   
Bigger’s certainty that something awful will happen to him becomes a 
shorthand for his perspective on his place in society as a member of a 
powerless underclass with no agency and no life options.  His failure to 
acknowledge his role in his own actions and eventual fate speaks to his 
embrace of animalistic drives and impulses as a way of relieving his 
restlessness.   
Bigger’s early attempts to allay his anxious idleness merely prolong it: 
“Well, he could not stand here all day like this.  What was he to do with 
himself? He tried to decide if he wanted to buy a ten-cent magazine, or go to a 
movie, or go to the poolroom and talk with the gang, or just loaf around.  With 
his hands deep in his pockets, another cigarette slanting across his chin, he 
brooded and watched the men at work across the street” (12-13).  Here Bigger 
offers up a false choice: stand there all day or “loaf around” somewhere else, 
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while he silently observes the obvious alternative across the street—men at 
work.  Each of the activities Bigger considers are simply distractions—ways to 
kill time.  He associates his lack of opportunities for action with his position in 
a racial underclass in his conversation with Gus after the pair has finished 
pantomiming various movie representations of whites in positions of power, 
what they call “playing white”: “‘Goddammit!’ ‘What’s the matter?’ ‘They 
don’t let us do nothing.’ ‘Who?’ ‘The white folks [. . .] They do things and we 
can’t’” [Wright’s emphasis] (19-20).  The one thing Bigger knows whites will 
allow him to do, in terms of opportunity and acknowledgement, is become a 
criminal.  It is this predetermined interpellation that leads Bigger to 
accidentally kill Mary Dalton.  He knows the act of being a black man in a 
white woman’s bedroom will lead to accusations of rape, and his panicked 
attempts to avoid detection lead to murder.  Bigger suffers from a fatal 
restlessness.  He cannot live with the nervous anxiety that is the product of the 
limited narrative choices available to him and he cannot relieve these passive 
feelings without resorting to violence.   
The novel frequently links Bigger’s passivity to his position as a 
spectator both of the mass media and of the strangers he watches.  He often 
absorbs and internalizes the information he passively receives about himself.  
Newspapers, for example, are an external form of media that shape his 
internal desires and relationship to the world.  Constituted by the images he is 
presented with, he is not an active or critical reader of mass culture.  Bigger 
becomes the narrative he reads about himself.  In a conspicuous example, the 
media’s construction of Bigger-as-rapist presages Bigger’s actual rape of 
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Bessie.  His relationship to film viewing, however, is his most explicit act of 
spectatorship in the novel.  Bigger views movies specifically as a distraction: 
“He needed more money; if he did not get more than he had now he would 
not know what to do with himself for the rest of the day.  He wanted to see a 
movie; his senses hungered for it.  In a movie he could dream without effort; 
all he had to do was lean back in a seat and keep his eyes open” (13-4).  Bigger 
“dreams without effort” by letting the film do his dreaming for him, 
effectively circumscribing the narratives available to his consciousness.  His 
willful rejection of agency encompasses even his potentially powerful 
spectator position.  Indeed, Bigger is rarely an active spectator.  In the movie 
theater, as on the street, or while observing Mary and Jan together, he is 
affected by the events he sees unfold while those events remain unaffected by 
him.  Even when Bigger reimagines the imagery of Trader Horn, as I discuss 
shortly, he simply swaps one image of his powerlessness for another as he is 
unable to imagine a situation where society allows him to do something instead 
of nothing.   
The Regal Theatre scene illustrates how Bigger’s passive and restless 
spectatorship becomes associated with queerness.  In this scene, Bigger and 
Jack masturbate together in the theater, then change seats and watch a 
newsreel featuring the vacation exploits of Mary Dalton before viewing part of 
the film.  Their public sex act is performed as much for each other as for any 
private release as they verbally narrate their pleasure to one another:  
Bigger moved restlessly and his breath quickened; he looked round in 
the shadows to see if any attendant was near, then slouched far down 
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in his seat.  He glanced at Jack and saw that Jack was watching him out 
of the corners of his eyes.  They both laughed.  ‘You at it again?’ Jack 
asked.  ‘I’m polishing my nightstick,’ Bigger said.  They giggled.  ‘I’ll 
beat you,’ Jack said.  (30)   
Their pleasure takes on the language of discipline and authority.  Bigger’s 
“nightstick” is a punishing instrument.  Jack’s brag that he’ll finish first is a 
simultaneous offer of aid.  The only other theatergoer mentioned is a woman 
who may have observed Bigger and Jack masturbating as she walked past 
them.  This spectator is figured as both a willing and unwilling participant in 
the pair’s sexual act and fantasies: “‘I believe that woman who passed saw us.’ 
‘So what?’ ‘If she comes back I’ll throw it in her.’ ‘You a killer.’ ‘If she saw it 
she’d faint’ ‘Or grab it, maybe.’ ‘Yeah.’” (30).  This dialogue appears after a 
break in their conversation, so it is not entirely clear which character is 
speaking which lines.  Since Bigger turns out to actually be a rapist and “a 
killer,” it is easy to assume that he is the one who threatens to “throw it in 
her” and brags that the sight of his member might cause her to faint, but the 
ambiguity here signals that the thought process of these juvenile delinquents 
is interchangeable.  At this moment, Bigger is simply one of any number of 
boys, as would later be revealed at his trial when “the manager of the Regal 
Theatre told how Bigger and boys like him masturbated in the theatre, and of 
how he had been afraid to speak to them about it, for fear that they might start 
a fight and cut him [my emphasis]” (380).  The manager confirms that the 
theater is a site where public sex acts were a known occurrence.  Bigger and 
Jack’s masturbation is not an aberrant bit of deviance, but part of a public sex 
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culture among un- or under-employed young men.  Jack’s comment to Bigger, 
“You at it again?” signals a pattern of behavior in which Bigger can be 
understood to not only habitually masturbate in this public space, but also to 
do so either with or observed by Jack.  While the boys may claim to wish they 
had their respective girlfriends with them, the erotic nature of the scene 
depends on their public, homoerotic display of virility.  The manager’s 
testimony about boys like Bigger is immediately followed by “A man from the 
juvenile court [who] said that Bigger had served three months in a reform 
school for stealing auto tires,” thus further associating public masturbation 
with a history of juvenile delinquency (380).   
In his sociological study of twentieth-century African American 
literature, Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique, Roderick 
Ferguson reads social formations, modernization, industrialization, and 
urbanization as forces that shaped a perception of African American 
communities during the 1920s and 30s as nonheteronormative.  Ferguson 
makes this claim by citing sociologists’ linking of ethnicity with variant 
familial constructions and argues that Bigger’s juvenile delinquency in Native 
Son constitutes queer behavior due to the 1930s sociological association of 
such behavior with nonheteronormativity: “The [Regal Theatre] scene 
imagines juvenile delinquency as dangerously close to outright 
homosexuality, a closeness institutionalized through urban life.  Though 
nonnormative heterosexual practices and homosexual practices were not 
commensurate in the 1930s, they were indeed adjacent” (48-9).  The Regal 
scene, in its homoeroticism and the relative privacy of the darkened theater, 
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also gestures decidedly toward a gay cruising subculture.  Gay male culture in 
1930s Chicago was relatively open during the early years of the decade, but 
increasingly policed by the end, as David K.  Johnson notes in his work on 
these historical subcultures.  Johnson cites records from 1937 relating how 
“plainclothes police officers arrested men in theaters for fondling other men, 
and judges, under pressure from a frightened populace, gave maximum $200 
fines for the crime” (112).  He also describes gay male culture in the 1930s as a 
type of youth subculture already focused on nonreproductive sexual practices:  
[S]ince at least World War I, a peer-oriented, youth subculture has 
played a central role in shifting the center of social life from the home to 
the streets, theaters, and dance halls of urban America.  Given the 
importance by 1930 of a youth culture organized around heterosexual 
dating, petting parties, and commercialized amusements—that is, 
around heterosexual desire unassociated with family or reproduction—
the existence of a parallel world of homosexual desire seems almost 
unremarkable.  (114)  
In Native Son, Bigger and Jack’s public masturbation is portrayed as 
unequivocally deviant and nearly equal parts juvenile delinquency and 
homosexual behavior.  Such nonheteronormative behavior has much in 
common with a 1930s gay cruising subculture. 
George Chauncey writes of the adoption of various urban movie 
theaters as gay cruising grounds in the early twentieth century in Gay New 
York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male World 1890-1940: 
Numerous movie and burlesque theaters, especially those in gay 
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cruising areas, also became a part of the gay circuit.  [.  .  .] The theaters 
also developed an unsavory reputation in middle-class society at large, 
which the nascent movie industry overcame only by building huge, 
elegant theaters (appropriately known as movie palaces) in the 1910s 
and 1920s.  Even some of the palaces became known as trysting spots 
for heterosexual couples, however, and a few, particularly in less 
reputable areas, became places where gay men (as well as straight men 
simply interested in a homosexual encounter) could meet one another.  
(194)  
The Regal Theater was in fact one of the urban “picture palaces” Chauncey 
describes, though located in Chicago instead of New York. Chauncey further 
writes: 
Since moviegoing was a perfectly legitimate way to spend the 
afternoon, theaters were places where young men could go to search 
out other gay men and begin to learn about the gay world.  ‘I thought I 
was [the] only one like this until I reached High School,’ recalled one 
thirty-four-year-old black man in 1922.  After learning a bit about the 
gay world from the other homosexuals he met in school, though, ‘I 
used to go to matinees, meet people like myself, get into conversation 
and [I] learned that this is a quite common thing.  They put me wise.’ 
(194-5)   
Chauncey’s descriptions of movie theaters as cruising grounds that facilitated 
nonreproductive sexual acts and homosexual encounters recall the behavior of 
Bigger and Jack at the Regal.  Their joint masturbation is an act made possible 
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by the relative privacy of the theater, yet it is still a public, illegal, 
nonheteronormative sexual practice.  The act of cruising itself bears a specific 
relationship to temporality.  It is defined by watchful waiting and repetitive 
movements that serve as a prelude to a sexual act or encounter, such as 
circling a theater: “I usually take a quick tour of the whole place, just to see 
how things are looking.  Here, that’s down the aisle there and up that one over 
there.  Then it’s once around the balcony,” Delany tells a friend he has brought 
to the Metropolitan, a popular cruising ground (26).  “There are a lot of people 
in here walking around,” his friend observes [author’s emphasis] (27).  Delany 
and Chauncey’s descriptions of movie theater cruising share this in common 
with Bigger’s experiences in the Regal—cruising involves a lot of time killing. 
Although witnesses at his trial testify that Bigger and his friend Jack 
masturbate to the newsreel of Mary Dalton, attempting to demonstrate 
Bigger’s lust for white women and Mary in particular, this is not what actually 
happens in the theater.  Bigger and Jack masturbate prior to the start of the 
film to the sound of the theater’s pipe organ and change seats afterward.  
Indeed, the erotics of the scene concern nearly everything except lust for a 
white woman, including the homoerotic proximity of the male characters and 
the exotic space of the Moorish-Revival theater29 itself, as well as the cinema 
                                                
29 In his history of the venue, Clovis E.  Semmes describes the ornateness of the 
Regal and explains how the lavish interior was designed to invoke a particular 
exoticism through its Moorish Revival-style architecture and interior design: 
“Promoters boasted of marble floors from the Carrara quarries of Italy, silks 
from the Orient, ornate crystal chandeliers from Belgium, and mottled 
Moroccan leather-covered seats” (3).  He continues, “The ceiling—a semi-
atmospheric, illuminated, domed structure—provided a soaring tent-like 
effect with a richly beautiful, multicolored, striped motif.  Through apertures 
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spectacles it houses and represents, and, finally, the sense of arousal at plans 
for their impending violent act—armed robbery.  The place of women in the 
theater might seem to subject both the larger-than-life Mary Dalton in the 
newsreel and the female movie theater patron to Bigger and Jack’s controlling 
gaze, yet this is an illusory power they fail to actively wield, as demonstrated 
by Bigger’s earlier comments about passive movie watching.  Even the 
potentially violent actions of the pair in this scene are merely projected onto 
them.  The theater manager assumes the two are violent because they engage 
in deviant behavior, yet the idea of them pulling a knife when interrupted 
while masturbating seems logistically improbable.  Likewise, the woman who 
walks past them is only retroactively threatened—only after she has passed by 
without incident do they make sexual threats that read as empty bravado.  
Like the “straight kid” in Delany’s example who claims to be aroused solely 
by the porn actress on screen, but is clearly seeking same-sex interaction, 
Bigger and Jack’s public sex act is primarily performed for each other.   
The masturbatory actions of Bigger and Jack take place before viewing 
the movie they had gone to see—the 1931 film, Trader Horn.  The primitivism 
on display in Trader Horn, which Bigger only half-watches, blurs the roles of 
spectator and spectacle for Bigger whose position as a spectator is inextricably 
bound up with his position as spectacle both in the plot of the novel and in his 
identification with the black bodies on screen; in both cases he lacks or 
believes he lacks agency.  While film scholars have theorized modes of active 
                                                                                                                                       
in the tent-like structure you could see the delicate silhouette of Moorish 
castles under a blue night sky with twinkling stars” (26). 
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spectatorship that involve processes of identification, what Native Son 
provides is a scene of spectatorship that serves a larger narrative purpose.  
Within the novel, spectatorship in the Regal is coded as passive time killing; 
and time killing in the novel—whether on the streets, in the pool hall, or in the 
movie theater—is associated with male homosociality.  Male homosociality, as 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick notes, is part of a queer continuum that connects it 
with male homosexuality (Between Men 1-5).   
Writing of Bigger’s spectatorship in terms of Wright’s Marxist cultural 
criticism, Vincent Pérez argues that Bigger’s desire for societal inclusion can 
be temporarily met within the confines of his spectatorship:  
Just as American consumers in the 1930s and 1940s were drawn to the 
utopian aspects of media culture, by “losing himself” among the crowd, 
or amid the dazzling representations in the movies, Bigger too 
momentarily “merges” with the mainstream world as an equal 
member. Yet, significantly, unlike members of mainstream society, 
Bigger [. . .] is not drawn to the glamour of media culture. Rather, 
media texts for him embody inclusion in a national community from 
which he and other Blacks have traditionally been excluded [author’s 
emphasis].  (157-8) 
Pérez sees Bigger as an active spectator whose consumption of mass culture is 
an equalizing force in a capitalist society.  Jacqueline Stewart also sees Bigger 
as an active spectator, and discusses Bigger’s black spectatorship in Migrating 
to the Movies as engaging in a “spectatorial fluidity” that allows him to read 
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across the various performances witnessed in the theater, such as multiple 
film programs and newsreels: “Wright’s scene suggests that the variability of 
theater programs would have also shaped early Black ‘moviegoing’ 
experiences in general, and readings of individual films in particular” (100).  
Addressing the unrestored version of the text, which omits the masturbation 
scene and includes a double feature consisting of The Gay Woman and Trader 
Horn, Stewart argues that due to Bigger’s lack of socioeconomic mobility his 
relationship to film is that of a “reconstructed spectatorship” at odds with 
both the “ideal” white spectator and the figure of the deliberately distracted 
flâneur:  
[W]ithout the flâneur’s affected freedom of unchecked 
social/geographic mobility, Bigger’s gaze is always tethered.  In his 
viewing behavior he bristles at these restrictions, seeking to construct 
and synthesize fragments of images and sensations into coherent, 
satisfying wholes, or goals—the opposite of the flâneur/surrealist’s 
deliberately aimless, partial, disintegrative viewing (107).   
Yet Bigger’s distracted spectatorship still presents him with possibilities not 
available to him outside the theater where his problems stem from his 
inability to construct a “satisfying whole” out of his life experiences: “There 
was something he knew and something he felt; [.  .  .] something spread out in 
front of him and something spread out in back; and never in all his life, with 
this black skin of his, had the two worlds, thought and feeling, will and mind, 
aspiration and satisfaction, been together; never had he felt a sense of 
wholeness [author’s emphasis]” (240).   
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This “sense of wholeness” Bigger craves is an impossible desire—the unifying 
of the split subject made impossible by the unintelligible nature of his racial 
otherness: 
It was when he read the newspapers or magazines, went to the movies, 
or walked along the streets with crowds, that he felt what he wanted: to 
merge himself with others and be a part of this world, to lose himself in 
it so he could find himself, to be allowed a chance to live like others, 
even though he was black.  (240)   
Bigger’s lack of feelings of societal inclusion and his mental rewriting of Trader 
Horn’s depictions of blackness are less a means of constructing a pleasurable 
narrative, however, than an underscoring of the privilege he does not possess.  
Bigger “looked at Trader Horn unfold and saw the pictures of naked black men 
and women whirling in wild dances and heard drums beating and then 
gradually the African scene changed and was replaced by images in his own 
mind of white men and women dressed in black and white clothes, laughing, 
talking, drinking, and dancing.  Those were smart people; they knew how to 
get hold of money, millions of it” (33).  The elision of these two worlds: the 
primitivist fantasy of Trader Horn and Bigger’s imagining of a wealthy white 
world, merely replaces one racial caricature with another, exchanging the 
African jungle for a white urban one.  Bigger “loses” himself by letting his 
passive acts of spectatorship—how he kills time—define and circumscribe his 
identity.  The newspapers and movies may offer the illusion of “merging,” but 
ultimately they tell him who he can and cannot be, and which narratives he 
can and cannot occupy. 
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Stewart argues that Bigger’s spectatorship shares “some important 
affinities between Black working-class modes of modern looking via the 
cinema and those of bourgeois white flâneurs” by virtue of his “disjunctive 
engagements with the cinema as show (physical and mental engagement and 
withdrawal)” (106).  Bigger’s primary engagement in the restored version of 
the scene, however, is with the physical space of the cinema itself—the theater 
that offers a place to wait and the opportunity for the homosociality that 
Bigger associates with idleness and time killing.  His secondary engagement 
with the film and the newsreel surely gestures toward Bigger’s fantasy life, 
but in doing so reveals his lack of opportunity.  For Bigger’s dream is not 
simply to be or to bed the rich, but is a fantasy about white narratives of 
upward mobility that are unavailable to him.  The attainable progress 
narratives he is ultimately presented with, such as religious salvation, are 
unappealing to Bigger. 
While Pérez and Stewart make forceful claims for Bigger’s agency as an 
active film spectator rather than a passive recipient of mass culture, Bigger has 
far less agency than he might appear to possess.  Since spectatorship is coded 
as passive time killing within the larger plot of the novel, the duration of the 
scene should be read in terms of its inaction, or a lack of forward progress 
characterized by queer behavior.  Bigger’s queerness within the movie theater 
corresponds with the temporality of that moment in the text, which functions 
as a delay in the movement of the plot toward its resolution.  Like other 
moments of killing time in the novel, this one is followed by an eruption of 
violence, even though the intended crime never takes place.  Bigger nervously 
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changes his mind about the robbery and becomes violent with his friends to 
escape participation—a violence that carries homosexual undertones.  After 
being accused of being “too nervous” by his friends, he attacks one of them, 
knocking Gus to the floor at which point “Bigger laughed, softly at first, then 
harder, louder, hysterically” (37).  Bigger then draws a knife and forces Gus to 
lick its phallic blade (39).  Bigger’s feminine anxiety is the precursor to 
sexualized violence. 
Bigger’s relationship to the available progress narratives the space of 
the Regal represents is perhaps best expressed by Max at his trial: “this Negro 
boy, Bigger Thomas, is a part of a furious blaze of liquid life-energy which 
once blazed and is still blazing in our land.  He is a hot jet of life that spattered 
itself in futility against a cold wall” (399).  Bigger’s “hot jet of life” proves as 
impotent as his nonreproductive masturbatory sex act, semen also spattering 
in futility on the theater floor: “‘I don’t know where to put my feet now,’ 
Bigger said, laughing.  ‘Let’s take another seat’” (30).  Bigger fails to secure a 
future within the novel, a fact the novel attributes to the state of race relations 
in the 1930s: “Well, to tell the truth, Mr.  Max, it seems sort of natural-like, me 
being here facing that death chair.  Now I come to think of it, it seems like 
something like this just had to be” (358).  Yet Bigger’s inability to imagine a 
future for himself also stems from his queer associations.  In a 
heteronormative society that defines maturity as the reproduction of the 
dominant social order through sexual reproduction, Bigger’s inability to gain 
the economic and sexual maturity that would allow him to “grow up” and 
claim a place in this ordered world costs him his life.   
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As Max argues during his trial, Bigger’s primary sexual outlet is 
nonreproductive masturbation: “Was not Bigger Thomas’ relationship to his 
girl a masturbatory one? Was not his relationship to the whole world on the 
same plane?” (402).  Bigger takes pleasure without giving and his juvenile 
masturbation becomes synonymous with an immature worldview that proves 
incompatible with a society focused on what Lee Edelman has called 
“reproductive futurism,” or “terms that impose an ideological limit on 
political discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of 
heteronormativity by rendering unthinkable, by casting outside the political 
domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of 
communal relations” (2).  Bigger embodies the queer threat to the future of the 
fantasmatic figure of the Child, which Edelman posits as the basis for 
regulatory regimes that privilege heteronormativity and reproduction, 
through both his refusal to engage in a reproductive relationship and the 
murderous tendencies that make him a threat to society. 
Although included in the page proofs sent to publisher Harper and 
Brothers in 1939, Wright edited the Regal Theatre scene prior to publication in 
order to make the novel’s acceptance as a Book-of-the-Month Club selection 
possible.  In requesting the changes, Wright’s publisher, Edward Aswell 
wrote: 
[I]ncidentally the Book Club wants to know whether, if they do choose 
Native Son, you would be willing to make some changes in that scene 
early in the book where Bigger and his friends are sitting in the moving 
picture theatre.  I think you will recognize the scene I mean and will 
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understand why the Book Club finds it objectionable.  They are not a 
particularly squeamish crowd, but that scene, after all, is a bit on the 
raw side.  I daresay you could revise it in a way to suggest what 
happens rather than to tell it explicitly.   
(486)  
As a Book-of-the-Month Club selection, the novel sold 215,000 copies in the 
first three weeks of its release (Radway 287).  The “raw” movie theater scene 
had a clear monetary value attached to its expurgation.  Yet of all the 
potentially objectionable scenes in the novel, such as its graphic depictions of 
rape and murder, it was not the sexual and sexualized violence that offended, 
but the scene with mutually pleasurable homosexual undercurrents, the scene 
in which juvenile delinquency becomes conflated with queer behavior.  The 
omitted text discussed in this chapter was restored in the 1991 Library of 
America edition based on Wright’s 1939 manuscript and HarperCollins has 
published this restored text in all subsequent printings and editions.30  
In his book club revision, Wright omitted the masturbation entirely, as 
well as much of the newsreel and any mention of Mary Dalton.  Instead, the 
scene focuses on a lengthy depiction of the apparently fictional film The Gay 
Woman. The description of how Bigger saw Trader Horn’s “pictures of naked 
black men and women whirling in wild dances and heard drums beating” (33) 
was replaced with a description of Bigger viewing the movie’s poster: “Two 
                                                
30 See Arnold Rampersad’s “Too Honest for His Own Time” Rpt. in The 
Critical Response to Richard Wright. Ed. Robert J. Butler.  Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1995. (163-166) for a description of the editorial decisions 
made in restoring the text for the Library of America volume. 
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features were advertised: one, The Gay Woman, was pictured on the posters in 
images of white men and white women lolling on beaches, swimming, and 
dancing in night clubs; the other, Trader Horn, was shown on the posters in 
terms of black men and black women dancing against a wild background of 
barbaric jungle” (490).  The description of The Gay Woman seems to replace the 
images of Mary Dalton in the newsreel: “He saw images of smiling, dark-
haired white girls lolling on the gleaming sands of a beach.  The background 
was a stretch of sparkling water.  Palm trees stood near and far” (31).  This 
passage appears to replace the image of Mary Dalton as one of the “daughters 
of the rich taking sunbaths in the sands of Florida!” (31).  The description of 
the Trader Horn poster, however, is curious.  The novel highlights the 
primitivist poster depiction of Africans, yet many of the extant movie posters 
for the 1931 film actually focused on the spectacle of the scantily clothed white 
female star of the film Edwina Booth, who portrays white “savage” Nina 
Trent, the lost daughter of missionaries who has “gone native” and become a 
tribal goddess.  When looking at representative Trader Horn 1931 movie 
posters (figures 1-2), it becomes clear that MGM’s marketing strategy in the 
U.S. revolved around the sexualized figure of the white savage goddess—the 
fair-haired white woman made sexually available through her connection to 
uncivilized black Africa.  In contrast, a 1931 poster from Sweden (figure 3) 
takes different approach and shows the disembodied head of an African 
tribesman, invoking imagery of the “noble savage.”   
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1931 Movie Poster 
(Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Trader_Horn_(1931_film)_ 
poster.jpg) 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: http://www.movieposterdb.com/posters/09_12/1931/22495 
/l_22495_6cc8a0c6.jpg) 
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Figure 3 
 
(Source: http://www.movieposterdb.com/posters/06_09/1931/ 
0022495/l_131271_0022495_fedbeca9.jpg) 
 
In both of the U.S. posters, Booth is a larger-than-life figure towering 
above not only black and white men, but also various jungle creatures, 
including elephants, hippos, and gorillas.  As in von Sternberg’s 1932 film, 
Blonde Venus, where an exoticized Marlene Dietrich emerges from a gorilla 
suit in her African safari-themed “Hot Voodoo” number to perform 
suggestively to “jungle beats,” Booth wears a veneer of savage blackness that 
serves to sexualize the otherwise untouchable white woman underneath.  Yet, 
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as the film and the posters makes clear, the white goddess is only really made 
sexually available to the white explorer, Horn.  In one of the posters (fig. 2), it 
becomes clear that the only thing that can tame the “White goddess of the 
pagan tribes.  The cruelest woman in all Africa!” is sexual conquest by the 
white male explorer.  Horn’s conquest of the White Goddess is the domination 
and possession of Africa as well.   
Mary becomes the stand-in for Booth (in both the published and 
restored versions) in her short appearance in the novel as the wild daughter of 
wealthy progressives who has a communist boyfriend and an interest in racial 
tourism.  Jack goads Bigger with stories about how “them rich white women’ll 
go to bed with anybody, from a poodle on up.  They even have their 
chauffeurs” (33), and inside the theater Bigger thinks: 
Yes, his going to work for the Daltons was something big.  Mr. Dalton 
was a millionaire.  Maybe Mary Dalton was a hot kind of girl; maybe 
she spent lots of money; maybe she’d like to come to the South Side and 
see the sights sometimes.  Or maybe she had a secret sweetheart and 
only he would know about it because he would have to drive her 
around; maybe she would give him money not to tell.  (34)   
Yet that very evening, when Bigger discovers that Mary is indeed a “hot kind 
of girl” with a secret sweetheart who wants to visit the South Side, his reaction 
is one of fear and confusion.  Presented with his theater fantasy Bigger recoils: 
“some remote part of his mind considered in amazement how different the 
girl had seemed in the movie.  On the screen she was not dangerous and his 
mind could do with her as it liked.  But here in her home she walked over 
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everything, put herself in the way” (55).  The momentary illusion of power he 
had over Mary-as-screen-spectacle dissolves once he enters her house and 
becomes her “project,” which makes him feel “naked, transparent; he felt that 
this white man, having helped to put him down, having helped to deform 
him, held him up now to look at him and be amused.  At that moment he felt 
toward Mary and Jan a dumb, cold, and inarticulate hate” (67).  Despite his 
advances, Mary is ultimately sexually available only to Jan, while Bigger is 
merely a passive spectator:  
He was not driving; he was simply sitting and floating along smoothly 
through darkness.  His hands rested lightly on the steering wheel and 
his body slouched lazily down in the seat.  He looked at the mirror; 
Mary was lying flat on her back in the rear seat and Jan was bent over 
her.  He saw a faint sweep of white thigh.  They plastered, all right, he 
thought.  He pulled the car softly round the curves, looking at the road 
before him one second and up at the mirror the next.  (78)   
Bigger slouches lazily in his seat just as he does in the movie theater, here 
enjoying a different type of show.  As in the theater, his voyeurism leads to 
autoerotic arousal: “his muscles grew gradually taut.  He sighed and sat up 
straight, fighting off the stiffening feeling in his loins” (78).  This passive 
spectatorship, yet again, prefigures an outburst of violence when he smothers 
a drunken Mary to death with a pillow shortly after he drives her home. 
The restoration of the masturbation scene by editor Arnold Rampersad 
was not without controversy, which largely hinged on questions of author 
intentionality.  Rampersad argues that the restored text is closer to Wright’s 
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authorial intention prior to the interference of the Book-of-the-Month Club, 
which he claims led Wright, “Poor all of his life and eager for a financial 
windfall,” to agree to make the revisions (164).  Other critics argue that the 
expurgated passages belong in a note to the text.  They see the publication of a 
manuscript instead of the published 1940 version whose changes Wright had 
completed as an undoing of the author’s final approval of the text.31  
More interesting, however, is the content of the restored scene.  The 
restoration of Bigger and Jack’s queer act of masturbation to the text 
complicates earlier readings of Bigger’s masculinity and sexuality.  Critical 
discussions of how this scene adds nuance or dimension to Bigger’s sexuality 
often focus on Bigger’s desire for white women while ignoring the queerness 
of two boys masturbating together in the darkened theater.  Such readings 
either assign the masturbatory act an aggressive heterosexuality or relate it to 
Bigger’s desire for white women, even though this scene, as I’ve discussed, is 
precisely not about Bigger’s desire for Mary.  Rampersad claims: 
[I]n making Bigger almost asexual and unresponsive where Mary 
Dalton is concerned, the Book-of-the-Month Club version made him 
less human, less alive and almost incomprehensible.  And quite apart 
from its meaning in the novel itself, Bigger’s vibrant sexuality had 
historic significance.  Never before in American literature, except in 
scurrilous attacks on black men as rapists or likely rapists, had black 
make sexuality been represented with such frankness.  (165)  
                                                
31 See James Tuttleton, “The Problematic Texts of Richard Wright” rpt.  in The 
Critical Response to Richard Wright. (167-172). 
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While Bigger’s sexuality is indeed represented frankly in the scene, it is not 
primarily heterosexual desire that is portrayed.  Aimé J. Ellis similarly reads 
Bigger and Jack’s actions in the theater as an example of  “defiantly 
oppositional black male cultural practices” (185).  In their act of public 
masturbation, Ellis sees a “collective unwillingness to abide by U.S. social 
decorum and order throughout the 1930s,” arguing that as it is “Inextricably 
connected to a culture that appears to emasculate, maim, and desexualize, and 
in every conceivable way castrate black male subjectivity, masturbation can be 
interpreted not only as an oppositional gesture but also as a ‘humanizing’ 
practice” (189, 194).  Yet this reading of the homoerotic scene as political 
protest views it through a heteronormative lens, a framework that is 
ultimately ill-suited for understanding the scene.  Wright’s widow and 
daughter, Ellen and Julia Wright, similarly supported the restoration of the 
Regal scene, arguing that it provides a fuller characterization of Bigger’s 
sexuality, stating: 
It is important to us that Bigger Thomas, who was ‘castrated’ because 
deprived of his sexual life in the edited 1940 text, is made whole 
again—and made human—by the reinstatement of this masturbation 
scene at the beginning of Native Son and of references to his guilt-
ridden desire for rich, white Mary prior to the panic which leads him to 
smother her accidentally.  (qtd. in Tuttleton 171)   
What still remains unsaid in the debate over restoration, however, is an 
acknowledgement of the queerness of the scene.  Bigger’s sexuality is read as 
either denied (in the 1940 version) or aggressively, damningly heterosexual (in 
 139 
the 1991 restoration), yet neither of these assessments can convincingly 
account for the actual act of masturbation that occurs or the physical site of 
this manifestation of desire—a movie theater.  Readings that claim the 
inclusion of the scene restores Bigger’s sexuality or masculinity refer only to 
his inner thoughts about Mary as he wonders if she is “a hot kind of girl,” not 
his sexual behavior in the theater, which occurs before he first sees her on the 
newsreel (34).  The restored text asks the reader to make sense of Bigger as a 
queer figure—a more complicated reading of his sexuality than as simply that 
of a violent rapist or emasculated boy, as it has largely been understood.   
The Queer Temporality of Arrested Development 
In The Queer Child, or Growing Sideways in the Twentieth Century, 
Kathryn Bond Stockton writes of the essential queerness of the figure of the 
child and discusses the relationship between the Freudian concept of “arrested 
development” and homosexuality.  Within the framework of Freud’s stages of 
psychosexual development—oral, anal, phallic, latency, and genital—
homosexuality (what he called “inversion”) represents an “immature” 
sexuality that occurs when over- or under-indulgence of the child occurs 
during one stage and causes a fixation that prevents sexual maturation: “it is 
possible to point to external influences in their lives, whether of a favourable 
or inhibiting character, which have led sooner or later to a fixation of their 
inversion.  (Such influences are exclusive relations with persons of their own 
sex, comradeship in war, detention in prison, the dangers of heterosexual 
intercourse, celibacy, sexual weakness, etc)” (Freud 6).  For Freud, 
“masturbation is quite as frequently their [inverts’] exclusive [sexual] aim” 
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(11).  Stockton notes that the “phrase [arrested development] has been the 
official-sounding diagnosis that has often appeared to describe the supposed 
sexual immaturity of homosexuals: their presumed status as dangerous 
children, who remain children in part by failing to have their own” (22).  
Bigger’s stalled developmental narrative resonates with such Freudian and 
cultural rhetoric that reads homosexuality as a case of “arrested development” 
and masturbation as an immature form of sexual release.  Bigger’s sexuality 
throughout the novel is nonreproductive and more closely associated with 
death than life, from the masturbation associated with his queerness and 
juvenile delinquency to his rape of Bessie, which ends in her brutal murder.  
Throughout the novel, Bigger is referred to with racial condescension as a 
“boy” by white authority figures such as the police and Mr.  Dalton, called one 
by his lawyer who attempts to use Bigger’s youth as a mitigating factor at 
trial, and by his mother as an expression of kinship.  Infantilized by his 
economic dependence on his mother and his position in a racial underclass, 
Bigger, though twenty, is never a grown “man.” Writing about emasculation 
and nationalism in Wright’s work, Anthony Dawahare notes, “Wright shows 
how these feelings of emasculation can be intensified for black men, since they 
are extra-oppressed by racism and are symbolically emasculated as ‘boys’ in a 
racist discourse” (452).  Dawahare further argues that the “Black men/‘boys’ 
are infantilized by white society, making American racism conterminous with 
sexism, since the infantilization of black men symbolically aligns them with 
‘women,’ that other figure long associated with weakness and dependency in 
patriarchal society” (454-455).  Bigger’s socially conditioned lack of 
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development is reflected in the delays in the narrative structure of the text, 
which take the form of long stretches of time killing in the novel. 
The narrative structure of Native Son is generally thought of in terms of 
familiar plots and literary movements: it is a crime and punishment tale; a 
melodrama; a detective story; a confessional; a biblical narrative; a historical 
account; a black protest novel; and either a naturalistic narrative of 
environment and inevitability or a work of modernist fiction.  As a rewriting 
of Theodore Dreiser’s naturalist novel, An American Tragedy (1925), Native Son 
presents a narrative of crime and punishment and features an unsympathetic 
protagonist.  Dreiser’s long novel finds its narrative duration in the even, 
slow, and deliberate pacing of events relayed in excessively detailed 
exposition.  The narration shifts between the omniscient, third-person point of 
view of the narcissistic, entitled, and social climbing protagonist, Clyde 
Griffiths, and a third-person subjective one that provides access to Clyde’s 
thoughts and feelings.  The narrative point of view does not remain within 
Clyde’s consciousness, which allows for a slow and even third-person 
recounting of events as he schemes to obtain an upper-class lifestyle and 
methodically plots the murder he hopes will clear the way to it.  The pacing of 
Wright’s novel, in contrast, fluctuates wildly in third-person free indirect 
discourse, following the consciousness of Bigger—a socially created sociopath 
with violent mood swings.  While both characters are represented as victims 
of their social environments, Bigger has no hope of accessing the wealth and 
privilege Clyde seeks.  Bigger runs on animal instinct, killing out of impulse 
and opportunity, while Clyde attempts to cunningly navigate the society he is 
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presented with, eventually resorting to premeditated murder.  For Dreiser, the 
“American tragedy” is the existence of social class strictures that turn Clyde, 
who might have otherwise been a well-adjusted boy, into a murderer.  For 
Wright, Bigger’s existence can only take the form of a monster created by the 
inhuman social and economic conditions facing young, urban black males.32 
While indebted to Dreiser’s naturalistic depictions of violence and 
socioeconomic class, Wright’s narrative differs in the motivations underlying 
each character’s actions, as well as the ways in which they carry out their 
crimes.  Clyde’s planned crimes beget a measured narrative pace while 
Bigger’s erratic patterns of action and inaction are similarly mirrored in the 
delays and pauses in the text.   
Gaining a better understanding of the novel’s narrative structure 
requires a closer study of Bigger’s seesawing pattern of passivity and action.  
Upon examination, it becomes clear that certain emotional states correspond 
to Bigger’s periods of passivity as opposed to those of violent action.  Those 
moments in the text when Bigger passively kills time through spectatorship or 
surveillance are marked both by homosociality, as Part I explored, and the 
experience of “weak” emotions such as hysteria, anxiety, and boredom.  
Bigger’s passive stalling further reflects his “arrested development,” in which 
                                                
32 Notably, in neither work is tragedy understood to include the murdered 
women killed by their current, former, or would-be lovers.  The murder of a 
white woman in both novels serves as a plot device to illustrate the social 
forces at work on the male protagonists.  The crimes committed against these 
women provide the impetus for the lengthy trial scenes and prison 
conclusions, but they are not the victims of either novel.  Nor is Bigger’s black 
girlfriend Bessie, whose rape and murder at his hand ultimately goes 
unpunished. 
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he is prevented from becoming a “man” in a white class-bound society, and 
rejects the normative progress narratives made available to him.  Bigger’s 
failure to “grow up” relegates him to a queer, futureless existence resulting in 
a narrative that can only be resolved by his death.  The certainty of his 
execution provides closure to the novel.   
In her 1993 essay on the novel, “The Re(a)d and the Black,” Barbara 
Johnson writes, “The unavailability of new plots is deadly” (154).  Arguing 
that the signifying markers of Bigger’s blackness go “un-read” within the 
dominant narratives of the novel’s power structures, she asserts, “What 
Wright’s writing demonstrates again and again is the deadly effect both of 
overdetermination and of underdetermination in storytelling.  It is because the 
‘rape’ plot is so overdetermined that Bigger becomes a murderer” (154).  Yet 
we should resist the urge to chalk the employment of familiar, knowable plots 
up to a failure of imagination on Wright’s part, for other narratives surely 
exist within the novel—they simply remain as “un-read” to the reader 
accustomed to them as Bigger’s blackness remains hidden in plain sight from 
the police.33 These narratives are overshadowed by the larger plots that propel 
the narrative with their insistent forward motion.  To Johnson’s focus on the 
racial power structures of the novel that determine the range of narratives 
available to Bigger’s character, I would add the heteronormative narrative of 
maturation or “growing up,” as predicated on entering a societal structure 
                                                
33 Wright has this to say about the plot of the novel in his essay, “How ‘Bigger’ 
Was Born”: “Life had made the plot [the treatment of black boys by police and 
arrests on rape charges] over and over again, to the extent that I knew it by 
heart” (455). 
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organized by and to ensure continuation of reproductive futurity, as an 
additional stricture.   
Bigger’s queerness in the novel often goes unread.  Those moments of 
time killing when Bigger is ruled by passive and homoerotic feelings disrupt 
the linear temporality of the narratives available to him.  In Wright’s essay on 
the writing of Native Son entitled, “How ‘Bigger’ Was Born,” he attributes 
certain emotions to the various “Biggers” who served as models for the Bigger 
Thomas character in the novel: “All Bigger Thomases, white and black, felt 
tense, afraid, nervous, hysterical, and restless” (446).  Wright attributes these 
feelings to the modern condition where people were “living in a world whose 
fundamental assumptions could no longer be taken for granted: a world 
ridden with national and class strife; [. . .] a highly geared world whose nature 
was conflict and action [. . .] a world that existed on a plane of animal 
sensation alone” (446).  The novel’s Bigger Thomas experiences all of these 
emotions to be sure, but I am primarily concerned with the narrative effects 
generated by these weak feelings of nervousness, anxiety, restlessness, and 
hysteria.  Barthes’s Neutral affects are considered such only insofar as they 
suspend conflict.  Bigger’s restlessness, as well as his anxiety and laziness, 
forestall his violent outbursts, but is as unsustainable as his violent actions: 
“the Neutral means suspension of violence [. . .] [it is] unsustainable” (TN 13).  
The paired weak and strong affects Bigger experiences—indifference and 
rage—create a seesaw effect not only in his life, but also in the narrative 
structure of the novel as its narrative pace fluctuates between lengthy 
exposition or scenes with little action and scenes with short bursts of action 
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and rapid plot advancement.  The relatively brief police chase that ends with 
the dramatic water tower capture of Bigger, for example, is preceded by his 
long period of hiding out in abandoned buildings and is followed by a 
plodding trial with a foregone conclusion that comprises the last third of the 
novel (Book Three: Fate).  Ample scholarship details the role of Bigger’s racial 
consciousness in his violent actions, however the passive aspects of his 
character are less frequently acknowledged.  Bigger’s feelings of anxiety, 
restlessness, and hysteria might eventually lead to his violent acts of rape and 
murder, but these emotions are passive by nature and it is the quest to 
alleviate the discomfort of these weak feelings or the rejection of them that 
leads to spontaneous acts of violence, not the feelings themselves.   
In the novel, Bigger’s weak affects often occur within scenes of passive 
spectatorship—instances of time killing.  Bigger spends a great deal of his time 
in the novel attempting to relieve his near constant feelings of nervous 
hysteria—feelings correlated with fear, inaction and paralysis.  Early in the 
novel,  
Bigger felt an urgent need to hide his growing and deepening feeling of 
hysteria; he had to get rid of it or else he would succumb to it.  He 
longed for a stimulus powerful enough to focus his attention and drain 
off his energies.  He wanted to run.  Or listen to some swing music.  Or 
laugh or joke.  Or read a Real Detective Story Magazine.  Or go to a 
movie.  Or visit Bessie.  (28)   
Here Bigger identifies the actions that might save him from his fear, from his 
“hysteria”: the active physical feats of running, laughing, and sex, and the 
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more passive spectatorship associated with art: listening to music, reading, 
and film watching.  The stimulating effects of each lead to different 
conclusions: the direct physical exertion of running or intercourse or laughter 
leads to a physical tiredness, while the indirect mental stimulation of the 
detective story magazine, or swing music, or movie going seems to lead to a 
delayed hysteria by providing only a temporary distraction.  Bigger’s weak 
emotions prefigure explosive acts of violence.  They are the disempowered 
feelings that turn discontentment into deadly momentum.  His moments of 
passivity are often aligned with the failure of his emotions to correspond to 
his gender identity, which frequently leads to a failure of narrative 
recognition.   
Bigger’s hysteria throughout the novel, for example, is an explicitly 
gendered emotional state.  The archetype of the “hysterical woman” is a well-
documented one.  In Hysterical Men: The Hidden History of Male Nervous Illness, 
Mark S. Micale notes that “the term hysteria traces etymologically to the Greek 
and Sanskrit words for uterus or womb, and that hysteria served for millennia 
of medical history as a male-authored commentary, often blatant in its 
misogyny, on women” (5).  Galloping, misplaced wombs and nervous 
afflictions are often depicted as the sole province of women (the former for 
obvious reasons), yet as Micale notes, the cultural visibility of hysterical men 
(or descriptions of “men of feeling”) tend to follow social trends in the 
understanding of gender categories: 
Those times and cultures in which people felt threatened—regardless of 
whether the nature of the threat was military, economic, religious, 
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cultural, or sexual—experienced a greater need to rearticulate 
traditional gender identities, in contrast to the times  perceived as ages 
of stability and security [. . .] Accordingly, a society’s capacity to accept 
the crossing of gender boundaries—and male hysteria is the 
quintessential gender-crossing diagnosis—waxes and wanes. (278)   
Bigger’s “gender-crossing” hysteria is the product of his marginalized position 
as a member of a racial and socio-economic underclass during the Depression.  
His anxiety and nervousness are coded as feminine feelings, passive and 
ineffectual, and Bigger’s association with them marks him as a feminized 
subject in his moments of idleness.  In order to realign himself with a 
masculine sensibility, Bigger commits increasingly brutal, sexually motivated 
acts of violence.   
In Bigger’s world, the only way to “be a man” is to physically 
dominate, yet his feminine bouts of hysteria lead to fatal inaction.  For 
example, after disposing of Mary’s body, Bigger attempts to remain calm as 
investigators explore the basement that contains the furnace in which he had 
burned her remains: “Bigger held his breath.  But the man would not poke 
into that fire; nobody suspected him.  He was just a black clown.  He breathed 
again as the man closed the door.  The muscles of Bigger’s face jerked 
violently, making him feel that he wanted to laugh.  He turned his head aside 
and fought to control himself.  He was full of hysteria [my emphasis]” (206). 
Bigger’s hysteria renders him incapable of action: “Bigger said nothing.  He 
was limp all over; he was standing up here against this wall by some strength 
not his own.  Hours past he had given up trying to exert himself any more; he 
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could no longer call up any energy.  So he just forgot it and found himself 
coasting along” (210).  This passivity and paralysis eventually leads to the 
discovery of Mary’s body when he is physically unable to clear out the ashes 
in the furnace: “‘I’m getting ‘em [the ashes] out,’ Bigger mumbled, not moving 
from where he stood [. . .] Bigger heard someone near him; then someone was 
tugging at the shovel in his hands.  He held onto it desperately, not wanting to 
let it go, feeling that if he did so he was surrendering his secret, his life” (216).  
Bigger’s hysterical inaction leads to the surrender of his life within the plot, for 
he knows he will be executed if Mary’s body is discovered.  While Bigger’s 
powerful feelings of lust and fear and hatred allow him to kill first Mary, then 
his girlfriend Bessie, his weak feelings of anxiety and nervousness render him 
passive and nearly invisible.  In fact, he is able to initially escape the Dalton 
house because the cops fail to recognize him as a subject capable of covering 
up a murder due to his passivity in their presence.  His hysteria further leads 
to his desire for damning silence at his trial when he tells his lawyer fearfully 
that he doesn’t want to speak in court: “Bigger’s nerves gave way and he 
spoke hysterically: ‘They going to kill me!  You know they going to kill me . . . 
.’” (367).  Bigger’s hysteria is composed of ineffectual feelings that impede 
action on his part.  Hysteria is figured as the cross-gendered, queer state that 
hinders forward narrative progress. 
Ferguson reads Bigger as a figure of “anxiety about feminization and 
castration” (44), and argues that as “a feminized figure who does not conform 
to the heteropatriarchy or nationalism’s regulated ideal, Bigger represents 
nonheteronormative dysfunction” (47).  While Bigger’s mother and sister are 
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positioned within the novel as castrating figures who chastise him and 
question his masculinity (“We wouldn’t have to lie in this garbage dump if 
you had any manhood in you” his mother proclaims), Bigger is rendered 
powerless not only through economic and racial oppression, as Ferguson 
notes, but also through the weak or neutral affects that characterize much of 
his state of being in the novel—the ineffectual emotions, such as his 
indifference and anxiety, that are themselves products of his various 
marginalized positions (8).  Bigger’s hysteria, which is the product of his 
powerlessness, in turn compounds and reproduces this powerlessness.  As 
David L. Eng argues in his work on race and masculinity, hysteria afflicts 
those members of society who are the most powerless, asserting “hysteria [. . .] 
speaks to the production of a class of male subjects who are excluded by and 
large from symbolic privileges because of their class.  In this expanded 
capacity, male hysteria also comes to mark off as well as create powerless 
bodies—both female and male—defined against the universal (white, middle-
class, heterosexual) normative male subject” (179).  In these gendered 
moments of inaction, Bigger becomes a queer figure and loses his cultural 
visibility.  
Bigger’s nervous hysteria, the gender-crossing affect that that 
necessitates a trip to the Regal in the first place, results in further 
nonheteronormative behavior within the theater walls.  While Bigger the 
violent male rapist, exists within the text as a juridical and social subject, the 
narrative contours of Bigger the anxious, feminized hysteric or queer cruising 
subject are hazy.  Sentenced to die for the one crime he did not commit—the 
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crime no one committed—the rape of Mary Dalton, Bigger’s fate is 
predetermined not simply by the ready availability of the overdetermined plot 
of the black, male rapist, but also by the overdetermined plot of the tragic 
queer who is at odds with developmental models of progress and 
reproduction.  In both cases, the only narrative ending available is death.   
Bigger rejects all of the progress narratives he is presented with, mostly 
ideological (the salvation of religion, the political enlightenment of 
communism, and a discourse of racial uplift), embracing instead the constant 
vacillation between two poles: indifference and violence; brooding and desire; 
potential and kinetic energy (28-9). Max, the novel’s mouthpiece of communist 
ideology, forwards a social conditioning and internalized racism defense in 
his closing arguments and his visit to Bigger’s cell before his execution:  
Bigger, you’re going to die.  And if you die, die free.  You’re trying to 
believe in yourself.  And every time you try to find a way to live, your 
own mind stands in the way.  You know why that is?  It’s because 
others have said you were bad and they made you live in bad 
conditions.  When a man hears that over and over and looks about him 
and sees that his life is bad, he begins to doubt his own mind.  His 
feelings drag him forward and his mind, full of what others say about 
him, tells him to go back.  The job in getting people to fight and have 
faith is in making them believe in what life has made them feel, making 
them feel that their feelings are as good as those of others (427-8).   
Yet this passage reveals a different internal conflict in addition to the one Max 
intends.  Max seeks to legitimate the positive, forward-thinking feelings of 
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self-improvement, if not exactly racial uplift, that he assumes are held in check 
by a mind filled with paralyzing internalized racism.  In Max’s narrative, 
Bigger wants to move forward, but is held back through societal influences.  
Bigger, however, frequently rejects these types of progress narratives.  Those 
espoused by religion are particularly vulnerable to his scorn as a preposterous 
panacea.  He sees the church as an institution that advocates acceptance in the 
face of injustice and a denial of reality.  Recognizing Christian ideology as that 
which offers empty hope to people such as his mother, he violently rejects 
Reverend Hammond’s attempts to proselytize.  During his flight, the church’s 
function within black society is explicitly rejected by Bigger:  
Would it not have been better for him had he lived in that world the 
music sang of?  It would have been easy to have lived in it, for it was 
his mother’s world, humble, contrite, believing.  It had a center, a core, 
an axis, a heart which he needed but could never have unless he laid 
his head upon a pillow of humility and gave up his hope of living in 
the world.  And he would never do that.  (254)   
When Max later asks why Bigger stopped attending church he replies: 
I didn’t like it.  There was nothing in it.  Aw, all they did was sing and 
shout and pray all the time.  And it didn’t get ‘em nothing.  All the 
colored folks do that, but it don’t get ‘em nothing.  The white folks got 
everything [. . .] I wanted to be happy in this world, not out of it.  I 
didn’t want that kind of happiness.  The white folks like for us to be 
religious, then they can do what they want to with us.  (355-6) 
For Bigger, the linear progress narrative of salvation offered by religion is a 
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sham.  With or without it, he is still going nowhere.   
Bigger’s eventual confession does not redeem him or bring pleasure—
the recounting of his acts as spectacles renders him passive once more in his 
role as a detached spectator.  Thus the crime and punishment melodrama that 
appears to structure the novel, much like the plots Bigger fancies in his 
detective magazines, provides the forward movement of the novel to its 
inevitable end.  Execution seems the only plausible fate for Bigger once he is 
captured.  This procedural structure frames the narrative’s action in only one 
sense, however, for the affective movement of the novel is that of an adolescent 
stalled in the back and forth movement between the emotionally-driven 
registers of restless hysteria and violence.  Bigger figures this in-between space 
as the “No Man’s Land” between white and black that he occupies passively.  
Wright describes it in this way in “How ‘Bigger’ Was Born”: “What made 
Bigger’s social consciousness most complex was the fact that he was hovering 
unwanted between two worlds—between powerful America and his own 
stunted place in life—and I took upon myself the task of trying to make the 
reader feel this No Man’s Land” (451).  Bigger’s failure to gain access to 
normative white America is marked as “stunted” growth.  Wright’s language 
of a life of thwarted development resonates with a narrative of queer arrested 
development.   
Bigger’s acts of violence are the only mode of expression available to 
him because he lacks the language to otherwise express his emotional states, 
and he lacks this language because he lacks a narrative precedent for his 
experiences.  He cannot access a narrative with a future that will retroactively 
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make sense of his present.  As an adolescent who will never grow up—both 
literally and figuratively—Bigger’s present is unintelligible without a 
narrative through which to understand it.  Max draws upon this absence of 
available narratives in his legal defense of Bigger:  
We know that happiness comes to men when they are caught up, 
absorbed in a meaningful task or duty to be done, a task or duty which 
in turn sheds justification and sanction back down upon their humble 
labors.  We know that this may take many forms: in religion it is the 
story of the creation of man, of his fall, and of his redemption; 
compelling men to order their lives in certain ways [.  .  .] In art, science, 
industry, politics, and social action it may take other forms.  But these 
twelve million Negroes have access to none of these highly crystallized 
modes of expression, save that of religion.  (398-9)  
Max discusses these expressive narratives as those belonging to civilized 
society and marks those who lack access to them as residing in the antisocial—
set decidedly and permanently apart from mainstream society.  Here a person 
who lacks access to conventional, linear, life-ordering narratives—those with 
the creation-fall-redemption arcs of religion (and, frequently, art), or the 
hypothesis-experiment-conclusion arcs of science, or the conflict-protest-
resolution arcs of social action—is not living a life at all, but simply acting on 
animal impulse or reacting to external stimuli.  In this worldview, organizing 
one’s life within or according to nonlinear narratives is an impossibility; chaos 
and unintelligibility are the only possible outcomes within an ontology that 
associates being with logical, linear order.  Having attempted to join these 
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ordered worlds, Bigger fails and reverts to passivity: “Having been thrown by 
an accidental murder into a position where he had sensed a possible order and 
meaning in his relations with the people about him; having accepted the moral 
guilt and responsibility for that murder because it had made him feel free for 
the first time in his life [ .  .  .] having done all this and failed, he chose not to 
struggle anymore” (274).  A life with no future cannot orient itself in a 
coherent fashion within these existing narrative paradigms.  This is why 
Bigger wakes with a knowledge of his own unintelligible racial otherness 
within a white world the morning after Bessie’s murder: “Why should not this 
cold white world rise up as a beautiful dream in which he could walk and be 
at home, in which it would be easy to tell what to do and what not to do? If 
only someone had gone before and lived or suffered or died—made it so that 
it could be understood!” (241).  The lack of narrative precedent renders 
Bigger’s life unknowable: “He felt that there was something missing, some 
road which, if he had once found it, would have led him to a sure and quiet 
knowledge.  But why think of that now?  A chance for that had gone forever.  
He had committed murder twice and had created a new world for himself” 
(241).  The illusory nature of this “new world” Bigger creates, however, 
becomes clear after his capture: “An organic wish to cease to be, to stop living, 
seized him.  Either he was too weak, or the world was too strong; he did not 
know which.  Over and over he had tried to create a world to live in, and over 
and over he had failed” (345).  Max famously codes Bigger’s acts of murder as 
acts of creation in an attempt to render Bigger an intelligible subject, and 
therefore one deserving of mercy, by translating the seemingly motiveless 
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random brutality, destruction, and death into a generative narrative of 
progression: “He was living, only as he knew how, and as we have forced him 
to live.  The actions that resulted in the death of those two women were as 
instinctive and inevitable as breathing or blinking one’s eyes.  It was an act of 
creation” (400).  If Bigger’s crime was an “inevitable” one, Max reasons, then its 
societal root causes can be traced backward through time and history as a 
long, linear narrative.  If it was a generative act of creation, similarly, it can be 
logically followed forward according to a narrative of living, of progression.  
Max’s pleas fail, of course, as a future for Bigger is always already an 
impossibility and his crimes defy understanding within such an ordered 
framework. 
To end where we began then, in Delany’s movie theater where the 
figure of heterosexual masculinity is queered by the homoerotic surroundings 
that make his pleasure possible.  So it is with Native Son.  As a novel, it is often 
read as a commentary on a type of menacing black masculinity, or even 
misogyny, yet its narrative of the consequences of oppressive racial and socio-
economic power structures in America is very rarely seen as bearing the 
associated temporal markers of queerness.  If Bigger’s life is “stunted” by the 
first two social structures, then it is also queered by the way this stunting 
renders access to narratives of heteronormativity and reproductive futurity 
impossible.  Examining the gendered and sexualized connotations of “weak” 
affects presents an opportunity to examine the way Bigger’s Otherness is 
created and compounded by his nonheteronormative feelings.  In Native Son, 
Bigger’s intelligibility as a juridical and social subject becomes tied to the 
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intelligibility of his gendered affects and the cultural narratives associated 
with them.  When his strong affects lead to action he is said to “exist,” when 
weak affects pause or suspend narrative action, his subjectivity becomes much 
less certain.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
WHERE THE DAY TAKES YOU: BOREDOM AND BELONGING IN 
CARSON MCCULLERS’S THE MEMBER OF THE WEDDING 
 
In The Member of the Wedding, Carson McCullers’s 1946 novel about 
girlhood in the American South, the first words from twelve-year old 
protagonist Frankie Addams mouth are “It is so very queer [. . .] The way it all 
just happened” (461).  This is an apt description of the novel itself, whose 
narrative structure can be understood, as with the other novels in this 
dissertation, to possess a queer temporality.  “The [queer] way it all just 
happened” for Frankie describes her introduction to, and eventual exclusion 
from, the heteronormative framework of her brother’s wedding—a union of 
which she desperately wishes to be a part.  For the reader, however, the 
narrative—the way Frankie’s story, related in third-person limited narration, 
“all just happened”—unfolds in its own queer way, characterized by long 
periods of waiting and inaction during which nothing much seems to happen, 
as well as by the way this anti-progress narrative reflects a queer model of 
temporal progress.  Its foregrounding of queerness as related to events (the 
thing that happened), temporality (the thing that just happened), and 
narrative (the way it happened) is key to an understanding of the novel that 
does not rely on the author’s biographical details or readings of McCullers as a 
regional writer.  These common critical approaches prove unsatisfactory in 
their treatment of the text as either an extension of McCullers’s personal life or 
in their comparison of her work to a canon of Southern authors such as 
William Faulkner, Eudora Welty, and Flannery O’Connor—an approach that 
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often minimizes the complexity of her fiction in its own right. 
McCullers uses the term “queer” repeatedly throughout the novel, 
frequently to refer not just to the odd or curious, but also to describe 
nonheteronormative desires and the feelings for which Frankie has no words.  
“Queer,” for McCullers, names both the deviant and the unknowable.  In 1946, 
the novel’s publication date, the term “queer” was in public circulation as not 
simply meaning “odd” or “strange,” but also as (mostly pejorative) slang for 
homosexual—a use dating back to the early twentieth century (OED).  Given 
McCullers’s familiarity with queer communities and her use of queer 
characters in her fiction, her choice of the word “queer” instead of “odd” in 
many cases merits scrutiny and can be seen as carrying nonheteronormative 
connotations.  As Rachel Adams argues in her essay “‘A Mixture of Delicious 
and Freak’: The Queer Fiction of Carson McCullers”: 
What McCullers means by the queer is vague but suggestive.  Her 
invocation of the term queer is frequently associated with her 
characters’ receptiveness to otherwise unthinkable permutations of sex 
and gender, which are defined in opposition to normative categories of 
identification and desire.  Such a veiled deployment of the queer is 
unsurprising at a historical moment when it regularly functioned as a 
shaming mechanism to legitimate discrimination and physical violence 
against homosexuals [author’s emphasis].  (554) 
McCullers’s use of the term is by no means straightforward in The Member of 
the Wedding as it most often springs from the mouth or mind of Frankie, a 
queer character in her own right.  Frankie’s identification of those things that 
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are and are not queer mirror her position as an adolescent caught between 
worlds—between a dominant heteronormative social order and her own 
nonheteronormative, deviant desires.  Thus when Frankie thinks of 
heterosexual intercourse or innuendo, for example, as “queer,” she does so 
from a position of social naïveté, or a rejection of social norms as is the case 
when she begins to feel ill at ease around the drunken soldier who would later 
attempt to assault her.  “The hot, close smell in the hotel suddenly made her 
feel a little queer” because she is distinctly uncomfortable with the 
heterosexual expectations others have of her (525).  To Frankie, it is strange 
that she wouldn’t be included in her brother’s marriage or that she should 
desire heterosexual sex.  The perversion in her mind is the opposite of a 
dominant societal view that codes the monogamous heterosexual couple as 
normative and an incestuous triad as queer.  Similarly, heterosexual 
intercourse strikes her as deviant while a shared honeymoon with her brother 
and his bride and sharing a bed with her father seems both normal and 
desirable.  Frankie eventually learns, however, which things are “properly” 
queer and which fall within normative societal expectations through the 
guidance of the serially monogamous Berenice and the reality of her exclusion 
from her brother’s wedding, which forces her to confront heteronormative 
societal expectations.  Throughout this chapter I highlight McCullers’s use of 
the word to demonstrate Frankie’s understanding of the concept of 
heteronormativity as she makes the change from queer tomboy to young 
Southern lady through a rejection of her nonnormative desires—a trajectory 
that proves inescapable for her.  At stake is an understanding of the novel’s 
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queerness at the level of language and, as in the works discussed in previous 
chapters, narrative temporality.  Understanding the shift in Frankie’s mind 
between the things that are queer to her in the beginning versus the end of the 
novel also reveals a shift in the pace of the narrative.  The unmoored, drifting 
girl who passes the time in the kitchen in a series of scenes that document little 
action gives way to the young woman whose life narrative gains purpose after 
she forsakes her youthful queer desires.  Frankie the queer girl alternately 
trips and methodically lingers over her words in her attempts to have them 
received with the same gravity with which she feels them.  Her language often 
thrashes about and her awkward limbs and emotions do the same as she 
attempts find purchase in an adolescence spent adrift and alone.  Frances the 
teenager, however, is on a clear path to “growing up” which her confident (to 
the point of condescension), object-driven speech reflects as it also moves the 
novel to its swift conclusion.  Her language mirrors her shifting emotional 
state, from bored and anxious to happy and content. 
This chapter ultimately examines the consequences of queer desire for 
the two young characters in the novel, Frankie and her cousin John Henry 
West.  For Frankie, her assimilation into the dominant social order requires 
that she abandon her queer desires to maintain her tomboy identity and 
become the third party in her brother’s wedding and marriage.  The 
alternative to embracing a heteronormative developmental model of progress 
is represented by John Henry, who cross-dresses and believes that people 
should be “half boy and half girl” (547).  His untimely death demonstrates the 
lack of narrative options available outside heteronormative linear progress 
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models.   
The Member of the Wedding is primarily about the inaction of waiting 
and unfulfilled desires, an inaction characterized by Frankie’s constant weak 
feelings of boredom and anxiety.  The novel provides the structural inverse of 
the narratives of stalled progress found in Native Son and Lolita.  The action in 
the novel performs the work of interrupting the inaction that characterizes 
much of the plot.  Lolita and Bigger are presented as adolescents whose 
normative development is stunted by exterior forces—pedophiles, racism, and 
socioeconomic inequality.  Frankie, on the other hand, starts the novel “on the 
wrong track,” so to speak.  Her adolescent development is re-routed and 
normativized, whereas Lolita and Bigger’s is derailed.  Instead of a child 
queered by external conditions, she is the innately queer child who must be 
straightened out.  
In Native Son, Bigger’s weak affects compound his racial otherness 
within the text by suspending narrative action with paradoxically violent acts 
of passivity.  In Lolita, neutral affects serve a subversive function as the tool 
Lolita uses to impede the narrative of her captor and delay his sexual 
gratification in the hopes of providing herself with a future, thus creating a 
sense of queer temporality in the novel.  In The Member of the Wedding, 
Frankie’s primary affects are restlessness, anxiety, and loneliness.  The 
duration of these feelings that impede or limit action also create duration 
within the novel’s plot. Frankie’s restlessness keeps her in the kitchen, and the 
novel is stuck there as well.  Her one strong, positive emotion—happiness—
causes the novel to come to an abrupt end.  The last sentence of the novel 
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reads, “‘I am simply mad about—’  But the sentence was left unfinished for 
the hush was shattered when, with an instant shock of happiness, she heard 
the ringing of the bell” (605).  The arrival of Frankie’s girlfriend Mary—the 
normative replacement for her dead queer cousin, John Henry—causes a 
happiness that interrupts the persistent “hush” of the kitchen, a location 
figured as a queer space within the novel and one that had allowed her to 
articulate her deepest thoughts and feelings.  The “special hush” she 
associates with John Henry and his lingering “solemn, hovering, and ghost-
gray” presence is broken by Frankie’s content emotional state that no longer 
requires the lengthy kitchen conversations that the restlessness and anxiety 
caused by her queer desires do (605).  Frankie’s casual happiness undoes her 
pensive boredom and anxiety.  Her joy banishes John Henry’s ghostly queer 
presence and ends the novel, for the narrative has no duration without the 
delay of her weak feelings.  Frankie survives her adolescence, but survival 
comes at the cost of relinquishing an unintelligible subject position 
characterized by neutral affects for one more closely related to the narrative of 
futurity her brother’s marriage comes to represent, one aligned with strong, 
positive feelings.   
While all three novels, as I have argued in previous chapters, can be 
read as adhering to a narrative logic informed by the queer temporality that 
comes from a developmental model seen as delayed or thwarted when 
negatively compared to a normative model predicated on “growing up” 
straight, The Member of the Wedding is different in that it reveals a shift in 
narrative pace from the beginning of the novel to the end that is linked to 
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Frankie’s adoption of this heteronormative notion of “growing up.”  As Lolita 
and Native Son constitute failed or thwarted coming-of-age narratives, the 
pauses and delays linked to their characters’ weak or neutral affects and queer 
behaviors continue throughout those texts.  The Member of the Wedding, in 
contrast, sees its narrative inaction give way to unimpeded forward progress 
as Frankie moves from having a queer relationship to futurity to a more 
readily imaginable heteronormative one.  This enables her survival within the 
text while Lolita and Bigger are not so lucky.  The Member of the Wedding 
demonstrates what is at stake in a conventional bildungsroman by showing 
how access to a cultural narrative of “growing up” requires queer sacrifice.  
Frankie undergoes a period of transition from her tomboy childhood to an 
embrace of womanhood after a spiritual crisis in which her queer desire to 
become the third party to her brother’s wedding and marriage is thwarted 
(signified by her shift in self-naming from Frankie as a child, to F. Jasmine 
during her growing awareness of her sexuality and her maturation, to Frances, 
the thirteen-year-old “grown girl”).  Frankie achieves the social recognition 
denied to Bigger and Lolita through her repudiation of queer desires that had 
threatened to consign her to a similar fate—othered and killed.  Thus the 
queer temporality of the majority of the novel is similar to Lolita and Native 
Son’s in that weak or neutral emotions associated with queer behavior create 
its duration through narrative delay until Frankie adopts a heteronormative 
social imperative.  The novel highlights the consequences for queer 
adolescents while maintaining a form of queer narrative temporality, which 
makes it instructive to read alongside Nabokov and Wright’s novels.         
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As in these novels, the moments of conflict or action in the plot of 
MOW are often downplayed or hidden in favor of lengthy descriptions of 
inaction.  Indeed, inaction is a central theme of the novel, portrayed as the 
consequence of Frankie’s boredom and near constant state of anxious 
anticipation or fearful expectation.  McCullers’s novel is about desire, the state 
that can only exist in the absence of its fulfillment—a constant waiting for 
something to happen.  Roland Barthes describes waiting in A Lover’s Discourse 
as the “Tumult of anxiety provoked by waiting for the loved being, subject to 
trivial delays (rendezvous, letters, telephone calls, returns)” (37).  So it is with 
Frankie’s anxiety as she waits for her loved object—the wedding.  The weak or 
“neutral” affects Frankie experiences—chiefly anxiety and boredom—can be 
read through Barthes’s examination of such feelings in both A Lover’s Discourse 
(1977) and The Neutral (1978).  Barthes’s affirmation of the lover’s discourse, 
“which offers the reader a discursive site: the site of someone speaking within 
himself, amorously, confronting the other (the loved object), who does not 
speak” resonates with Frankie’s narrative as she silently confronts her loved 
object, which does not and cannot speak back (3).  While Berenice, the 
Addams family’s African American cook and mother figure to Frankie, 
initially describes Frankie’s feelings toward her brother’s nuptials as jealousy, 
she later realizes that she is wrong.  Frankie isn’t jealous of the wedding, she 
desires to join it: “Frankie got a crush! / Frankie got a crush! / Frankie got a 
crush! / On the Wedd-ing!” Berenice sings (491).  Frankie’s crush on the 
wedding itself as well as her longing to become a third party to her brother 
Jarvis’s marriage, is figured as a profoundly queer desire and the product of 
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her feelings of loneliness and alienation during “the summer when for a long 
time she had not been a member.  She belonged to no club and was a member 
of nothing in the world.  Frankie had become an unjoined person who hung 
around in doorways, and she was afraid” (461).  Her desire for a queer 
triangulated marriage fails when Frankie cannot articulate her desires to her 
brother and his bride and does not become a member of their wedding, 
managing only to wail, “Take me! Take me!” in a “sizzling” dirt road in the 
wake of the newlywed’s departing car (587-588).  The novel’s swift conclusion 
follows in which her six-year old cousin and compatriot John Henry dies 
suddenly of meningitis, Frankie finds a socially appropriate female friend, 
thus completing her “coming of age,” and Berenice decides to marry her beau 
and leave the employ of Frankie’s father due to the family’s impending move.  
To give such plot details, however, is to miss the (in)action of the novel, which 
is structured around the anticipatory emotions Frankie endures.   
In a review of McCullers’s 1940 novel The Heart is a Lonely Hunter, 
whose adolescent female character Mick Kelley shares much in common with 
MOW’s Frankie Addams, Richard Wright writes:  
The naturalistic incidents of which the book is compounded seem to be 
of no importance; one has the feeling that any string of typical actions 
would have served the author’s purpose as well, for the value of such 
writing lies not so much in what is said as in the angle of vision from 
which life is seen.  There are times when Miss McCullers deliberately 
suppresses the naturally dramatic in order to linger over and 
accentuate the more obscure, oblique and elusive emotions.  (18)   
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The same can be said of The Member of the Wedding, a novel that seems to gloss 
over major dramatic events in favor of a focus on the portrayal of weak or 
“neutral” emotions that occur during the series of non-events that characterize 
four days spent waiting for a wedding.  The novel does not explore Frankie’s 
grief; it examines her boredom.  It cannot flesh out her joy at the conclusion, 
because its concern is with her anxiety, her nervousness, her frustration, her 
unease, and her restlessness.   
This focus has led some critics to describe the novel as lacking a plot.  
In a review of the dramatized stage version of The Member of the Wedding34 
John Mason Brown describes McCullers’s “choosing to dispense with 
plotting” as a virtue, but decries her narrative pace: “the pity is that Mrs. 
McCullers’s play lacks inward progression.  It is more static than it needs or 
ought to be.  Its virtue is its lack of contrivance, but its shortcoming is its lack 
of planning.  Salty and sensitive as is the delineation of its major characters, 
they do not develop; they stand still” (46, 47).  George Dangerfield’s review of 
the novel claims that “what makes this story so unusual is the fact that most of 
it takes place through the medium of desultory conversations between three 
really weird people sitting in an even weirder kitchen.  Nothing or almost 
nothing occurs here, and yet every page is filled with a sense of something 
having happened, happening, and about to happen” (32).  More recently, 
Elizabeth Freeman has argued, “rather than plot, the novel consists of a series 
                                                
34 The stage dramatization of the novel by McCullers interestingly compresses 
the narrative time of the novel—the wedding, Frankie’s running away, and 
John Henry’s illness all occur on the same day.  The effect of this compression 
of events is actually a quicker narrative pace than the novel.   
 167 
of linked performances: fantasies, soliloquies, hallucinations, recounted tales” 
(Wedding Complex 59).  These descriptions, however, are inadequate.  The 
novel does, of course, have a plot, it can even be said to have a traditional 
three-part narrative arc consisting of rising action (preparing for the 
wedding/Frankie’s immature state), the climax (the wedding/F. Jasmine’s 
spiritual crisis), and falling action (aftermath of the wedding/Frances’s 
conformity into and acceptance by a heteronormative social order) that 
mirrors the conventional plot of a bildungsroman.  We might further describe 
this plot as a moralized love story in Barthes’s terminology:  
Every amorous episode can be, of course, endowed with a meaning: it 
is generated, develops and dies; it follows a path which it is always 
possible to interpret according to a causality or a finality—even, if need 
be, which can be moralized (‘I was out of my mind, I’m over it now’ ‘Love 
is a trap which must be avoided from now on’ etc): this is the love story, 
subjugated to the great narrative Other, to that general opinion which 
disparages any excessive force and wants the subject himself to reduce 
the great imaginary current, the orderless, endless stream which is 
passing through him, to a painful, morbid crisis of which he must be 
cured, which he must ‘get over’ [. . .]: the love story [. . .] is the tribute 
the lover must pay to the world in order to be reconciled with it 
[Barthes’s emphasis].  (LD 7)   
In this sense, Frankie’s coming of age is very much a love story.  She falls in 
love with the wedding and the idea of a triadic marriage, realizes the 
impossibility of her queer desire within the heteronormative social order she 
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is expected to join, and disavows her queer desires—gets over them, so to 
speak—in favor of a more proper love object choice that will enable her to join 
the world.  This though is not what critics mean when they accuse the work of 
plotlessness.  What such criticism is really saying is that nothing much 
happens throughout the course of the novel and when significant events do 
happen—like the tragic death of a character—they seem minimized, 
dispensed with in a page or two.  This untethered affective dimension of the 
plot is what Barthes describes as a type of corollary to the love story: “Very 
different is the discourse, the soliloquy, the aside which accompanies this story 
(and this history) without ever knowing it.  It is the very principle of this 
discourse [. . .] that its figures cannot be classified: organized, hierarchized, 
arranged with a view to an end (a settlement) [Barthes’s emphasis]” (LD 7-8).  
Barthes’s alphabetical arrangement of figures—usually affects—which 
accompany the love story and have the ability to prolong narrative duration 
while confounding its resolution, but have no internal order, allow us to better 
understand the narrative movement of The Member of the Wedding.  Frankie’s 
emotions, which stem from her queer love affair, dictate the narrative pace of 
the novel creating a sense of queer temporality, within which narrative delay 
is prominent when Frankie experiences her queer desires, only to give way to 
a rapid, forward movement characterized by her adoption of heteronormative 
norms.  Frankie’s four-day queer love affair takes up the bulk of the novel, 
while her adoption of these norms allows two months to pass in the space of 
the last few pages.  Queer affects delay and stall narrative development, just 
as they provide a sense of duration to Frankie’s adolescence. 
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Queers and Freaks 
 
McCullers’s work, as critics have widely noted, evinces a fascination 
with “freaks,” a category frequently understood to include both people and 
things that are queer in both senses of the term.  Her novels are filled with 
misfits, characters with disabilities, queer figures, and literal circus sideshow 
acts.  Carnival freaks figure prominently in The Member of the Wedding, and 
Frankie’s preoccupation with them is less morbid enjoyment of spectacle than 
fear-driven fascination as she worries about being or becoming a freak herself.  
Frankie’s initial description reveals her tomboyish appearance, which she 
associates with being a freak:  
This summer she was grown so tall that she was almost a big freak, and 
her shoulders were narrow, her legs too long.  She wore a pair of blue 
track shorts, a B.V.D. undervest, and she was barefooted.  Her hair had 
been cut like a boy’s, but it had not been cut for a long time and was 
now not even parted.  The reflection in the glass was warped and 
crooked, but Frankie knew well what she looked like.  (462)   
This warped reflection of an adolescent girl who looks like a boy with a “close 
crew-cut” is transformed at the end of the novel, when Frankie has turned 
thirteen and changed her boyish nickname to her given moniker, Frances—the 
feminine version of the masculine name “Francis,” a switch that signals a 
resolution of her gender ambiguity (475).  Before she makes this transition, 
however, Frankie displays a fascination with various “freaks” including 
sideshow freaks and prison inmates.  Her fascination belies both a queer 
attraction and a fear of recognition.  Her fears stem from a concern with being 
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physically freakish, and thus visually correlated with freaks, as well as being a 
misfit, thus occupying the social sphere of the freaks as outcasts.  She also 
associates freaks with nonheteronormative desires, which parallel her own.  
These interrelated components of freakdom: physical, social, and sexual, are 
conscious concerns for Frankie as she warily evaluates herself.  She calculates 
that, given her rate of growth, eventually “according to mathematics and 
unless she could somehow stop herself, she would grow to be over nine feet 
tall.  And what would be a lady who is over nine feet high?  She would be a 
Freak.” (475).  She characterizes freaks as those who suffer from 
nonheteronormative desires and are subsequently barred from the sense of 
belonging she seeks: “‘I doubt if they ever get married or go to a wedding,’ 
she said.  ‘Those Freaks’” (477).   
The most popular freak at the fair is “the Half-Man Half-Woman, a 
morphidite and a miracle of science” (476-77).  While the other freaks in the 
“Freak House” tent are studies in physical excess or disproportion—the Giant 
and the Fat Lady are too large; the Midget and the Pin Head are too small, the 
Wild Nigger and the Alligator Boy are too inhuman—the Half-Man Half-
Woman is distinguished by costuming: “The Freak was divided completely in 
half—the left side was a man and the right side a woman.  The costume on the 
left was a leopard skin and on the right side a brassiere and a spangled skirt.  
Half the face was dark-bearded and the other half bright glazed with paint.  
Both eyes were strange” (477).  Whereas the Midget is a freak by virtue of 
dwarfism, the Half-Man Half-Woman is a freak by virtue of clothing and 
makeup and an unwillingness to choose an acceptable gender from a 
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male/female binary, enjoying instead a third gender that unites both.  It is 
worth noting that “morphidite” or, more commonly, “morphodite” was not 
only a colloquialism for hermaphrodite, but also slang in the South at the time 
for a flamboyant homosexual or transvestite (OED).  In this case, the 
“morphidite” is billed as a hermaphrodite—a “miracle of science,” but since 
costuming, not genitalia, is what others the Half-Man Half-Woman, 
transvestism is invoked as well.  The queerness of the hermaphrodite mirrors 
Frankie’s position as a tomboy who is torn between masculine and feminine 
gender performances, as well as her desire to disrupt the binary of her brother 
and Janice’s marriage and create a triadic union between the three of them, so 
that they can become the “we of me” for her.   
Barthes writes of the impossibility of drawing Plato’s 
hermaphrodite35—the figure of total unity—spending “an afternoon trying to 
draw what Aristophanes’ hermaphrodite would look like: globular, with four 
hands, four legs, four ears, just one head, one neck.  Are the halves back to 
back or face to face? [. . .] I persist, but get nowhere, being a poor draughtsman 
or an even poorer utopianist.  The hermaphrodite, or the androgyne, figure of 
that ‘ancient unity of which the desire and the pursuit constitute what we call 
love,’ is beyond my figuration,” seeing instead “a monstrous, grotesque, 
improbable body,” which is how Frankie views the Half-Man Half Woman 
(LD 227).  Frankie is a better utopianist, however, and her “Dream of total 
union with the loved being” instead takes the form of a union with the loved 
couple; a man and a woman with Frankie, who feels half-girl half-boy, to 
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connect them (LD 226).   
Frankie’s utopian dreams, however, still tend to reinscribe gender 
binaries, whereas John Henry, the novel’s other queer child, embraces gender 
mutability.  John Henry’s interest in Berenice’s list of “queer things” she 
recites for the children one night in the kitchen focuses on her story about a 
transsexual: “‘How?’ John Henry suddenly asked.  ‘How did that boy change 
into a girl?’” (533).  John Henry spends a portion of the novel in drag, is also 
fascinated by carnival freaks, and imagines an alternate world in which 
“people ought to be half boy and half girl,” a vision for which Frankie 
“threatened to take him to the Fair and sell him to the Freak Pavilion” a plan 
for which his answer was to “only close his eyes and smile” (547) for “his 
world was a mixture of delicious and freak” (546).  Frankie’s suggestions for 
improving the world, on the other hand, would allow people to “instantly 
change back and forth from boys to girls, whichever way they felt like and 
wanted” (547).  Her vision preserves binary gender divisions while John 
Henry invents a third.  Frankie fears becoming a “freak” while John Henry 
embraces it.  When Frankie plans to run away, she decides that “if the train 
went to Chicago, she would go on to Hollywood and write shows or get a job 
as a movie starlet—or, if worse came to worse, even act in comedies.  If the 
train went to New York, she would dress like a boy and give a false name and 
a false age and join the Marines” (593).  Frankie frames her future choice as 
one between the idealized femininity of the movie starlet and the 
hypermasculinity of the marine, whereas John Henry refuses to choose.  This 
                                                                                                                                       
35 Plato, The Symposium. 
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contrast determines the fate of these two queer kids.  One understands that 
she has to choose and makes the socially acceptable choice.  The other does 
not and fails to survive his childhood.   
Barthes’s treatment of the hermaphrodite/androgyne in A Lover’s 
Discourse and The Neutral helps us understand the figure’s destabilizing role.  
For Barthes, “the Neuter is not what cancels the genders but what combines 
them, keeps them both present in the subject, at the same time, after each 
other” (191).  He continues, “The androgyne thus is the Neuter, but a Neuter 
conceived as the complex degree: a mixture, a dos, a dialectic, not of man and 
woman (genitality) but of masculine and feminine.  Or better yet: the man in 
whom there is feminine, the woman in whom there is masculine” (193).  The 
figure of the androgyne destabilizes binary categories of masculine/feminine 
by combining both; this is true, too, of Frankie’s androgynous, occasionally 
disconcerting appearance: “You had all your hair shaved off like a convict, 
and now you tie a silver ribbon around this head without any hair.  It just 
looks peculiar,” remarks Berenice about Frankie’s half-boy half-girl 
appearance (540).  It is important to note that Frankie’s androgyny, as a figure 
of the Neutral, is unsustainable.  It simply delays the binary choice she has to 
make: masculinity or femininity? She cannot progress within a dominant 
heteronormative society without choosing.  To refuse such a choice is to 
become the Half-Man Half-Woman of the freak tent.  Barthes figures the 
hermaphrodite as a farcical version of the androgyne: “As always, things, 
when they are important [. . .] have a farcical version.  The androgyne has its 
farcical version: the hermaphroditeuniversally discredited.  A monster: not 
 174 
terrifying, but worse: uncanny [. . .] the hermaphrodite is linked to the theme 
of the dull, of the aborted, the decadent” (191).  Whereas the hermaphrodite is 
a medical “monster” or oddity, the androgyne is a union of opposites, yet 
Barthes admits that his distinction is one of degree, “a value distinction” (192).  
As a metaphor, the hermaphrodite is the monster that emerges when the 
ambiguity of the androgyne becomes untenable.  The other narrative option, 
of course, is the fate that befalls John Henry, who is content to inhabit an 
androgynous body and idealizes gender mutability.  Such an unsustainable 
identity ultimately leaves John Henry without a living body at all. 
John Henry dresses in Berenice’s high heels and hat, tottering around 
the kitchen comically while Frankie and Berenice attempt a serious discussion 
about naming and identity.  He “stood like a little old woman dwarf, wearing 
the pink hat with the plume, and the high-heel shoes” (476).  John Henry is an 
imitation of a queer freak in this scene—mimicking the cross-dressing of a 
transvestite while resembling a dwarf, for the “Freak House” at the fair the 
children visit included “the squeezed Midget who minced around in little 
trick evening clothes” (476).  This act of dress-up in the safe space of the 
kitchen, however, turns into an act of deviance when John Henry leaves the 
house later that evening to follow Frankie wearing “the jonquil dress, as F.  
Jasmine had given him all the costumes” (571).   
John Henry courts recognition as a freak through his acts of mimicry.  
He performs an impression of the Pin Head in the kitchen, as he “held out an 
imaginary skirt and, touching his finger to the top of his big head, he skipped 
and danced like the Pin Head around the kitchen table.  Then he said: ‘She 
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was the cutest little girl I ever saw.  I never saw anything so cute in my whole 
life’” (477).  John Henry moves from miming the actions of a female freak, to 
cross-dressing, and it is his queer penchant for impersonation that contributes 
to his death:  
A headache [Berenice] said she had, and John Henry West put his head 
down on the table and said he had a headache, also.  But nobody paid 
any mind to him, thinking he copied Berenice.  ‘Run along,’ she said, 
‘for I don’t have the patience to fool with you.’  Those were the last 
words spoken to him in the kitchen, and later Berenice recalled them as 
judgment on her from the Lord.  John Henry had meningitis and after 
ten days he was dead.  (603-4) 
John Henry’s painful death is described briefly, yet graphically.  McCullers 
weaves the details of his illness with those describing Frankie’s visit to the Fair 
with her new girlfriend, Mary Littlejohn.  While “they rode on nearly 
everything, but did not enter the Freak Pavilion, as Mrs.  Littlejohn said it was 
morbid to gaze at Freaks,” John Henry lay dying (604).  He “had been 
screaming for three days and his eyeballs were walled up in a corner, stuck 
and blind.  He lay there finally with his head drawn back in a buckled way, 
and he had lost the strength to scream” (604).  The close of the novel does not 
allow Frankie to gaze morbidly at freaks, but requires the reader to stare at 
John Henry’s mangled, tortured body and see him as one of them.  Frankie is 
not only barred from seeing the literal carnival freaks, but her cousin as well, 
for fear of contracting his illness, and his appearance in her dreams is that of 
embodied death: “like an escaped child dummy from the window of a 
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department store, the wax legs moving stiffly only at joints, and the wax face 
wizened and faintly pained, coming toward her until terror snatched her 
awake” (605).  John Henry dies because that is what happens to freaks in 
McCullers’s fiction.36  The world cannot tolerate their existence, so they take 
their leave of it. 
For her part, Frankie “was afraid of all the Freaks, for it seemed to her 
that they had looked at her in a secret way and tried to connect their eyes with 
hers, as though to say: we know you” (477).  Haunted, Frankie asks Berenice, 
“Do I give you the creeps? [. . .] Do you think I will grow into a Freak?” (477).  
Berenice responds in the negative, but Frankie still worries.  Frankie knows 
that freaks do not belong just as she believes her physical appearance, both her 
height and her masculine characteristics, her queer desires, and her “criminal” 
behavior exclude her from the society she wishes to belong to.  Paused in front 
of the jail on the day before her brother’s wedding while walking into town, 
Frankie recalls her feelings toward the freaks and fears both recognition of her 
queerness and a sense of connection because of it.  The inmates “would be 
hanging to the bars; it seemed to her that their eyes, like the long eyes of the 
Freaks at the fair, had called to her as though to say: We know you” (571).  
Here Frankie’s fear of recognition stems from her belief that she is a criminal, 
having shoplifted earlier in the summer; a person who shared an affinity with 
the freaks behind bars: “After she took the three-bladed knife from the Sears 
and Roebuck Store, the jail had drawn the old Frankie—and sometimes on 
                                                
36 For another example, see Antonapoulos and Singer, the queer mutes in The 
Heart is a Lonely Hunter, who die from illness and suicide respectively, 
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those late spring afternoons she would come to the street across from the jail, a 
place known as Jail-Widow’s Walk, and stare for a long time” (571).  The “old 
Frankie” is, of course, Frankie-the-tomboy who begins the novel an “unjoined 
person” who “wanted to be a boy and go to the war as a Marine,” while the 
Frankie who passes the jail on the eve of her brother’s wedding has taken on 
the appellation “F. Jasmine” in anticipation of joining her brother and his 
bride in marriage (461, 480).  Frankie muses to Berenice: 
‘J A,’ said Frankie.  ‘Janice and Jarvis.  Isn’t that the strangest thing?’  
‘What?’  ‘J A,’ she said.  ‘Both their names begin with J A’ ‘And?  What 
about it?’  Frankie walked round and round the kitchen table.  ‘If only 
my name was Jane,’ she said.  ‘Jane or Jasmine.’  ‘I don’t follow your 
frame of mind,’ said Berenice.  ‘Jarvis and Janice and Jasmine.  See?  [. . 
.] ‘I wonder if it is against the law to change your name.  Or to add to 
it.’  ‘Naturally.  It is against the law.’  ‘Well, I don’t care,’ she said.  ‘F. 
Jasmine Addams.’  (474)  
Here Berenice codes Frankie’s desire to join Janice and Jarvis’s marriage as 
expressed through her desire for the name change that she believes will enable 
such a union through naturalizing it—three ‘J A’s would naturally form a 
partnership—as both illegal and unnatural.  Frankie shrugs off the specter of 
illegality, adding it to the series of “criminal” acts in which she believes she 
has already engaged. 
Deemed too old to sleep in her father’s bed, the unwillingly maturing 
Frankie “began to have a grudge against her father and they looked at each 
                                                                                                                                       
precipitated by the heartbreak of one losing the other to death 
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other in a slant-eyed way,” which drives Frankie to aimlessly venture away 
from the house during the summer until she finds herself “in so much secret 
trouble that she thought it was better to stay home” (481, 461).  The “trouble” 
Frankie had gotten herself into that summer can be understood through her 
conflicted androgyny, which she attempts to hide.  She steals phallic signifiers 
of heterosexual masculinity, the pocketknife from Sears as well as her father’s 
pistol from his bureau: “She broke the law.  And having once become a 
criminal, she broke the law again, and then again” (482).  Yet Frankie also 
hides a sexual encounter that marks her as a heterosexual female, which she 
also considers to be part of her “criminal” behavior: “One Saturday afternoon 
in May she committed a secret and unknown sin.  In the MacKeans’ garage, 
with Barney MacKean, they committed a queer sin, and how bad it was she 
did not know.  The sin made a shriveling sickness in her stomach, and she 
dreaded the eyes of everyone” (482).  Frankie’s shame over her heterosexual 
development, which she sees as unnatural, finds its remedy in her fantasies 
that involve Barney’s murder at her hands through her illicit masculine 
weapons: “She hated Barney and wanted to kill him.  Sometimes alone in the 
bed at night she planned to shoot him with the pistol or throw a knife between 
his eyes” (482).  Frankie’s uncomfortable outsider androgyny becomes an 
accepted part of F. Jasmine’s desired role in the wedding.  Thus Frankie’s 
attitude toward the prisoners changes with her name, as it signals her belief 
that she is on the cusp of a union and state of belonging: “The jail did not 
frighten her this evening, for this time tomorrow she would be far away” 
(572).  Frankie believes that the wedding will give her a sense of belonging 
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because she does not yet fully realize the queerness of the incestuous triad she 
envisions and desires.  Her brother and his bride are, she decides, the “we of 
me,” a phrase that crystallizes her desire to herself, but makes little sense to 
others, as I discuss in the next section.                          
Berenice provides the reader with a laundry list of “many a queer 
thing” she has heard of including men in love with ugly women, strange 
weddings, a deformed burn victim, women who love evil men, “boys to [sic] 
take it into their heads to fall in love with other boys,” and a transsexual who 
“changed his nature and his sex and turned into a girl” (531).  The queerest 
thing of all, however, is Frankie’s crush on her brother’s upcoming nuptials: 
“‘I never before in all my days heard of anybody falling in love with a 
wedding.  I have knew many peculiar things, but I never heard of that 
before’” (533).  Queerness here names nonnormative desires: men loving ugly 
women when they should prefer beauty, women loving evil men when they 
should prefer good and kind ones, gay men and transsexuals.  Interestingly, 
the one queer thing in Berenice’s list that does not involve sexual desire, is her 
example of “a boy with his whole face burned off” (531).  Berenice 
significantly includes “freaks” in the category of “queer,” displaying a 
definitional overlap between the two categories.  Frankie’s love for the 
wedding queers both herself and that quintessentially heteronormative event 
and when her plan to become the third party to the wedding and marriage 
does not succeed it is the event that becomes the “failed wedding,” thwarted 
like the bridge games played with the adulterated card deck, the deck that can 
no longer serve its purpose because John Henry cut out the jacks and then the 
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queens to keep them company (itself an adulterous pairing—the kings are left 
alone).  For Frankie, the wedding is a failure because it ends in the 
monogamous pairing of a heterosexual couple instead of the queer three-way 
union she sees as natural.   
In her reading of McCullers’s work through the lens of queer theory, 
Rachel Adams notes that her “fiction is populated by freaks, characters 
constrained by corporeal anomalies that defy the imposition of normative 
categories of identity” (552).  Indeed, it is difficult not to read the various 
“freaks” in the novel as figures of queer embodiment by virtue of their 
nonnormative position as Others—the figures that allow the novel’s characters 
claim their “normal” identities by positioning themselves in opposition to 
such outwardly grotesque bodies.  Adams argues that  “These freaks suffer an 
alienation from their bodies that parallels their experiences of estrangement 
within and isolation from the society of others,” and claims that such 
characters “point to the untenability of normative concepts of gender and race 
at a moment when these categories were defined with particular rigidity” 
(552).  In The Wedding Complex: Forms of Belonging in Modern American Culture, 
Elizabeth Freeman reads The Member of the Wedding in terms of the 
contemporary gay marriage debate, arguing that “The novel’s queerness lies 
in its perverse use of the wedding as an opportunity to redescribe how 
intimacy, connection, or ‘membership’ might be formalized and displayed” 
(52).  Reading the novel’s deployment of a wedding and marriage as queer in 
the way it offers alternate modes of relating or belonging to the heterosexual 
institution, Freeman claims 
 181 
[I]n its redescription of desire itself as the desire to join— and in 
joining, transform—a mode of public, collective identification, Member 
departs from the terrain of both the object-focused ‘‘lesbian’’ and less-
gender-specific ‘‘queer,’’ using the overfeminized form of the wedding 
to produce what might be called a female inflected queer 
rearrangement of social life in the 1940s and beyond.  (52)  
While Freeman’s argument that the novel showcases a “female inflected queer 
rearrangement of social life,” is compelling, I purposely rely on the “less-
gender-specific” term “queer” because Frankie’s desire to rearrange social life 
is presented alongside, and should be read in relation to, John Henry’s 
antisocial practices.   
Criticism of The Member of the Wedding’s narrative often falls into two 
schools: readings of the novel as a coming-of-age narrative that culminates in 
Frankie’s assimilation into a dominant social order and more optimistic 
readings that view the ending as subversive of social norms.  The latter has 
become more popular since the 1990s, with a number of feminist and queer 
essays reading the novel’s ending as either implying a lesbian relationship 
between Frankie and Mary Littlejohn, or as at least maintaining the sexual and 
gender ambiguity present in the rest of the novel.  As compelling as many of 
these accounts are, I remain unconvinced by them.  I argue instead that the 
queerness of the novel is in fact made possible by its very instability.  As 
oppositional desires are aligned with the Othered “freaks,” Frankie’s queer 
desires cannot coexist with the normative social order, for if they could they 
wouldn’t be queer at all.  The instability or transitory nature of her desires is 
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what provides the narrative structure for the novel.  The narrative endures 
only as long as her queer feelings do.  While Adams discusses how queerness 
functions within the novel to open up the “potential of new and varied 
[nonheteronormative] possibilities” and claims that “the potential of the freak 
[is] to provide alternatives to the exclusionary norms that structure his 
culture,” the novel ultimately presents the normative social order it critiques 
as inescapable (575).  By definition, freaks do not belong to the adult world 
Frankie longs to enter.  Adams presents an optimistic reading of the novel as 
one that embraces queerness, resisting a reading of the novel’s ending and 
Frankie’s new friendship with Mary as “evidence of her ultimate 
normalization” (575).  She argues that in the end the girls boycott the Freak 
tent at the fair because they realize “that the world is composed of freaks, that 
they no longer need to secure their own normality by exploiting a less 
fortunate Other” (515).  Yet such a positive reading is wishful.  The girls don’t 
have to look at the freaks because Frankie is no longer worried she might be or 
become one and because the freak that really matters to her—John Henry—is 
dying.  Though Adams claims there are “lesbian implications” to their 
friendship, there is little evidence of this.   
Freeman summarizes lesbian readings of Frankie’s character in this 
way, though she disagrees with them:  
[L]ate-twentieth-century critics have read the novel as a classic ‘coming 
out story.’ As with Ann Bannon’s Beebo Brinker and other lesbian pulp 
novels that succeeded Member, Frankie’s boyish body predicts her 
trajectory toward her newfound relationship with Mary Littlejohn in 
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the last chapter, which represents the beginning of her recognition that 
she desires not weddings but other girls.  A reading of The Member of 
the Wedding as a lesbian classic, perhaps even as a link between the 
lesbian relationships fostered by the all-female military and work 
environments of World War II along with the butch-femme bar cultures 
that succeeded them, would understand Frankie’s obsession with the 
wedding of her brother Jarvis and his bride Janice as the misguided 
‘before’ to a happily lesbian, partnered ‘ever after’.  (47)   
Reading Frankie as a lesbian, however, is not an adequate way to address the 
triangulated (and incestuous) relationship she desires with her brother and his 
bride, nor does it account for her “crush” on the wedding itself, independent 
of the marriage it inaugurates37.  The relationship Frankie develops with Mary 
Littlejohn is perhaps the least queer aspect of the novel, as it is portrayed as 
normative feminine behavior best understood in relationship to Frankie’s 
                                                
37 Critics often point to McCullers’s own triangulated queer relationships as 
the blueprint for Frankie’s desires, as she and her husband Reeves both 
pursued affairs and triadic relationships with other men and women.  In her 
biography of McCullers, Virginia Spencer Carr details the difficulty of these 
relationships and writes, “The triangle that haunted her fictional characters 
now haunted her in reality, as well.  A we of me relationship was good only as 
long as it suited Carson—and included her—but it was devastating if it left 
her out” (171).  McCullers also referred to herself as an “invert” and 
“frequently preached to [Reeves] that it was perfectly all right for a person to 
love a member of the same sex.  To her, nothing human in nature was alien or 
abnormal.  A love relationship between two men or two women could also be 
a very spiritual union that should be above petty jealousies” (171).  I mention 
this here as the majority of criticism that treats questions of gender and 
sexuality in McCullers’s work either incorporates or fully relies upon such 
biographical details in readings of her fiction.  I have avoided such 
biographical criticism in my own analysis of the novel, preferring to read the 
text on its own terms.  The queerness of the text is apparent, regardless of 
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earlier exclusion from female cliques:  
‘Look,’ John Henry said, and he was staring out of the window.  ‘I think 
those big girls are having a party in their clubhouse.’ ‘Hush!’ Frankie 
screamed suddenly.  ‘Don’t mention those crooks to me.’ There was in 
the neighborhood a clubhouse, and Frankie was not a member.  The 
members of the club were girls who were thirteen and fourteen and 
even fifteen years old.  They had parties with boys on Saturday night.  
Frankie knew all of the club members, and until this summer she had 
been like a younger member of their crowd, but now they had this club 
and she was not a member.  They had said she was too young and 
mean.  On Saturday night she could hear the terrible music and see 
from far away their light.  Sometimes she went around to the alley 
behind the clubhouse and stood near a honeysuckle fence.  She stood in 
the alley and watched and listened.  They were very long, those parties.  
(469)  
Frankie’s exclusion is painful.  The image of her waiting and watching those 
parties from the outside is one of acute loneliness and rejection, which she 
hides with bravado: “‘Maybe they will change their mind and invite you,’ 
John Henry said.  ‘The son-of-a-bitches.’ Frankie sniffled and wiped her nose 
in the crook of her arm” (469).  Frankie has been excluded from the company 
of teenage girls and their “parties with boys” due to age, immaturity, and lack 
of sexual knowledge: “‘The son-of-a-bitches,’ she said again.  ‘And there was 
                                                                                                                                       
McCullers’s sexual history, preferences, or proclivities, as historically 
interesting or salacious as they may be.   
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something else.  They were talking nasty lies about married people.  When I 
think of Aunt Pet and Uncle Ustace.  And my own father! The nasty lies! I 
don’t know what kind of fool they take me for.’” (470).  So for her finally to 
have a female bosom friend at the novel’s conclusion is to participate in 
normative feminine heterosexual behavior.  Although Adams maintains that 
the novel’s “conclusion implies that she may be able to transform her 
experiences of gender confusion into more productive energies, rather than 
repressing them in favor of a socially acceptable heterosexual femininity,” just 
the opposite is true (559).  Frankie does wholly reject her queer desires, which 
are incompatible with the normative heterosexual femininity required of her 
in order to become a member of the dominant social order instead of a 
“freak.”  This is made clear when she contemplates suicide after the “failed” 
wedding: “She had said that she would shoot herself if the bride and her 
brother would not take her.  She pointed the pistol at the side of her head and 
held it there a minute or two [. . .] When she lowered the pistol, she told 
herself that at the last minute she had changed her mind” (596).  Frankie’s 
queer desire to be a member of the wedding is foiled, but she still longs to 
experience feelings of belonging.  Her choice is clear—persist in her queer 
desires, kill herself, and remain forever alone, “deadness was blackness, 
nothing but pure terrible blackness that went on and on and never ended until 
the end of all the world,” or reject these desires in favor of going to find the 
soldier who had attacked her the previous day and who represents an 
aggressive masculine heterosexuality within the novel: “suddenly it seemed 
she might as well ask the soldier to marry with her, and then the two of them 
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could go away.  Before he had gone crazy, he had been a little nice” (598).  
Frankie gives up on her queer desires in that dark alley, associating them with 
exclusion and death, and turns instead toward heteronormative expectations, 
which she further pursues in her friendship with Mary and their occupation 
with boys.   
To deny a subversiveness to the novel’s conclusion, however, is not to 
deny the complexity with which the work explores queer adolescence.  While 
a subversive reading of the 1946 novel, such as the one Adams posits, in 
which the work valorizes queerness or allows it to go unpunished is a positive 
one, it denies the power of the negative ending.  The novel ends with a dead 
child freak and a girl who rejects her adolescent queer desires in favor of 
membership in the heteronormative social order.  Such an ending is not 
McCullers’s referendum on queerness, however.  It functions as a critique of a 
monolithic social order that posits assimilation, exclusion, or death as the only 
permissible states through which one can be understood as an intelligible 
subject.  Frankie’s survival comes at a cost.  To ignore or deny that she paid 
dearly to escape her misfit status is to undermine the power of the novel’s 
social critique.   
Frequently grouped together with “Southern Gothic” writers, 
McCullers’s use of grotesque bodies and minds is often understood by critics 
in terms of regionalism, as I’ve noted, though Sarah Gleeson-White reads 
McCullers’s use of the grotesque through Mikhail Bakhtin’s analysis of the 
carnivalesque in her book, Strange Bodies: Gender and Identity in the Novels of 
Carson McCullers.  Gleeson-White reads McCullers’s adolescent female 
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protagonists—Frankie in The Member of the Wedding and Mick in The Heart Is a 
Lonely Hunter—as “revolutionary; they figure as sites of resistance since it is the 
adolescent, representing the new generation, the future as hope and 
possibility, in which society so greatly invests.  The female adolescent body, as 
a grotesque site of becoming, challenges the very notion of discrete (feminine) 
identity [author’s emphasis]” (12).  Gleeson-White writes that these figures are 
caught in a liminal state “between femininity and masculinity,” and therefore 
contain “grotesque possibilities of becoming” (12).  Though it is tempting to 
see these likeable young characters as revolutionary, the fact remains that the 
world of The Member of the Wedding—trapped as it is within a very specific 
mid-century, white, Southern, heteronormative social order—truly offers 
Frankie only one real possibility of becoming.  While Frankie is caught 
between feminine and masculine behavior to be sure, she does not realistically 
have the option of either remaining in the middle of such a binary or fully 
embracing masculinity and rejecting her femininity, for either of those options 
would preclude her from developing into an adult, an accomplishment that is 
only recognized through one’s assimilation into the dominant social order.  
Frankie’s options are clear—grow up and become a Southern lady or reject the 
tenets of socially appropriate femininity and become a freak, trapped in an 
immature stasis.  She chooses the former.  Gleeson-White recognizes the 
conflict between the gender expression of these characters and what their 
society demands of them and argues that “in opposing the ideal of woman, 
the tomboys are marked as freaks [. . .] The freak is thus a fruitful and 
appropriate trope for the expression of the adolescent experience of otherness 
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and perplexity, for it highlights the manner in which normative gender 
politics statically contain and mark out the young tomboys in oddness” (23).  
This is not entirely true, however.  Being a “tomboy” is not synonymous with 
being a freak in the novel (or, I would argue, outside of it).  To be a young girl 
with some masculine characteristics is presented as a relatively normal state of 
affairs because Frankie is understood as a child who will grow out of this 
developmental stage.  Frankie is primarily afraid of becoming a freak who is 
nine feet tall and never gets married or goes to a wedding, while Berenice 
reassures her that she has the ability to clean up nicely (both literally and 
figuratively) and has a future ahead of her in which she will occupy a 
normative feminine space and marry a man.  Freaks are not tomboys, freaks 
are adults who never made a socially accepted choice in their gender 
expression or sexual desires, as represented by the Half-Man Half-Woman.  
Frankie isn’t a freak because of her gender expression, but rather because of 
her desire for gender fluidity and ambiguity: “She planned it [her version of a 
perfect world] so that people could instantly change back and forth from boys 
to girls, which ever way they felt like and wanted.  But Berenice would argue 
with her about this, insisting that he law of human sex was exactly right just 
as it was and could in no way be improved,” as well as her desire for a queer 
union with her brother and his bride (547).  “Tomboy” is not a derogatory 
term, unlike “freak,” because it does not name a fixed identity; it names 
behavior that is only possible during youth and is, by definition, temporary.  
There is no such thing as an adult tomboy, there are only girls who dress like 
boys and sometimes grow into lesbians (which is the narrative of coming out a 
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number of critics have read in the novel).  The fear of recognition as a freak 
that Frankie harbors in her present is less about her tomboyishness than her 
feelings of exclusion, as one thing remains clear in the novel’s portrayal and 
Frankie’s understanding of freaks—they do not belong. 
Boredom, Belonging, and Narrative Temporality 
 
“Sometimes the anxiety is so powerful and so pressing (since that is the 
word’s etymology)—an anxiety of waiting, for instance—that it 
becomes necessary to do something.  This ‘something’ is naturally 
(ancestrally) a vow: if (you come back . . .), then (I will fulfill my vow)” 
(Barthes, LD 164).  
 
“Because she could not break this tightness gathering within her, she 
would hurry to do something.  She would go home and put the coal 
scuttle on her head, like a crazy person’s hat, and walk around the 
kitchen table.  She would do anything that suddenly occurred to her—
but whatever she did was always wrong, and not at all what she had 
wanted.  Then, having done these wrong and silly things, she would 
stand, sickened and empty, in the kitchen door and say: ‘I just wish I 
could tear down this whole town’” (MOW 481).   
 
 The plot of The Member of the Wedding is primarily concerned with the 
inaction that accompanies Frankie’s waiting to belong to something larger 
than herself and the bored and anxious feelings that accompany her desires.  
The majority of the novel takes place in the span of the few days between 
Jarvis and Janice’s visit and their wedding, but these days are both the 
continuation and culmination of a long, hot, still summer of angst for Frankie.  
She has spent the spring and summer feeling excluded and acting out only to 
finally wait with nervous anticipation for her brother’s wedding.  The majority 
of the scenes in the novel take place in the kitchen of the Addams’s house 
where Frankie, Berenice, and John Henry gather to kill time.  As noted in the 
previous section, the novel’s “plotlessness” hinges on the long stretches of 
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“kitchen time”—extended scenes in which nothing much happens apart from 
card playing, eating, and idle conversations: “The three of them sat at the 
kitchen table, saying the same things over and over, so that by August the 
words began to rhyme with each other and sound strange” (461).  These 
scenes serve to delay the forward progress of the narrative and mirror 
Frankie’s own developmental delay, which is characterized by her 
inappropriate object of desire.  They are also marked by Frankie’s feelings of 
restlessness and anxiety, “weak” or “neutral” affects that hinder progress.  
Frankie tries to relieve her anxious feelings by rushing to “do something,” 
anything: “She went around town and the things she was and heard seemed 
to be left somehow unfinished, and there was the tightness in her that would 
not break.  She would hurry to do something, but what she did was always 
wrong” (481).  Her attempts to alleviate her feelings of nameless anxiety are 
always the “wrong thing and not what Frankie wanted” (481).  Thus she finds 
herself ever returning to the liminal space of the kitchen in which the deviant 
desires of both Frankie and John Henry are safely voiced.  The kitchen is also 
the primary site of queer inaction in the novel.  It figures as a queer space for 
this strange triad who would form, in retrospect, their own kind of three-way 
marriage that offered its own sense of belonging to its members, a sense of 
belonging Frankie ultimately rejects.  
Nothing much happens in the kitchen, but it serves as the site of 
lengthy narrative exposition as the three talk and eat and play cards all 
summer.  Frankie’s language within the kitchen alternates between a slow and 
deliberate parceling of thoughts meant to impart the seriousness of her 
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feelings and wildly unmoored tantrums or hurried cascades of words that 
replicate her restlessness. An example of the former emerges at the beginning 
of the novel: “‘It is so very queer,’ she said.  ‘The way it all just happened.’  
‘Happened?  Happened?’ said Berenice.  John Henry listened and watched 
them quietly.  ‘I have never been so puzzled.’  ‘But puzzled about what?’  ‘The 
whole thing,’ Frankie said.  And Berenice remarked: ‘I believe the sun has 
fried your brains.’  ‘Me too,’ John Henry whispered” (461).  What Frankie 
lacks the language to express—why exactly her brother’s announcement was 
so “queer” and how it made her feel—she makes up for in the sheer duration 
of the conversation.  Her cryptic statements require Berenice to prompt her for 
explanations she cannot give, which gives length to a conversation without 
substance. Such kitchen conversations, in turn, create duration in a novel that 
primarily records inaction.  Frankie’s enigmatic speech is partially 
deliberate—she wants to be taken seriously by Berenice and John Henry—and 
partially the result of her confused emotional state—she doesn’t know how to 
make sense of the world around her. Her speech in these moments is often 
contrasted with Berenice’s matter-of-fact responses.  When Frankie says, 
“‘They were the two prettiest people I ever saw.  I just can’t understand how it 
happened,’” Berenice responds, “‘But what, Foolish? [. . .] Your brother come 
home with the girl he means to marry and took dinner today with you and 
your Daddy.  They intend to marry at her home in Winter Hill this coming 
Sunday.  You and your Daddy are going to the wedding.  And that is the A 
and the Z of the matter.  So whatever ails you? (462).  Berenice, who wishes to 
guide Frankie on a normative, linear, developmental path, sees nothing 
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strange or ambiguous about a situation she can clearly articulate in a linearly-
ordered developmental fashion—A to Z.  Her speech is succinct while 
Frankie’s lingers and repeats itself, creating duration within the text.  Later in 
the conversation Frankie’s words, though still spoken slowly, begin to tumble 
over each other as she attempts to give voice to the queer feeling she cannot 
name:  
‘I mean this,’ said Frankie slowly.  ‘I saw them O.K.  Janice had on a 
green dress and green high-heel dainty shoes.  Her hair was done up in 
a knot.  Dark hair and a little piece of it was loose.  Jarvis sat by her on 
the sofa.  He had on his brown uniform and he was sunburned and 
very clean.  They were the two prettiest people I ever saw.  Yet it was 
like I couldn’t see all of them I wanted to see.  My brains couldn’t 
gather together quick enough and take it all in.  And then they were 
gone.  You see what I mean?’  (486) 
She sees the couple but does not see all of them because she views them 
through her desire for belonging—a desire that leads to her plot to become a 
member of their wedding.  She lacks the words to express her nonnormative 
desire, however, and her language eventually devolves into a verbal and 
physical tantrum, which reflects her inner anxiety:  
She could feel the beating of her heart, and when she spoke her voice 
was a whisper.  ‘What I need to know is this.  Do you think I made a 
good impression?’ [. . .] ‘Why, you didn’t do anything.’  ‘Nothing?’ 
asked Frankie.  ‘No.  You just watched the pair of them like they was 
ghosts.  Then, when they talked about the wedding, them ears of yours 
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stiffened out the size of cabbage leaves—‘  Frankie raised her hand to 
her left ear.  ‘They didn’t,’ she said bitterly.  Then after a while she 
added, ‘Some day you going to look down and find that big fat tongue 
of yours pulled out by the root and laying there before you on the table.  
Then how do you think you will feel?’  (490)   
Frankie’s outburst is followed by her restless movement, akin to that of a 
caged animal:  
Then she was walking round and around the room again.  ‘I am so 
scared I didn’t make a good impression.’  ‘What of it?’ said Berenice.  ‘I 
wish Honey and T. T. would come on.  You make me nervous.’  Frankie 
drew up her left shoulder and bit her lower lip.  Then suddenly she sat 
down and banged her forehead on the table. [. . .] Frankie sat stiff, her 
face in the crook of her elbow and her fists clenched tight.  Her voice 
had a ragged and strangled sound.  ‘They were so pretty,’ she was 
saying.  ‘They must have such a good time.  And they went away and 
left me [. . .] They went away and left me with this feeling.’  (490) 
“This feeling,” Frankie’s queer desire to become a part of the couple, 
structures the narrative time spent in the kitchen as her attempts at expressing 
it fail over and over again.  The last scene of the novel, which takes place in 
the kitchen as well, is also about anticipation as Frankie eagerly awaits Mary’s 
arrival, yet it occurs after Frankie has resolved the ambiguities surrounding 
her gender and sexuality. This scene of waiting lacks the restlessness of the 
earlier ones, as well as their duration.  Frankie’s language has morphed from 
oblique and inadequate to direct and condescending as she moves to end 
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rather than encourage discussion with Berenice:  
‘There’s no use our discussing a certain party.  You could not possibly 
ever understand her.  It’s just not in you.’  She had said that once before 
to Berenice, and from the sudden faded stillness in her eye she knew 
that the words had hurt.  And now she repeated them, angered because 
of the tinged way Berenice had said the name, but once the words were 
spoken she was sorry.  ‘Anyhow, I consider it the greatest honor of my 
existence that Mary has picked me out to be her one most intimate 
friend.  Me!  Of all people!’  (603). 
Frankie shuts down conversation with Berenice because, having come of age 
and been assured of her newly normative feelings, she no longer needs it.  
Without the trio’s meandering kitchen conversations, the text ceases to 
meander as well, and swiftly concludes with Mary’s arrival shortly thereafter.  
Although Berenice and John Henry share Frankie’s summer, they do 
not also share her angst or alienation.  While Frankie is terrified of becoming a 
freak, her cousin John Henry embraces the idea.  He is fully content in his 
world, that “mixture of delicious and freak” and is happy and comfortable in 
the kitchen (546).  He reads as the confident outsider to Frankie’s anxious 
misfit.  While criticism of the novel often paints Berenice as the third misfit 
outsider due her race, she should also be understood as an employee.  As the 
cook, the kitchen is her workplace and her own home life is separate from the 
Addams’s house.  Berenice visits Frankie’s queer world in which she is a 
mother figure for the girl, but she doesn’t live there.  As such, her guidance 
always pushes Frankie toward normative behavior whereas John Henry 
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encourages freakery.  Frankie is stuck between the two poles—heterosexuality 
as embodied by Berenice and her serial monogamous marriages or queerness 
as written on the cheerful cross-dressing genderqueer body of John Henry.  In 
the end, of course, John Henry’s path is unsustainable as evidenced by his 
death, while Berenice quits the family and the kitchen and decides to marry 
her beau T. T.  Williams who “was very proper, and he liked to please 
everybody, and he always wanted to do the right thing” (493).   
The many scenes of kitchen time killing underscore Frankie’s feelings 
of alienation and unease: “They sat together in the kitchen, and the kitchen 
was a sad and ugly room.  John Henry had covered the walls with queer, child 
drawings, as far up as his arm would reach.  This gave the kitchen a crazy 
look, like that of a room in the crazy-house.  And now the old kitchen made 
Frankie sick.  The name for what had happened to her Frankie did not know, 
but she could feel her squeezed heart beating against the table edge” (463-4).  
Shaken by the news of the wedding, Frankie’s anxiousness is palpable.  Here 
queerness is associated with childhood and immaturity as well as a kind of 
freakery—the kitchen is a queer place for freaks, just like the confining walls 
of the “crazy-house,” or, later, the town jail.   
The kitchen space also exists out of time: “After the darkening yard the 
kitchen was hot and bright and queer.  The walls of the kitchen bothered 
Frankie—the queer drawings of Christmas trees, airplanes, freak soldiers, 
flowers.” (466).  The queer interior of the kitchen exists in opposition to the 
normative outside world: the yard is cool and dark after sundown, but the 
kitchen remains “hot and bright.” Though it is August outside, “queer 
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drawings of Christmas trees” adorn the interior walls.  While groups of 
children play outdoors Frankie and John Henry remain sequestered:  
‘Less play out.’ ‘I don’t want to,’ Frankie said.  ‘There’s a big crowd 
going to play out tonight.’ ‘You got ears,’ Frankie said.  ‘You heard me.’ 
[. . .] Along with the radio they could hear the voices of the children 
playing in the night.  ‘But less go out, Frankie.  They sound like they 
having a mighty good time.’ ‘No they’re not,’ she said.  ‘Just a lot of 
ugly silly children.  Running and hollering and running and hollering.  
Nothing to it.  We’ll go upstairs and unpack your week-end bag.’  (468) 
Frankie’s anxieties over her earlier actions of the summer, themselves a result 
of her attempts to “do something” to relieve her nameless anxiety, cause her to 
reject the outside world and games played by “ugly silly children.” Frankie 
does not feel a kinship with children anymore, yet is also not accepted by the 
clique of older, adolescent girls.  She belongs nowhere but the kitchen. 
Frankie kills time in the queer space of the kitchen much as Bigger kills 
time in the Regal Theater in Native Son by engaging in homosocial behavior.  
Both Frankie and Bigger feel oppressed by their anxiety-inducing idleness, but 
Frankie’s acting out and trouble causing includes attention-seeking antics, 
sexual experimentation, and petty larceny, whereas Bigger’s desires to do 
something lead to escalating incidences of violence, including rape and murder.  
Bigger’s feelings that “the white folks” “don’t let us do nothing” indicate his 
awareness of the lack of narrative options available to him as a member of a 
racial and socioeconomic underclass whereas Frankie’s restless anxiety stems 
from her desire to resist the progress narrative presented to her—finding a 
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nice “while boy beau” (NS 19-20; MOW 533).  As chapter two explored, 
“growing up” is not a possibility for Bigger.  Frankie’s narrative options are 
limited as well, but not to the same extent as Bigger’s.  Frankie must choose 
between growing up, rejecting her queer desires, and accepting her place as a 
Southern lady in her dominant heteronormative society or embracing her 
queer desires, becoming a “freak,” and facing John Henry’s fate.  Frankie well 
understands her options when she first asks Berenice if she thinks she “will 
grow into a Freak” and, upon Berenice’s negative reply, asks, “Well, do you 
think I will be pretty?” with prettiness serving as a marker of heterosexual 
attractiveness and freakiness signifying its opposite (477).  Frankie’s choice is a 
privilege Bigger and Lolita do not have.   
Freeman reads the temporality of the novel as a rejection of progress 
narratives, as do I, and she sees such a rejection as politically valuable: “This 
kind of thinking seems key to queering U.S.  politics: to imagine social 
configurations and narrative forms that can refigure both the horizontal bonds 
between peers beyond couplehood and the vertical bonds between 
generations beyond parenthood.  [. . .] [The novel] provides material for 
rethinking ‘queer’ beyond the nationalist (now global) frontier mentality and 
progress narrative” (65).  While I share Freeman’s belief that the novel 
confounds progress narratives, creating what I argue is the novel’s queer 
temporality, I believe that this confounding effect relies on the portrayal of 
weak affects in the novel—the affects associated with Frankie’s queer desires.   
Unlike Lolita’s self-sustaining and protective indifference and Bigger’s 
apathetic relationship with the world, Frankie’s boredom stems from her 
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sense that she does not belong.  Whereas Bigger belongs to a specific 
underclass position in a socioeconomic hierarchy and Lolita essentially 
belongs to Humbert, the setting of Frankie’s narrative is framed by her 
feelings of alienation: “This was the summer when for a long time she had not 
been a member.  She belonged to no club and was a member of nothing in the 
world.  Frankie had become an unjoined person who hung around in 
doorways, and she was afraid” (461).  As such, the novel is often read as a 
commentary on loneliness.  Frankie does feel very much alone, however her 
feelings of isolation can be attributed to the “extreme solitude” of what 
Barthes called the “lover’s discourse” (LD 1).  She is isolated by her desires.   
The spring and summer of that year had been filled with a mixture of 
fear, giving way to anxiety and indifference for Frankie.  Convinced that she 
must leave her town, Frankie continually packs and unpacks her suitcase 
having nowhere to go and no way to get there.  Frankie’s feelings are largely 
impotent and ineffectual, leaving her restless and unsatisfied: “This was the 
summer when Frankie was sick and tired of being Frankie.  She hated herself, 
and had become a loafer and a big no-good who hung around the summer 
kitchen: dirty and greedy and mean and sad” (478).  Frankie’s fears stem in 
part from her adolescent loneliness.  She has lost her best friend to a move, 
been banished from her father’s bed at night, and has begun to form a sense of 
self that is separate and unconnected from the world around her:  
She was afraid because in the war they would not include her, and 
because the world seemed somehow separate from herself [. . .] She was 
afraid of these things that made her suddenly wonder who she was, 
 199 
and what she was going to be in the world, and why she was standing 
at that minute, seeing a light or listening, or staring up into the sky: 
alone.  She was afraid, and there was a queer tightness in her chest.  
(480-481).   
Frankie’s sense of isolation corresponds with the monotony of that spring and 
summer: “For the last spring, that year, was lazy and too sweet.  The long 
afternoons flowered and lasted and the green sweetness sickened her” (480).  
Disconnected from the world and a member of no club—a lack of belonging 
that Frankie fears contributes to her affiliation with freaks, time moves very 
slowly for her, a temporality reflected in the narrative. 
By the end of the summer, Frankie’s impotent angst is mirrored in the 
monotony of the kitchen: “And so each gloomy afternoon their voices sawed 
against each other, saying the same words, which finally reminded Frankie of 
a raggedy rhyme said by two crazies.  She would end by telling Berenice: ‘It 
looks to me like everything has just walked off and left me.’ And she would 
put her head down on the table and feel afraid” (487).  Frankie manages to 
suppress her feelings of fear at the adolescent changes she is experiencing, and 
her changing recognition of the world as something apart from herself and 
replace them with indifference and apathy:  
So she stayed home and hung around the kitchen, and the summer did 
not end.  By dog days she was five feet five and three-quarter inches 
tall, a great big greedy loafer who was too mean to live [. . .] She stuck 
close in the kitchen with John Henry and Berenice.  She did not think 
about the war, the world.  Nothing hurt her any longer; she did not care 
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[. . .] She would not let things make her sad and she would not care [. . 
.] Each day was like the day before, except that it was longer, and 
nothing hurt her any more.  (482-483) 
The summer of the kitchen has dragged on seemingly indefinitely, as 
suggested by the description of the radio constantly on in the background: 
“The radio had stayed on all the summer long, so finally it was a sound that as 
a rule they did not notice.  Sometimes, when the noise became so loud that 
they could not hear their own ears, Frankie would turn it down a little.  
Otherwise, music and voices came and went and crossed and twisted with 
each other, and by August they did not listen any more” (468).  The monotony 
of the kitchen is a reflection of Frankie’s seeming stasis.  She is 
developmentally stuck between childhood and adulthood.  Her perpetual 
restlessness drives her to do something, anything, but her actions are always 
“wrong” in that they do not relieve her anxiety.   
Eventually, Frankie simply gives in to her boredom, idleness, and the 
stalled pace of her life.  Frankie’s desire for the wedding begins the novel, 
which presents her anticipation of the event as a greater degree of the same 
unproductive emotions she has been feeling—anxiety and restlessness.  Her 
desire to become a member of the wedding does not relieve her restlessness 
because it is not the correct desire that would help shepherd her into young 
adulthood the way a desire to have a “young white boy beau” like Barney 
would (533).  The novel presents Frankie’s queer desire for the wedding as 
another example of how she is developmentally stalled in adolescence.  Her 
inability to do something highlights the paralyzing anxiety that accompanies 
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her queer desires, which are seen as thwarting her forward, developmental 
progress.  When Frankie cannot progress, neither can the narrative.  Thus the 
narrative itself is a long exercise in delay, as the reader spends just as much 
monotonous time in the kitchen as Frankie does, and gives as much attention 
to the non-events, the inactivity of the characters, as to the few dramatic 
instances that strangely merit little description.  While several hours in the 
kitchen constitute the bulk of the novel’s narrative, the wedding itself is 
dispensed with in a page; the soldier’s attack on Frankie, a paragraph; and 
John Henry’s death, a sentence, for in the kitchen, “The clock ticked very 
slowly on the shelf above the stove, and it was only quarter to six.  The glare 
outside the window shade beneath the arbor was black and solid.  Nothing 
moved.  From somewhere far away came the sound of whistling, and it was a 
grieving August song that did not end.  The minutes were very long” (475). 
The news of her brother’s wedding gives Frankie “a feeling she could 
not name,” yet she does name it when she says, “I just never saw an two 
people like them [Jarvis and Janice].  When they walked in the house today it 
was so queer” (462).  There is, of course, nothing strange about her brother’s 
announcement as he has been engaged for two years.  What is queer in this 
scene is Frankie who has begun to imagine a place for herself within the 
wedding, picturing both her brother and his bride as “faceless” (462).  “The 
spring of that year had been a long queer season” for Frankie and the 
queerness of her adolescent development coalesces around her brother’s 
wedding: “Together [Janis and Jarvis] made in her this feeling that she could 
not name.  But it was like the feelings of the spring, only more sudden and 
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more sharp.  There was the same tightness and in the same queer way she was 
afraid” (479; 483).  Frankie tries to make sense of her feelings by asking 
Berenice to narrate events she had been present for—her brother’s visit: “‘Tell 
me,’ she said.  ‘Tell me exactly how it was.’ ‘You know! said Berenice.  ‘You 
seen them.’ ‘But tell me,’ Frankie said.  ‘I will discuss it for the last time,’ said 
Berenice” (485).  Frankie attempts to make sense of her lived experience by 
having Berenice tell her repeatedly what she has seen herself.  Berenice gives a 
matter-of-fact description: the couple arrived, Frankie changed, the couple, 
Frankie, her father, and John Henry sat and had drinks, then dinner, then 
Janice and Jarvis left on the train, “The wedding will be this coming Sunday.  
And that is all.  Now, is you satisfied?” (485).  Frankie, of course, is not 
satisfied with Berenice’s retelling because the events of the visit seem very 
ordinary when compared with the extraordinary feelings she experiences: 
“Tell me,’ Frankie said again.  ‘Exactly what did they look like?’ ‘Look like?’ 
Said Berenice.  ‘Why, they looked natural.  Your brother is a good-looking 
blond white boy.  And the girl is kind of brunette and small and pretty.  They 
make a nice white couple.  You seen them, Foolish’” (485).  Berenice’s 
description of the pair as “natural” is telling in her role as kitchen arbiter of 
the natural and unnatural.  Natural for Berenice is a “good-looking blond 
white boy” marrying a “small and pretty” brunette.  Frankie is not a small and 
pretty lady and she has no desire for a “natural” or appropriate romantic 
relationship.  When Berenice tells her “‘What you ought to begin thinking 
about is a beau [. . .] A nice little white boy beau,’” Frankie rejects the idea: “I 
don’t want any beau.  What would I do with one?” (533).  Berenice’s 
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instructions on femininity, “‘You ought to fix yourself up nice in your dresses.  
And speak sweetly and act sly,” do not appeal to Frankie (533).  Berenice is 
eventually the person who articulates Frankie’s desire for a queer union: “I see 
what you have in your mind.  Don’t think I don’t.  You see something 
unheard of at Winter Hill tomorrow, and you right in the center.  You think 
you going to march down the center of the aisle right in between your brother 
and the bride.  You think you going to break into that wedding, and then Jesus 
knows what else” (556).  By calling Frankie’s plot “unheard of,” Berenice 
underscores the unnatural nature of Frankie’s desires.  She further insinuates 
that part of Frankie’s unnatural desires are incestuous, as she wants to 
participate not just in the wedding itself, but in the “Jesus knows what else” 
that follows the ceremony—the wedding night and honeymoon that will 
consummate the marriage.  Berenice warns Frankie away from indulging her 
queer desires lest they lead to an unnatural lifestyle: “If you start out falling in 
love with some unheard-of thing like that, why is going to happen to you? If 
you take a mania like this, it won’t be the last time and of that you can be sure.  
So what will become of you? Will you be trying to break into weddings the 
rest of your days? And what kind of life would that be?” (556).  In this 
passage, Berenice’s undertones are clear—girls who try to break into 
weddings never become brides because those who fall in love with “unheard 
of” objects of desire, be it weddings, couples, or other women, are doomed to 
an unfulfilled life of disappointment.  And as Frankie knows, the people who 
don’t get to go to weddings are freaks.   
Frankie seeks the answer to her feelings of alienation in the queer union 
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she desires with Jarvis and Janis.  She sees them as the “we of me”: 
“Yesterday, and all the twelve years of her life, she had only been Frankie.  
She was an I person who had to walk around and do things by herself.  All 
other people has a we to claim, all others except her [. . .] the old Frankie had 
had no we to claim, less it would be the terrible summer we of her and John 
Henry and Berenice—and that was the last we in the world she wanted” (497).  
Frankie turns away from the queer kitchen trio to the even queerer prospect of 
belonging to her brother’s marriage, of joining the we of Jarvis and Janis: 
“There was her bother and the bride, and it was as though when first she saw 
them something she had known inside of her: They are the we of me.  And that 
was why it made her feel so queer, for them to be away in Winter Hill while 
she was left all by herself; the hull of the old Frankie left there in the town 
alone” (497).  Yet Frankie’s choice of a we is seen as an unnatural one 
compared to all the other “we’s” she lists: Berenice’s family, church, and 
lodge; her father’s store; members of various clubs; army soldiers; and 
criminals on a chain-gang (497).  All of these institutions—work, family, 
church, community, and even prison—are sanctioned as normative collectives 
of individuals.  Marriage, however, is a union for couples and couples only.  
As Barthes laments, “Thus—according to Nature, traditional wisdom, the 
myth—do not look for union (amphimixis) outside the division of roles, if not 
of the sexes: it is the couple’s reason.” (LD 227).  Frankie’s desires are decidedly 
nonnormative and thus painted as unnatural and ultimately unsustainable.  
While Frankie’s vision of the future calls for gender mutability and world 
travel as part of her brother’s wedding, this vision is ultimately unrealizable.   
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While Frankie’s queer desires do provide an in-between space that 
thwarts an oppositional choice, they do so by stalling rather than providing an 
obtainable third option outside and apart from dominant heteronormative 
society.  Her queer desires and the feelings of anxiety that accompany them 
thus perform the work of Barthes’s Neutral, which, as examined in previous 
chapters, temporarily destabilizes such oppositional binaries.  Frankie the 
androgyne may destabilize masculine/feminine binaries, for example, but this 
is an ultimately untenable position.  Likewise, her desire to infiltrate and 
expand the heterosexual couple is not an achievable goal.  Barthes writes of 
the ethical component he assigns to the Neutral and its role in conflict 
avoidance, of resisting “injunctions addressed by the world to ‘choose,’ to 
produce meaning, to enter conflicts, to ‘take responsibility’” (7).  The Neutral 
suspends such choices, suspends meaning, and suspends progress.  As such, 
Frankie’s idle, androgynous adolescence is Neutral territory, refusing to 
choose between adulthood and childhood; masculine and feminine; queer and 
heteronormative.  Her stalled development is bathed in anxiety and boredom, 
the Neutral affects that correspond to and paradoxically perpetuate inaction 
and stasis.   
Despite Berenice’s admonitions, Frankie has big plans for the wedding.  
While sitting across from a soldier she meets in the Blue Moon, a hotel bar she 
wanders into in her excitement to tell people about the wedding, “she 
suddenly saw the three of them—herself, her brother, and the bride—walking 
beneath a cold Alaskan sky, along the sea where green ice waves lay frozen 
and folded on the shore; they climbed a sunny glacier shot through with pale 
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cold colors and a rope tied the three of them together, and friends from 
another glacier called in Alaskan their J A names” (523).  For Frankie, the 
future fantasy of her life in this three-way marriage seems more solid and 
appealing than the drunken soldier who buys her a beer and asks her out: “It 
was the actual present, in fact, that seemed to F. Jasmine a little bit unreal” 
(523).  Frankie later that night dresses for her date with the soldier and 
“look[s] like a regular grown girl” in her “silver shoes! And silk stockings!” 
and “sweet dress” (578).  Frankie puts on her approximation of normative 
femininity in anticipation of what she perceives to be grown-up heterosexual 
behavior—her date with the soldier, which does not go as planned: “although 
by the clock the time was not long, it seemed to F.  Jasmine endless [. . .] their 
two conversations would not join together, and underneath there was a layer 
of queerness she could not place and understand” (580).  Frankie feels 
unjoined from the soldier because she doesn’t understand his flirting and 
innuendo.  She knows that a sexual undercurrent is at play in his “gay” and 
“sassy talk,” and it makes her uncomfortable and confused: “It was again as 
though the soldier talked a kind of double-talk that, try as she would, she 
could not follow—yet it was not so much the actual remarks as the tone 
underneath she failed to understand” (580-581).  She feels “Like a nightmare 
pupil in a recital who has to play a duet to a piece she does not know, F.  
Jasmine did her best to catch the tune and follow” (581).  When the soldier 
invites her up to his room, she equates it with the fair: “It was like going into a 
fair booth, or fair ride, that once having entered you cannot leave until the 
exhibition or the ride is finished” (581).  Frankie compares the soldier’s 
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attempt to assault her to “a minute in the fair Crazy-House, or real 
Milledgeville” and Frankie escapes by knocking him unconscious and fleeing 
his room via the fire escape (583). 
Frankie significantly compares escaping her would-be assailant to 
“[running] like a chased person fleeing from the crazy-house at Milledgeville,” 
thus associating the sailor’s aggressive masculine heterosexuality with the 
freaks in the institution and calling him a “crazy man” (584).  She runs away 
from a heterosexuality that confuses her and toward her brother’s wedding, 
arriving home and proclaiming, “I wish we were going to the wedding right 
this minute [. . .] I think that would be the best thing to do” (585).  Her 
encounter with the soldier who is, at best, a drunk and a creep and, at worst, a 
rapist and a pedophile, seems not to leave her traumatized.  Her feelings 
simply echo those she has been experiencing all summer, those heightened by 
her plan for the wedding: “The waiting made her feel restless” (585). 
Frankie fails to articulate her plans to her brother and his bride, 
however, never managing to explain how they are the “we of me” and causing 
a scene at the wedding by climbing into their car, clinging to the steering 
wheel, and sobbing for them to take her with them.  Yet she describes this 
outcome as a failure on the wedding’s part and not her or her brother’s:  
From the beginning the wedding had been queer like the card games in 
the kitchen the first week last June.  In those bridge games they played 
and played for many days, but nobody ever drew a good hand, the 
cards were all sorry, and no high bids made—until finally Berenice 
suspicioned, saying: ‘Less us get busy and count these old cards.’ And 
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they got busy and counted the old cards, and it turned out the jacks and 
the queens were missing.  John Henry at last admitted that he had cut 
out the jacks and then the queens to keep them company and, after 
hiding the clipped scraps in the stove, had secretly taken the pictures 
home.  So the fault of the card game was discovered.  But how could 
the failure of the wedding be explained? (589)   
Here the card game between the odd trio is “queered” when John Henry 
removes and keeps the coupled queens and jacks, which represent a 
heterosexual (though illicit if the queen is running away with her servant) 
pairing that allows the world of the card game to function successfully.  In 
Frankie’s mind, the wedding that would allow the odd trio of her fantasy—
her, her brother, and his bride—was queered just like the card game, when the 
heterosexual couple is set apart from the group. 
After her plan to join her brother’s wedding fails, Frankie runs away 
and has the thought that she will marry the soldier who she narrowly avoided 
being sexually assaulted by the night before, as she realizes “There was only 
knowing that she must find somebody, anybody, that she could join with to 
go away.  For now she admitted she was too scared to go into the world 
alone” (598).  As her queer union hopes have been dashed, Frankie has her 
heteronormative sexual awakening, piecing together the time she walked in 
on her father’s boarders having sex, the “nasty talk” of her friends, and her 
experiences with Barney and the soldier:  
[S]he recalled the silence in the hotel room; and all at once a fit in a 
front room, the silence, the nasty talk behind the garage—these 
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separate recollections fell together in the darkness of her mind, as 
shafting searchlights meet in the night sky upon an aeroplane, so that 
in a flash there came in her an understanding.  There was a feeling of 
cold surprise; she stopped a minute, then went on toward the Blue 
Moon.  (598) 
In this moment, Frankie understands heterosexuality and her place in it.  The 
“cold surprise” she feels is unpleasant—she has lost her dream of the wedding 
and found only uncomfortable, misunderstood, and undesired moments.  This 
realization precipitates her recognition that to occupy the position of a queer 
outcast as a tomboy who prefers the company of the cook and her queer 
cousin was to prevent her from belonging to a world structured by 
heterosexual norms.  She pauses, but then continues into the hotel bar where 
she had met the soldier, thus accepting her heteronormative fate, which is 
sealed when a policeman approaches and identifies her, saying “I’ll phone in 
to headquarters to say you’re found” (599).  Frankie has indeed been lost and 
found in the eyes of her father and the Law, but for Frankie she has not been 
found so much as lost for good. 
Following this night of recognition and acceptance, “Frances was never 
once to speak about the wedding,” finding instead her feelings of anxiety and 
restlessness replaced by happiness and a feeling of belonging, not simply 
within her friendship with Mary, but also in her larger relationship to the 
world, from which she no longer feels set apart (601).  Thus her lack of weak 
feelings also signals the end of both her developmental and narrative delays.  
Frankie rejects her tomboy character and is allowed entrance into an adult 
 210 
world defined by the heteronormativity her brother’s marriage represents.  
John Henry embraces his queer desires and remains a child forever—his death 
denying him the opportunity to grow up.  The novel reaches its resolution 
when Frankie reaches hers.  Having heeded the word’s call to choose, 
Frankie’s life progresses and the narrative documenting her stalled 
adolescence ends. 
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CONCLUSION 
KIDS THESE DAYS 
Ultimately, it is my hope to understand these novels through thinking 
about the cultural movement of these fictional figures—Lolita, Bigger, and 
Frankie—through time.  In this conclusion then, I wish to briefly sketch the 
afterlife of these novels in our contemporary cultural imagination as a means 
of investigating the way time continues to work on these novels, and not 
simply within them.  As this aspect of my project is still developing, these are 
the ideas I want to continue to think about and as such are more suggestive 
than demonstrative.    
Two of the novels in this study have been canonized and one relegated 
to the category of “young adult fiction,” but significantly the only adolescent 
whose place in the popular imagination (in the U. S. and abroad) has 
continued to grow beyond the novel’s covers is the one we have the least 
access to within the text—Lolita.  Native Son and The Member of the Wedding do 
not share Lolita’s cultural currency.  Wright’s novel has entered the canon of 
American literature, to be sure, but Bigger Thomas is still seen as product of a 
specific historical moment.  McCullers’s novel is less widely read and has met 
the fate common to novels about adolescence—they become novels for 
adolescents and thus somehow less serious and less universal than adult 
literature.  Though lauded at the time of publication, The Member of the 
Wedding is now a book about a twelve year old, meant to be read by twelve 
year olds.  The same can be said for any number of coming-of-age novels, 
perhaps most notably Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye, which went from being 
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a novel that attracted a large amount of literary criticism in the 1950s and 60s 
to a novel for high school students—an immature work about an immature 
boy.  I confess that I am not entirely sure what to make of this phenomenon 
except to note how the persistent devaluation or minimization of works about 
adolescents reflects a perpetually conflicted intergenerational relationship that 
ensures young people can only speak to and for each other while en route to a 
pre-determined futurity not of their making.   
Lolita, on the other hand, now has a life nearly completely untethered 
from her textual depiction.  Her name has become synonymous with sexual 
precociousness, underage temptresses, and various incarnations of “jailbait.”  
The news media is quick to label precocious teens “Lolitas” as demonstrated 
by the 1992 case of Amy Fisher, the 17 year old famously labeled the “Long 
Island Lolita” after she attempted to murder her 36-year-old lover’s wife.  
Fisher, now out of prison, has become a porn actress—a career Nabokov’s 
Lolita summarily rejected.  It is striking the extent to which Humbert’s 
depiction of his “nymphet” has blotted out the reality of a victimized child in 
the popularization of “Lolita” as a descriptive term.  We do not call kidnapped 
and sexually abused girls “Lolitas,” after all.  Humbert’s view of girl children 
disturbingly mirrors our cultural one—they are simultaneously innocent and 
seductive, wholly sexual and sexualized. 
Lolita is not just an American phenomenon.  In Japan, a “Lolita” street 
fashion culture emerged in the 1980s or mid-1990s, depending on the source, 
and continues today.  Wearing (or being, as the style is oft considered a state 
of mind) “Lolita” involves the donning of gothic Victorian frilly and child-like 
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clothing by adult women.38  
Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
Gothic & Lolita Bible, Vol. 4 cover art. 
 
 
                                                
38 See figures 4 and 5 from the Gothic & Lolita Bible, a Japanese publication 
dedicated to Lolita fashion for examples of the style. 
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Figure 5 
 
Gothic & Lolita Bible, Vol. 4 interior pictorial. 
 
In contrast to precocious American “Lolitas,” the Japanese version attempts to 
reclaim a childhood innocence or modesty and its adherents assert that the 
look and the lifestyle it represents is about neither sexuality nor Nabokov’s 
novel: “Please put away all your preconceptions, this Lolita has nothing to do 
with Nabokov and his pedophilic Humbert, Humbert, nymphets, 
pornography, rorikon [“Lolita complex”] or Hentai [pornographic anime].  
Lolita is a fashion from Japan” (“Avant Gauche”).  “The pure, girl-like world 
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inside of me, that is what Lolita is all about,” says one self-professed “Lolita” 
(Talmadge).  These fashionistas argue that “Our Lolita is an elegant young girl 
inspired by Victorian or Rococo times.  They aspire to create a sense of 
nobility” (Jimenez CY4).  The fact remains, however, that women wearing 
infantilizing clothing often serves to sexualize both the women and childhood, 
a practice well evidenced by the popularity of the “rorikon” or  “lolicon” 
(short for “Lolita complex”) Japanese pornographic industry, which includes 
anime or manga that caters to middle-aged men with a sexual preference for 
young girls, or, at least, animated versions of them.39   
Back in the U. S., in October of 2009 Los Angeles architect John Bertram, 
citing his dismay with current and historical versions,  held an online contest 
to redesign Lolita’s book cover: “I am disappointed, as interesting as the 
various depictions of Lolita are, by how very few correspond thematically to 
the novel” (“Venus”).  He received 155 submissions from 105 different people 
in 34 countries (Bertram 3).  All of the entries are posted online40,allowing for a 
fascinating glimpse at what Lolita the novel represents within a contemporary 
public imagination.  The entries included a perhaps predictable number of 
nods to Kubrick’s 1962 film version of the novel, featuring sunglasses and 
lollypops (Figures 6 and 7).  Many depicted Lolita as a fully developed 
                                                
39 See Sparrow, William.  “Japan’s Lolita merchants feel the heat,” Asia Times. 
23 Feb 2008. Online: 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/JB23Aa02.html, for a 
description of the lolicon industry and recent Japanese pornography laws.   
40 Online gallery available at this address: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/johnzarow/sets/72157622389801039/. All 
images reprinted here are from John Bertram’s Flickr set located at the above 
address with the artist or designer noted in their respective captions. 
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woman instead of a twelve-year-old girl, and a number featured 
unintentionally humorous depictions of panty dropping, which displayed an 
ignorance of the plot of the novel (Figure 8).  A large number also contained 
disembodied body parts—Lolita’s legs, eyes, lips—just as a number of actual 
covers have done over the years.  After all, the images seem to say, the novel 
doesn’t ever show us the “real” Lolita, so how can the cover? (Figures 9 and 
10). 
Figure 6 
 
 
Lolita Book Cover Contest Submission, Janece Frick 
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Figure 7   
 
 
 
 
 
Lolita Book Cover Contest Submission, James Wesley Miller 
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Figure 8 
 
 
 
 
   
Lolita Book Cover Contest Submission, Luis Pedro Barriga 
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Figure 9 
 
 
 
 
 
Lolita Book Cover Contest Submission, Federico Diaz Mastellone 
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Figure 10   
 
U. S. Lolita cover design by Megan Wilson for Random House, 1997. 
 
The better designs display a knowledge of the text, reminding us of the 
violence and control at the novel’s core, like the cover by Natalia Olbinski, 
which features a young girl’s ponytail held in a man’s firm fist (Figure 11), or 
Derek McCalla’s design, which shows one of Nabokov’s butterflies startlingly 
resting on the barrel of a handgun (Figure 12). 
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Figure 11 
 
 
 
 
 
Lolita Book Cover Contest Submission, Natalia Olbinski 
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Figure 12 
 
Lolita Book Cover Contest Submission, Derek McCalla  
 
The cover I find most evocative, however, isn’t necessarily the best one from 
an artistic or graphic design perspective, but rather the one that combines 
archetypes of difficult children by casting Veruca Salt, the bratty little girl 
from the 1971 film version of Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory, as Lolita 
(Figure 13).   
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Figure 13 
 
Lolita Book Cover Contest Submission, Zhuldyzay Dauletalina 
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Figure 14 
 
Still from the 1971 film Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory showing Veruca 
Salt mid-tantrum. 
 
This cover image reminds me of the cultural currency of petulant little girls 
and the grown men who control them.  It forces me to ask what it might mean 
to understand Nabokov’s Lolita through or in relationship to Willy Wonka—
both the film and Gene Wilder’s creepy portrayal of Wonka as a man both 
childish and cunning who lures children into his hands with candy and 
evokes the specter of the pedophile.  Was Lolita also a “bad egg” or were, as 
the Oompa Loompas moralize, her parents to blame?  This reimagining of 
Lolita as Veruca manages to place the blame for the girls’ behavior—Veruca is 
spoiled and Lolita possesses a precocious sexuality—on poor parenting by the 
adults in their lives, but it also retains the peculiar lack of sympathy accorded 
to the girls themselves.  The audience isn’t unhappy when insufferable Veruca 
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plunges down the egg chute, even as the film’s dark undercurrent lets us 
know that she’s headed for the furnace, just as Lolita’s readers become so 
taken in by Humbert’s narrative perspective that they often have trouble 
seeing her as a victim even as she “sobs in the night—every night, every 
night” (176).  It is this dynamic, I think, that feeds the evolution of Lolita from 
fictional character to cultural signifier.  Lolitas (and Verucas) are responsible 
for their own fates, even though they are society’s creations.  They allow a 
public fascination with the details of victimization without requiring anyone 
to emphasize with the victims just as Dateline NBC’s wildly popular “To Catch 
a Predator” series allowed spectators to become privy to the desires of 
“predators” without victims (in the television show men were lured—some 
might say entrapped—into a house rigged with hidden cameras by adults 
pretending to be underage children and teenagers online, and summarily 
shamed by the host and arrested by waiting police officers).  As a culture, we 
seem to like girl children the best when we invent them.  This is, of course, 
partially James Kincaid’s argument about child sexuality as well: “erotic 
children are manufactured—in the sense that we produce them in our cultural 
factories, the ones that make meanings for us.  They tell us what ‘the child’ is, 
and also what ‘the erotic’ is [author’s emphasis]” (9).  If the cultural 
understanding of childhood is innocence, then the cultural understanding of 
Lolita is not that of corrupted innocence—a reading that might be justified by 
the text—but that of the girl who was “asking for it.”  Thus the erotic child in 
this case is the one imagined to be willing. 
 
 226 
WORKS CITED 
Adams, Rachel.  “‘A Mixture of Delicious and Freak’: The Queer Fiction of  
Carson McCullers.”  American Literature,  71: 3 (Sep., 1999), pp.  551-583. 
Ahmed, Sara.  The Cultural Politics of Emotion. Routledge UP, 2004.   
---. Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others.  Duke UP, 2006. 
Appel, Alfred Jr.  The Annotated Lolita.  Vladimir Nabokov.  1955.  New York:  
Vintage, 1991. 
Avant Gauche.  Web.  5 May 2011.  < http://www.avantgauche.co.uk/>. 
Barriga, Luis Pedro.  “Lolita Book Cover Contest Submission.”  2 October 2009.   
Web.  5 May 2011. <http://www.flickr.com/photos/johnzarow/ 
3979972941/in/set-72157622389801039>.  
Barthes, Roland.  “An Almost Obsessive Relation to Writing Instruments.”  
1973. The Grain of the Voice: Interviews 1962-1980.  Trans. Linda 
Coverdale.  New York: Hill and Wang, 1985.  177-182.   
---. Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography.  1980.  Trans. Richard Howard.   
New York: Hill and Wang, 1982. 
---. Elements of Semiology.  1964.  Trans. Annette Lavers.  New York: Hill and  
Wang, 1968.  
---. The Grain of the Voice: Interviews 1962-1980.  Trans. Linda Coverdale.   
New York: Hill and Wang, 1985. 
---.  “The Grain of the Voice.”  1972.  Image, Music, Text.  Trans. Stephen Heath.   
 New York: Hill and Wang, 1977.  179-189. 
---. Incidents.  Trans. Richard Howard.  Berkeley: U of California Press, 1992. 
---. A Lover’s Discourse.  1977.  Trans. Richard Howard.  New York: Hill and  
 227 
 Wang, 1979. 
---. Mourning Diary. Trans. Richard Howard. New York: Hill and Wang, 2010. 
---. Mythologies.  1957.  Trans. Annette Lavers.  New York: Hill and Wang,  
1972. 
---. The Neutral: Lecture Course at the Collège de France (1977-1978).  2002.  Trans.  
Rosalind E. Krauss and Denis Hollier.  New York: Columbia UP, 2005. 
---. The Pleasure of the Text.  1973.  Trans. Richard Miler.  New York: Hill and  
Wang, 1975.   
---. Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes.  1975.  Trans. Richard Howard.  Berkeley:  
U of California Press, 1977. 
---.  S/Z.  1970.  Trans. Richard Miller.  New York: Hill and Wang, 1974. 
---. “Textual Analysis of a Tale by Edgar Allan Poe” (1973).  The Semiotic  
Challenge. Trans. Richard Howard.  New York: Hill and Wang, 1988.  
261-293.  
---. Writing Degree Zero.  1953.  Trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith.  New  
York: Hill and Wang, 1967. 
Berlant, Lauren. Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion.  New York:  
Routledge, 2004. 
Bertram, John.  “Lingerie, Lollipops, Lipsticks: Inventing the Perfect Lolita  
Cover.”  Nabokov Online Journal.  Vol. IV (2010): n. pag.  Web.  25 April 
2011.  < http://etc.dal.ca/noj/index.html>. 
---.  “Lolita covers.”  Flickr set.  4 October 2009.  Web.  5 May 2011.   
 <http://www.flickr.com/photos/johnzarow/sets/ 
 72157622389801039/>.      
 228 
---.  Venus febriculosa.  Web.  1 May 2011.  < http://venusfebriculosa.com/>. 
Blonde Venus.  Dir.  Josef von Sternberg.  Perf.  Marlene Dietrich, Cary Grant.   
Paramount, 1932.  Film.     
Brown, John Mason.  “Plot Me No Plots.” Saturday Review.  1950.  Rpt.  in  
Critical Essays on Carson McCullers.  Ed.  Beverly Lyon Clark and Melvin 
J.  Friedman.  New York: G.  K.  Hall & Co., 1996.  45-48. 
Bruhm, Steven and Natasha Hurley, Eds.  Curiouser: On the Queerness of  
Children.  Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota Press, 2004. 
Butler, Judith.  Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.”  New York:  
Routledge, 1993. 
---.  Giving an Account of Oneself.  Fordham UP, 2005. 
Carr, Virginia Spencer.  The Lonely Hunter: A Biography of Carson McCullers.   
1975.  Athens: U of Georgia Press, 2003. 
Chauncey, George.  Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the  
Gay Male World 1890-1940.  New York: Basic Books, 1994. 
Coe, George A.  What Ails Our Youth?  New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,  
1927.   
Culler, Jonathan.  Roland Barthes.  New York: Oxford UP, 1983. 
---. “Preparing the Novel: Spiralling Back.”  Paragraph 31:1 (2008), 109-120. 
Cvetkovich, Ann.  An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian Public  
Cultures.  Durham: Duke UP, 2003. 
Dangerfield, George.  “An Adolescent’s Four Days.” Saturday Review.  1946.  in  
Critical Essays on Carson McCullers.  Ed.  Beverly Lyon Clark and Melvin 
J.  Friedman.  New York: G.  K.  Hall & Co., 1996.  31-33. 
 229 
Dauletalina, Zhuldyzay.  “Lolita Book Cover Contest Submission.”  4 October  
2009.  Web.  5 May 2011.  <http://www.flickr.com/photos/ 
johnzarow/3979935753/in/set-72157622389801039>.  
Dawahare, Anthony.  “From No Man's Land to Mother-Land: Emasculation  
and Nationalism in Richard Wright's Depression Era Urban Novels.” 
African American Review 33.3 (Autumn, 1999): 451-466. 
De la Durantaye, Leland.  Style is Matter: The Moral Art of Vladimir Nabokov.   
Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007. 
Delany, Samuel R.  Times Square Red, Times Square Blue.  New York: New York  
University Press, 1999.   
Derrida, Jacques.  The Work of Mourning.  Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 2003. 
Dreiser, Theodore.  An American Tragedy.  1925.  New York: Signet, 2000. 
Ellis, Aime J.  “‘Boys in the Hood’: Black Male Community in Richard  
Wright’s Native Son.  Callaloo 29.1 (2006) 182-201. 
Edelman, Lee.  No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive.  Durham: Duke  
UP, 2004. 
Eng, David L.  Racial Castration: Managing Masculinity in Asian America.   
Durham: Duke UP, 2001. 
Ferguson, Roderick A.  Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique.   
Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2004. 
Foucault, Michel.  The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction.  1976.   
Trans. Robert Hurley.  New York: Vintage, 1990. 
François, Anne-Lise. Open Secrets: The Literature of Uncounted Experience.   
Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2008. 
 230 
Freeman, Elizabeth.  The Wedding Complex: Forms of Belonging in Modern  
American Culture.  Durham: Duke University Press, 2002. 
---.  Introduction.  Queer Temporalities.  Spec. Issue of GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian  
and Gay Studies.  13:2-3 (2007).  159-176.   
Freud, Sigmund.  Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. 1905. Trans. James  
Strachey.  USA: Basic Books, 2000.     
Frick, Janece.  “Lolita Book Cover Contest Submission.”  1 October 2009.  Web.   
5 May 2011. <http://www.flickr.com/photos/johnzarow/3979956273/ 
in/set-72157622389801039/>. 
Genette, Gérard.  Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method.  Trans. Jane E.  
Lewin.  Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1980. 
Gleeson-White, Sarah.  Strange Bodies: Gender and Identity in the Novels of Carson  
McCullers.  Tuscaloosa: U of Alabama Press, 2003.   
Gothic & Lolita Bible.  Vol. 4 (2002).  Print. 
Jimenez, Dabrali.  “A New Generation of Lolitas Makes a Fashion Statement.”   
 The New York Times.  28 September 2008: CY4.  Print. 
Johnson, Barbara. “The Re(a)d and the Black.”  Richard Wright: Critical  
Perspectives Past and Present.  Eds. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and K. A. 
Appiah.  New York: Amistad Press, 1993.  149-155.    
Johnson, David K.  “The Kids of Fairytown: Gay Male Culture on Chicago’s  
Near North Side in the 1930s.”  Creating a Place for Ourselves: Lesbian, 
Gay, and Bisexual Community Histories.  Ed. Brett Beemyn.  New York: 
Routledge, 1997.  97-118. 
Kauffman, Linda S.  Special Delivery: Epistolary Modes in Modern Fiction.   
 231 
Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1992. 
Kincaid, James.  “Producing Erotic Children.” Curiouser: On the Queerness of  
Children.  Steven Bruhm and Natasha Hurley, Eds. Minneapolis, MN: U 
of Minnesota Press, 2004.  3-16. 
Lacan, Jacques.  Feminine Sexuality.  1966.  Ed. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline  
Rose.  New York: W. W. Norton, 1985. 
Lolita.  Dir.  Stanley Kubrick.  Perf.  James Mason, Sue Lyon, Shelley Winters,  
 and Peter Sellers.  MGM, 1962.  Film. 
Lorde, Audre.  Zami: A New Spelling of My Name.  Freedom, CA: The Crossing  
Press, 1982.   
Love, Heather.  Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History.   
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2007. 
Mastellone, Federico Diaz.  “Lolita Book Cover Contest Submission.”  22  
September 2009.  Web.  5 May 2011.  <http://www.flickr.com/photos/ 
johnzarow/3979913331/in/set-72157622389801039>.    
Metz, Christian.  The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema.   
Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1977. 
McCalla, Derek.  “Lolita Book Cover Contest Submission.”  1 October 2009.   
Web.  5 May 2011.  <http://www.flickr.com/photos/johnzarow/ 
3979935753/in/set-72157622389801039>.  
McCullers, Carson.  The Heart is a Lonely Hunter.  1940.  Carson McCullers:  
Complete Novels.  New York: The Library of America, 2001.  1-306.   
---.  The Member of the Wedding.  1946.  Carson McCullers: Complete Novels.  New  
York: The Library of America, 2001.  459-605.   
 232 
McLennan, Rachael.  Adolescence, America, and Postwar Fiction: Developing  
Figures.  New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.   
Melvin, Bruce L.  Youth—Millions Too Many?  A Search for Youth’s Place in  
America.  New York: Association Press, 1940.   
Micale, Mark S.  Hysterical Men: The Hidden History of Male Nervous Illness.   
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2008. 
Miller, D. A.  Bringing Out Roland Barthes. Berkeley: U of California Press, 1992. 
Miller, James Wesley.  “Lolita Cover Art Contest Submission.”  30 September  
2009.   Web.  5 May 2011.  <http://www.flickr.com/photos/ 
johnzarow/3980725954/in/set-72157622389801039>. 
“morphodite, n.” Oxford English Dictionary.  Third edition, April 2010; online  
version November 2010.  <http://www.oed.com:80/Entry/122353>;  
accessed 07 February 2011.   
Nabokov, Vladimir.  Lolita. 1955. New York: Vintage, 1997. 
---. “On a Book Entitled Lolita.”  Lolita. 1955. New York: Vintage, 1997. 311-317.  
---.  Strong Opinions.  New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973. 
Ngai, Sianne. Ugly Feelings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard, UP, 2005. 
Olbinski, Natalia.  “Lolita Book Cover Contest Submission.”  24 September  
2009.  Web.  5 May 2011. <http://www.flickr.com/photos/johnzarow/ 
  3980763044/in/set-72157622389801039/>. 
Ohi, Kevin.  Innocence and Rapture: The Erotic Child in Pater, Wilde, James, and  
 Nabokov.  New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
Pérez, Vincent.  “Movies, Marxism, and Jim Crow: Richard Wright’s Cultural  
Criticism.” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 43.2 (Summer 2001): 
 233 
142-168. 
Phelan, James.  Living to Tell About It: A Rhetoric and Ethics of Character  
  Narration.  Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2005. 
Pifer, Ellen.  Introduction.  Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita: A Casebook.  Ed. Ellen  
Pifer.  New York: Oxford UP, 2003.  3-16. 
Plato.  The Symposium.  London: Penguin Classics, 1999. 
“queer, n.2.” Oxford English Dictionary.  Third edition, December 2007; online  
version March 2011. <http://www.oed.com:80/Entry/156235>; 
accessed 01 May 2011.     
Radway, Janice.  A Feeling for Books: The Book-of-the-Month Club, Literary Taste,  
and Middle-Class Desire.  Chapel Hill, NC: U of North Carolina Press, 
1997. 
Rampersad, Arnold.  “Too Honest for His Own Time.” Rpt.  in The Critical  
Response to Richard Wright.  Ed.  Robert J.  Butler.  Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1995.  163-166. 
Remmers, H. H. and D. H. Radler.  The American Teenager.  Indianapolis:  
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1957. 
Riley, Denise.  Impersonal Passion: Language as Affect. Duke UP, 2005. 
Roosevelt, Eleanor.  Foreword.  Youth—Millions Too Many?  A Search for  
Youth’s Place in America.  By Bruce L. Melvin.  New York: Association 
Press, 1940.  5-6. 
Salinger, J. D.  The Catcher in the Rye.  1951.  New York: Little, Brown, and  
Company, 2001.   
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky.  Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial  
 234 
Desire.  New York: Columbia UP, 1985. 
---.  Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity.  Durham: Duke UP, 2003. 
Semmes, Clovis E.  The Regal Theater and Black Culture.  New York: Palgrave  
Macmillian, 2006.  
Sontag, Susan.  Preface. Writing Degree Zero.  1953.  Trans. Annette Lavers and  
Colin Smith.  New York: Hill and Wang, 1967.  vii-xxi. 
Sparrow, William.  “Japan’s Lolita Merchants Feel the Heat.”  Asia Times.  23  
 Feb 2008.  Web.  3 May 2011.  <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ 
 Front_Page/JB23Aa02.html>. 
Stewart, Jacqueline Najuma. Migrating to the Movies: Cinema and Black Urban  
Modernity.  Berkeley: U of California Press, 2005. 
Stockton, Kathryn Bond.  The Queer Child, or Growing Sideways in the Twentieth  
Century.  Durham: Duke UP, 2009.  
Talmadge, Eric.  “Tokyo’s Lolita Scene All About Escapism.”  The Japan Times  
Online.  7 Aug. 2008.  Web.  4 May 2011.  
<http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20080807f2.html>. 
Terada, Rei.  Feeling in Theory: Emotion after the "Death of the Subject."   
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2003. 
Tierney, John.  “A Generation’s Vanity, Heard Through Lyrics.”  The New York  
Times.  26 April 2011: D1.  Print. 
“To Catch a Predator.”  Dateline.  NBC.  2004-2007.  Television. 
Trader Horn.  Dir. W. S. Van Dyke.  Perf. Harry Carey, Edwina Booth, Mutia  
Omoolu. MGM, 1931.    
Tuttleton, James W.  “The Problematic Texts of Richard Wright” rpt.  in The  
 235 
Critical Response to Richard Wright.  Ed.  Robert J.  Butler.  Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1995.  167-172. 
Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory.  Dir.  Mel Stuart.  Perf.  Gene Wilder,  
Jack Albertson, Peter Ostrum.  Paramount, 1971.  Film. 
Wood, Michael.  The Magician’s Doubts: Nabokov and the risks of fiction.  London:  
 
Chatto & Windus, 1994.   
 
Wilson, Megan.  “Lolita cover.”  Covering Lolita.  Andrea Gentl, photographer.   
Dieter E. Zimmer, curator.  New York: Random House (Vintage 
International), 1997. Web. 5 May 2011. < http://www.dezimmer.net/ 
Covering%20Lolita/LoCov.html>. 
Wright, Richard.  Native Son.  1940.  New York: Harper Perennial, 2005. 
---. “How ‘Bigger’ Was Born.” 1940. rpt. in Native Son.  1940.  New York:  
Harper Perennial, 2005.  431-462. 
---. “Inner Landscape.” New Republic.  1940.  Rpt.  in Critical Essays on Carson  
McCullers.  Ed.  Beverly Lyon Clark and Melvin J.  Friedman.  New 
York: G.  K.  Hall & Co., 1996.  17-18. 
 
 
 
 
